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Politics within Post-Communist Transition in Romania

Aurel PIȚURCĂ

Abstract: *The concept of social transition deals with the process of passing from one society to another. It is a reality of contemporary world, it is linked to the mere dynamics of the current development. This article concludes that transition in Romania is not over, it continues, and the appearance of some new objectives such as the integration to the EU imposes continuing transition.*

Keywords: *transition, political revolution, politics, power, political regime, communism, anti-communism, democracy.*

One of the problems with which numerous societies, especially the post-communist ones in Central and Eastern Europe, had to deal with and still confront today is transition. Characterized through dynamism, human society has been in a permanent motion, passing from one form to the other, from a regime to the next, or from a growth stage to another. To put it differently, it was in a continuous transition from something to something else. Although the concept of transition was in the center of processes and social phenomena, it did not receive a clarifying approach, both as regards its contents, sense or meaning, a normal phenomenon if we consider that depending on the field of science in which it is being used, on the phenomena it designates, it bears different meanings and senses.

As a rule, the concept of social transition deals with the process of passing from one society to another. It makes in fact the

connection between two societies, the old, decaying one, in the process of disappearing, and the new one, rising and taking form. An attempt to define transition as a process of social existence was made by Maurice Godelier, for whom transition meant “a particular phase in the evolution of society, phase in which it bears more and more difficulties, internal or external, as regards the reproduction of economic and social relations which structure it and render it a logic of functioning”¹. The meaning Maurice Godelier confers to transition is one in a social-economic spirit; a more important one and with a different opening and vision is the one from a political perspective. From this point of view, transition appears as a “social change” or as the “interval between one political regime and the next”².

The definition of transition given by R. Bonegus subscribes to the same logic

of political change, Bonegus considering that this refers to “the change of totalitarian political regimes to democratic ones”³.

Within our approach we shall bear in mind political transition, with a particularization to post-communist Romania. Why political? Because, as Julien Freund suggested, “politics is the essence, in its absence one cannot conceive human nature”⁴. The study of politics during the post-communist transition in Romania implies the clarification of the content of the 1989 events, was it a political revolution or a *coup d'état*. This clarification is necessary, mandatory, as on it depends the appreciation of the content of the period covered by Romania following this date, that is transition itself. Even today, 20 years after the December 1989 events, many are tempted to consider, due to the presence and involvement of the army in the removal of N. Ceaușescu, of the roles played by some army commanders such as general A. Stănculescu, the fact that there was no previous training for the revolution and no social-political force to support and promote it. Clarification comes from the mere contents of the notion of *coup d'état*. As Edward Luttwak writes in his paper *Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook* (1968), “a *coup d' état* is accomplished through the infiltration of a small segment, but of utmost importance into the state apparatus, which is then used to overtake control of power from the government. The use of military power or of another power does not represent a defining element of the *coup d'état*”.

Starting from the explicative theoretical meaning, but also from the concrete aspects given by the social historical practice, a *coup d'état* does not change the political regime, the contents of power, does not remove the class holding the power, but remove the group being in power with another belonging to the same social class

or group. Consequently, a *coup d'état* does not bring profound, radical changes at the level of politics, regime or of the social order. Power passes from one hand to another, without affecting the bases of the regime or of the social order which remain the same, unaltered as regards its essence, structure and functionality.

The anti-communist revolution of December 1989, in Romania as well as in the entire space of Central and Eastern Europe, has triggered and imposed profound changes within the social, economic but mostly political life, as any revolution starts with the change of politics because only the latter may demolish the old society and lay the foundation for a new one. The fundamental restructuring of the entire political life is required more and more when we talk about the passing from an undemocratic, dictatorial political regime and system to a democratic one, as was the case with Romania. In this situation one could not talk about re-forming politics, as it was not able to solve the crisis which had reached a maximum in its manifestation. Politics, understood as a mode of organizing, ruling, institutions, ideological and doctrinaire studies, way of thinking, action and behavior, is the most subjected to profound change. Without it one cannot speak of a revolution, of passing to a new social system. It is the one triggering and imposing the other changes within social life.

The Romanian revolution of December 1989 was a political revolution. It had as main target the replace of the communist regime, and what can be more revolutionary, more political than the request and action of replacing the social order, of the political regime? It is true: the Romanian revolution of 1989 did not meet all the requirements of a “handbook” or typical revolution. It was a spontaneous political revolution of the masses, a result

and expression of the dissatisfaction accumulated along the years, which was highlighted by the attempts to repress in force the mass revolutionary movement, which was constructed and which manifested itself as the main social and political force which triggered and propelled the revolution. We cannot find any cover for the idea that it was in fact a *coup d'état* accomplished by internal organized forces, and so much the less by external ones.

The first step, and most obvious, which denotes the desire to remove communism as a regime and society was constituted by the creation of the new political institutions, the Council of National Salvation Front (CNSF). From the Decree-Law which constituted the CNSF we see clearly the option for removing communism and the installation of the new democratic society:

- abandoning the ruling role of a sole party and the settlement of a pluralist democratic system of government;
- organizing free elections during April 1990;
- the separation of executive, legislative and juridical powers within the state and the election of all political rulers for one, or no more than two mandates⁵.

Another aspect raised by the post-December transition issue, as regards politics, is that of continuity and discontinuity. One can talk and argue very little about continuity with concrete examples. Being a political revolution which purported to change the old political regime from grounds, obviously one cannot keep and perpetuate too much elements, some of them, as is the case of political institutions, the mechanism of their constituting and functioning, their principles, role and purpose, were totally wiped out, their place being slowly taken by the new democratic institutions. To these we must add the old acting, behavior, thinking mentalities etc.

It is obvious that politics, under each of its aspects, has known the most profound and radical changes from all points of view: institutional, structural, organizational, functional etc. These must not lead to generalization, that everything connected to the old society, from the political point of view, was denied, removed; some political values strongly rooted in our people's conscience and action such as unity, independence, patriotism, freedom, justice, equity, good neighborhood and living together, including a part of the human factor involved in politics, that is professionals, specialists from different political institutions, revolutionaries, people of good faith; they constitute a continuity of politics.

In a revolution, especially in one that removes a dictatorial regime, discontinuity, especially at the level of politics, is dominant. It aimed at the entire political spectrum, the latter having as fundamental objective the accomplishment of social-political democratism, Romania's inclusion into the European and universal democratic political space.

Referring to the particularity of transition in the Eastern post-communist countries in relation to transition in Latin America, Francisc C. Weffort appreciated: "my general hypothesis in this respect is that, by looking at transition as a whole, that is a process which does not affect only political institutions, but also the social and economic structures, a relative rupture with the past is typical to Eastern transitions, while transitions in Latin America were, mostly, characterized by historic continuities"⁶.

From this comes the conclusion that not all modification, change of the practices and institutions of a society can be assimilated to transition. Not all transitions mean and could lead to fundamental changes which may generate a new social-political system. The fundamental characteristic of the notion of transition is that of

accomplishing the passing from one historical reality to a new system of social-human relations, which generates a new space for action and a new matrix of values on which to build dominant mentalities⁷.

If the fundamental social, economic and political objective of post-December transition in Romania is largely known, in return, one does not know the length of transition. Transition from feudalism to capitalism lasted for a few centuries (XVI-XVII) and was mostly associated with modernization.

In return, the present transition is unfolding under the sign of democracy. In the post-communist countries transition aimed at restructuring the entire social system, democracy appearing in this context as a condition for systemic transformation.

Referring to the length of transition in post-communist societies, Ralf Dahrendorf appreciated that they would need 6 months for creating a constitution, 6 years for institutionalizing democracy that is of creating the rule of law, of the parliamentary system, political and ideological pluralism, and of 60 years to implement a democratic society⁸.

Transition is a reality of contemporary world, it is linked to the mere dynamics of the current development, it implies numerous risks, this is why defining and appreciating it more exactly, building the most adequate strategies is a necessity for all current societies and especially for the post-communist ones, a sphere of which Romania is part.

We can appreciate today that transition in Romania is not over, it continues, and the appearance of some new objectives such as the integration to the EU imposes continuing transition. It is true, it is a new type of transition, fully opposed to the one triggered in December 1989, this is why they do not have much in common; maybe the objective of integrating to the EU must

not even be considered a transition, but more of a new stage in Romania's development.

Notes

¹ M. Godelier (coord.), *Transitions et subordinations en capitalisme*, Editions M. S. H., Paris, 1991, p. 7.

² Apud Virgil Măgureanu, *Studii de sociologie politică* [Studies on political sociology], Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997, p. 400.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ J. Freund, *L'Essence du politique*, Editions Sirey, Paris, 1965.

⁵ I. Iliescu, *Revoluție trăită*, Editura redacției publicațiilor pentru străinătate, București, 1995, p. 135.

⁶ Francisc C. Weffort, What is a "New Democracy"?, in *International Social Science Journal*, No. 2, 1993, p. 251.

⁷ V. Măgureanu, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

⁸ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe*, Random House, New York, 1990, p. 99.

The Transition from Bicameral to Unicameral Parliament: Learning from the Experience of Western Democracies

Cezar AVRAM, Roxana RADU

Abstract: *The institution of Parliament is the center of a very recent debate in Romanian political life: bicameralism or unicameralism? The Romanian bicameral system is founded on the necessity of ensuring a balance in the exercise of the parliamentary functions, by the requirement to debate thoroughly the laws adopted and to temper the authoritarian or extremist tendencies of a Chamber. The issue of transition from bicameral to unicameral Parliament was held up together with the referendum from November 22nd 2009, when Romanians pronounced themselves upon the problem of reducing the number of congressmen. But in order to settle a unicameral Parliament it is needed, for the modification of the Constitution, another popular consultation and, of course, learning from the experience of Western democracies.*

Keywords: *bicameralism, chamber, government, unicameralism, Parliament.*

States come out from the communist regime at the beginning of the '90 of the last century were driven by necessity on a long and difficult way in order to find their calling for democracy and solve the difficulties of the past. The adoption of market economy's legislation, political pluralism, understanding and applying fundamental human rights, as well as the change of past mentalities asked for long strategies and mostly novelty governmental programs. The majority of Parliaments from Central and South-Eastern Europe have confronted themselves with functioning problems because of insufficient political and parliamentary experience. The difficulties have their specificity

depending on every state circumstances. Bicameralism proved for certain states, including Romania, at least inefficient, if not even useless, in most cases of laws adoption. The inefficient system of parliamentary commissions and the conflict of interests created the phenomenon generally named corruption. Many citizens do not respect anymore the institution of Parliament because of delays, uncovered promises and especially the image made by mass-media. Fundamental difficulties exist in the relations between the government and the Parliament. In many cases, such as Romanian case, the government exceeds the limits of a proper legislative delegation, issued by the Parliament.

According to Constitution, the Romanian state is organized based on the principle of the separation and balance of powers – legislative, executive and judicial – within the framework of constitutional democracy. The Parliament carries out the legislative power, having a bicameral structure. The Parliament of Romania is formed of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate which are elected in constituencies, by universal, equal, direct, secret, and freely expressed suffrage, on the basis of a list system and independent candidatures, according to the principle of proportional representation. The Chamber of Deputies is composed of 334 members, and the Senate of 137 members. The legally constituted organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities have the right to a Deputy mandate, in case they could not obtain in election at least one Deputy or Senator mandate, if they have obtained throughout the country a number of votes equal to at least 5 per cent out of the average number of votes validly expressed throughout the country for the election of one Deputy. The members of the two chambers have similar attributions and rights; this is the main reason for which all laws have to be passed by both chambers¹, fact that leads to equalitarian bicameralism, capable to make the legislative procedure more difficult².

Typically, the Parliament combines the legislative role with the assurance of the governmental personnel. As a rule, the chief of the government and the Cabinet selected from the parliamentary majority group have the obligation to report before the Parliament, accepting the principles of individual and collective responsibility which are applied both to the Cabinet and partly to each minister.

The main attribution of the Parliament is the one of representing the entire population, reflecting collectivity's aspiration and mediating these one in comparison

with the executive authority. The Parliament is "Nation's spokesman", being composed of the elected who maintain a permanent relation with their electorate; at last, the Parliament is the expression of the electorate's will and, through the agency of this one, everybody's will. From here derives the deliberative function, consisting of adopting some measures, legislative ones included, in the most important domains of economic and social life.

The function of governmental personnel's recruitment is being realized either by the fact that all ministers have to be part of one of the two chambers (as in the case of the British Parliament), either by the fact that, once nominated, the Prime Minister has to submit the list of the entire government to Parliament's approval (as in Ireland or Israel) or because, in certain circumstances, one of the chambers, the Senate as a rule, nominates the chief of the executive and always has to agree to the nomination of certain civil servants (in USA).

The Parliament exercises its function of control the government both through the agency of establishing the ministerial responsibility and other means such as the vote of no confidence and the motion of censure on the government's program or a initiative of this one, making up certain inquiry commissions, interpellation of the cabinet's members etc.

In an equilibrate system of distributing power's attributions, the function of control the executive activity does not raise the idea of government's subordination to the Legislative. The modalities of control are diverse: constitutional laws or customary practices, debates over general or special policy, general declarations of policy, governmental authorization to some of its decisions, opening of the impeachment procedure, interpellations addressed to the government, questions addressed to a minister,

launching the political responsibility of the government.

The Parliament is consulted whenever the referendum is organized in order that the president shall not abuse of this right of his. The method of people's consultation through referendum is not specific only for Romania³, but also for France, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Greece, Great Britain⁴. The Parliament gives the vote of confidence to the government after president's nominating the candidate for the function of Prime Minister out of the party or group of parties with absolute majority. Romanian Constitution stipulates the adoption of ministerial responsibility law, parliamentary commissions having the right to force the executive's members to present all documents and information considered necessary. In the respect of the principle specific to parliamentary regime, the Parliament can withdraw the confidence afforded to the government, the late one being responsible for its activity to this institution. The Legislative controls the Executive through questions and interpellations or through forcing the government to inform the Parliament concerning the development of its program.

The Organization of Parliamentary Activity

Taking into consideration the general statute of Parliaments and applying identical rules for all states we can notice that there are important discrepancies between parliamentary mandates and especially parliamentary activity.

The medium length of a mandate for the inferior chamber is 4 years (excepting France, Italy, Ireland and Luxembourg where the deputy's mandate lasts 5 years and Sweden – 3 years). In exchange, the medium length of a mandate for the superior chamber varies depending on the nomination method (4 years in Spain, 5

years in Italy through direct elections, 9 years in France with partial renewal at every 3 years etc.)⁵.

In the majority of states, the compatibility between parliamentary mandate and executive function is stipulated by law, this fact laying at the basis of monist parliamentarism. There are some states that chase the incompatibility – Norway, Luxembourg, Netherlands and especially France (starting with 1958) and made efforts for the consolidation of government's autonomy.

At the level of Parliament's organization, the differences are clearer from one state to another. This is the case of the session's regime, even if many Constitutions stipulate the permanent reunion of the Assembly. Some assemblies decide freely the postponement and the duration of the effective sessions (system stipulated in Germany), others settle sessions' duration by giving up the possibility of extraordinary sessions and plenary sessions. The French Constitution from 1958 does not settle the number of days of ordinary sessions, but the existence of extraordinary sessions became already a common thing.

“Atrophied” Parliament

The slow and heavy rhythm of the process of laws' adoption made the Romanian Parliament be perceived like a forceless institution, dominated by the Executive, whose imagine was affected by frequent legislative modifications (the 2003 constitutional revision, the introduction of uninominal vote in 2008), leading to the diminution of people's confidence in this institution⁶.

1991 Romanian Constitution stipulated the mediation between Chambers, but evidently the mediation was not able to ensure the adoption of decisions (as in most of the cases). The examples are numerous: the project of ombudsman's law (which

appears to be a constitutional imperative and there is also a general accord that this kind of project must be adopted), important law projects concerning the privatization of banking system and restoration of church property etc. The mediation was realized through the agency of a parity commission but, in case of failure, the text of the normative act should have been submitted to a new discussion in the common session of the two chambers. The 2003 constitutional revision eliminated the mediation phase from the legislative process: according to article 75, one of the chambers is being informed first, the project or legislative proposal being sent to the second afterwards, which will decide definitively.

Executive's domination upon Legislative is reflected under many aspects. First, the increase of the number of Emergency Government Ordinances which are acts issued by the government on the basis of a special ability law adopted by the Parliament "in terms and conditions stipulated by the late one" (article 108 par. 3 of Romanian Constitution). The alarming tendency of the Romanian government to abuse of this prerogative was considered by European Commission an abuse which "short-circuits the legislative and control role of the Parliament"⁷.

Another aspect is represented by the lack of legislative initiative of the members of Parliament in comparison with government's activity: almost 90% of laws voted after 1989 were initiated by the Executive⁸. Even when the congressmen had legislative initiative, a few of the projects advanced by them became laws, this fact being seen as a form of Legislative's "subjugation" towards Executive⁹. We can say that Romanian transition evaluated on the ascendant slope of the growth of Executive power, being impossible to stop the irreversible tendency of the power of parliamentary initiative to transform itself,

de facto or *de jure*, into a residual power, fact that permits in this way that examined texts be mostly of governmental origin.

The modification of the length of the presidential mandate from 4 to 5 years, as a result of 2003 constitutional revision, aimed the elimination, at least in principle, of "a mechanism which transformed the nominee to presidential elections into stars of the political game and, most of all, in arbitrators if not even artisans of the majorities inside the Legislative"¹⁰.

The introduction of the uninominal vote through the agency of Law no. 35/2008 reformed the electoral system but created two major deficiencies¹¹: the disadvantagement of independent nominees which have not been able to enter into the Parliament and the conditions to small parties' detriment in comparison with big parties and with the ones having "territorial support"¹². That it is why the institution of Presidency, seen by the majority of Romanian people as a source of "presidential majority"¹³ made room for the institution of Parliament to generate the political majority and split cleavages.

Bicameral Decline

During its historical evolution, parliamentary regime suffered many modifications. The first structural transformation concerns the bicameralism (bicameral political system) although the second chamber has its origin into the period when monarchy aimed to own a superior aristocratic Chamber, capable of equilibrating People's Chamber. Institutional democratization changed the relations between the two chambers under the circumstances of the loss of the one's or other's powers or the radical changes happened.

As it may be observed, the majority of states with bicameral system do not give a special importance to the second chamber. Nevertheless, thanks to federalism, the

German Bundesrat represents the lands before the Chamber which represents the people (Bundestag). The Bundesrat is formed by the representatives of regional Executives (and thus of political majority of each member state) and has a legislative power equal to the one of the inferior Chamber for all domains concerning the lands (the case of the majority of law projects). This co-decisional power of Bundesrat is more important as the more frequent is the case when the majority of the superior Chamber differs from the one of the inferior Chamber.

In France, the Senate elected among the choice of the society (especially the mayors of rural communes), after experiencing a decline during the period of the Fourth Republic (when had only a consultative power equal to the one owned by the Deputies Chamber before 1940) have hold a constitutional veto right since 1958. Its legislative power is equal to the one of the “National Assembly” and the governmental initiative can afford to this one the last word. During the first years of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle had the tendency to deform, then to reduce this senatorial authority. The Senate is elected, for the majority of its members, through direct vote at the level of provinces, as well as for a minority – by the Legislative Assembly of autonomous communities. He owns legislative power but, in case of conflict, the Congress has the decisive word (with absolute or relative majority after a two months adjournment).

In Belgium, the equalitarian bicameralism has been recently abandoned. Even if the Senate was elected through direct scrutiny for two thirds of its members (the other members were elected by the councils of the provinces or co-opted) and had powers equal to the ones of the Chamber of Representatives until 1993, the constitutional revision from 1993 modified its

structure (in present days it is formed by delegates of regions and communities) by giving him only a consultative power.

In Netherlands, bicameralism was introduced at Belgium’s requirement from 1815 and survived the 1830 secession. The first Chamber is the Superior Chamber, formed of provinces’ counselors. Not even the right to legislative initiative or the amendment right can allow it to adopt or reject in the lump the law projects. Its power represents only a power of influence.

In Great Britain, the second Chamber keeps only the minor attributions from the beginning. The Chamber of the Lords remained the aristocratic chamber.

In Romania, the issue of transition from a bicameral Parliament to a unicameral one was held up together with the referendum from November 22nd 2009, when Romanians pronounced themselves upon the problem of reducing the number of congressmen. The referendum being only an act of consulting the people, in order to settle a unicameral Parliament it is needed, for the modification of the Constitution, another popular consultation.

The political controversies from the last period do not concern only the number of Parliament members but also the internal organization, namely if one chamber Parliament (unicameralism) is more efficient than two chambers Parliament (bicameralism).

Unicameralism is illustrative for the Parliaments of unitary states. Extremely rare are the situations when federative states adopt this principle¹⁴. If federalism does not necessary ask for bicameralism, unicameralism certainly represents the parliamentary structure most adequate to democracy’s exigencies¹⁵. The single Chamber constituting the Parliament is being formed through universal, direct, equal and secret vote. It is not under the supremacy of the Superior Chamber (the Senate), being thus

avoid the temporization of the legislative process and, in the same time, the growth of parliamentary salaries.

Bicameralism represents the rule in case of federative states and the exception in case of unitary states. It consists of two chamber Parliament's organization and knows many forms such as:

- aristocratic bicameralism (the typical example is the Chamber of Lords from great Britain¹⁶) which associates the inferior chamber to a popular democratic chamber, formed of people's representatives elected through universal vote;
- political bicameralism for which the second chamber (in certain unitary states) is the answer to some political imperatives such as: stopping the abuses, temporization of democratic dynamism, "guarantee of the reflexion" etc¹⁷;
- socio-economical bicameralism or multicameralism which consists of having only one chamber which has to ensure the representation of all economical and social groups (trade unions, family associations etc.)¹⁸;
- federal bicameralism which depends on state's structure and has the role to ensure the equilibrium and harmony between federate states and unional state¹⁹.

While unicameralism facilitates the legislative process and strengthens the Legislative before Executive, bicameralism presents the following disadvantages²⁰:

- the risk of blocking the law in case of equalitarian bicameralism or delaying the legislative process in case of unequalitarian one;
- when the two Chambers are elected in the same time, it comes out the obstruction of democratic will's expression, the minority being forced to obey the majority;
- if the second Chamber is elected through indirect scrutiny, it will be formed by a

number of personalities, procedures that is essentially non-democratic;

- in case of using a different electoral regime, the formation of the majority is contradictory and democracy suffers because of it;
- if the mandate's duration for one of the Chamber is longer than for the other one, this fact is able to generate inequalities.

In case of Romanian state, the two Chambers are elected for a 4 years mandate. The fact that neither one of the two Chambers are renewed partially leads to the formation of an evident majority. The Romanian bicameral system is founded on the necessity of ensuring a balance in the exercise of the parliamentary functions, by the requirement to debate thoroughly the laws adopted and to temper the authoritarian or extremist tendencies of a Chamber in comparison with the other's ones.

Notes

¹ During the period between 1990 and 2000, the two chambers of the Parliament argued several times about the final form of a law that should have been voted, fact that generated lack of activity and delays in the legislative process. Because law projects could be introduced separately in every chamber, different law projects concerning the same subject have been often introduced in each chamber. (*Democrația în România*, Humanitas, București, 1997, p. 115).

² Dan Claudiu Dănișor, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice. Vol. I. Teoria generală*, Editura C. H. Beck, București, 2007, p. 412.

³ Article 90 of Romanian Constitution.

⁴ According to the Constitution, Romania's president can ask the people, after consulting the Parliament, to express its will concerning issues of general interests through the agency of referendum (Ion Rusu, *Regimul politic românesc*, Editura Bren, București, 2000, p. 139).

⁵ Hugues Porteli, *Les régimes politiques européennes. Etude comparative*, Paris, 1994, p. 27.

⁶ Cristian Preda, Sorina Soare, *Regimul, partidele și sistemul politic din România*, Editura Nemira, București, 2008, p. 36-37.

⁷ *Rapport de suivi sur le degré de préparation sur l'adhésion à l'UE de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie*, Bruxelles, 26 septembre 2006, p. 41.

⁸ Cristian Preda, Sorina Soare, *cited work*, p. 38.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

¹¹ Anca Parmena Olimid, *Supradimensionarea și disproporționalitatea legislativă. Uninomialul, reformă electorală sau miză politică?*, in *Revista de Științe Politice/ Revue des Sciences Politiques* nr. 21-22/2009, p. 66-71.

¹² Lavinia Stan, Diana Vancea, *Alegerile parlamentare din 2008: Vin vechi în sticle noi*, in *Sfera Politicii* nr. 131-132/XVII, 2009, p. 3-13.

¹³ Daniel Barbu, *Republica absentă*, Editura Nemira, București, 1999, p. 152-153.

¹⁴ Great Britain, unitary state, is the country which adopted for the first time in world history the bicameral system (at the end of XIII century).

¹⁵ New Zealand, starting with 1950, and Denmark, starting with 1953, adopted the unicameral system (Ion Deleanu, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice. Teoria generală*, București, 1991, p. 156).

¹⁶ Contains over 1100 members from which 800 own a hereditary title and the other ones are named for life by the Queen.

¹⁷ France, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Spain etc. are countries with a strong and long parliamentary tradition, Island and Norway occupy a specific place in the bicameral system because, after the direct election of Parliament's members, part of them are appointed to make part of the "Superior Chamber" (*Ibidem*, p. 107).

¹⁸ Examples of such bicameral or multi-lateral systems are extremely rare. The Economic Council of the Fourth and Fifth Republic represent such examples.

¹⁹ The Bundesrat of the ex-Western Germany, the Senate of USA, Canada, Australia, Brazil, State's Council of Switzerland and India, the Bundesrat of Austria.

²⁰ Dan Claudiu Dănișor, *cited work*, p. 414.

Minorities and the Issue of Limits

Ion DEACONESCU

Abstract: *This article discusses the diverse national and external manifestations of ethnic groups in the social and political context following 1989. The author claims that there is no juridical, civil or political limit, in fact; only the conditions of economic and social inequality.*

Keywords: *minority, limit, rights, integration, democracy.*

An accurate history of democracy can only be written in the context of the varied problems posed by minorities, perceived throughout a progressive process, from the constant vindictive vanities and stereotypes of the non-creative and conformist dogmatism to a generous opening of the ways towards the unity and valorization of their own culture and traditions.

During the democratization process of the society it would be productive for the state, the powers that be, the government as well as for the minorities to abandon egocentric practices, the use of coercion of any type, of political pressure because a modern state requires the science of integration, of obtaining the utmost human agreement with its own decisions. The act of governing as well as the diminishing need to coerce, and not the use of some connectionist manoeuvres, may bring substantial benefits to the governing bodies interested in providing the minorities with optimal conditions, equal to those conditions the majority of the population enjoys.

The casuistry of minorities in western thought is placed in the context of limits, which are intimately correlated with a limitless type of politics, as Alain Badiou stated, in the sense that both the minority and the majority form a commensurable and joint whole, always active and experimenting so as to transcend the objective or subjective limits established in an institutional manner, as well as the boundaries imposed by the abusive and detrimental mentality on both sides, in order to finally secure a harmonious and integrative vicinity.

The opposition phenomena, that have been present ever since the Athenian democracy, persist even nowadays, differing only in terms of register and their manifestations, fostering, unfortunately, the excessive differences and pretensions.

Specialists consider that today a double opposition functions in the case of minorities: the opposition of the power and, implicitly, of the majority, and that of the minority, in the context of democratization and total freedom of some countries which are undergoing an almost

timeless transition. What, how much and under what circumstances do we give to a minority that is demanding all its rights, sometimes obsessively, at other times by engaging in conflicts?

Are there any limits and legal and customary rules that target the access the person pertaining to a minority has to the national goods and welfare?

The conflict and the contradictions in discourses that are sometimes confined to the use of the terms of territorial autonomy, bilingualism, cultural autonomy, traditions, the period in which they settled there etc. persist in the name of the access to these goods.

These are real situations, which, from various reasons, receive conjectural, conventional answers that don't solve the problem in its essence.

The nationalism invoked by the power but also by the minorities is, more often than not, subtle and delicate but also opaque and difficult to perceive, especially in a state that is reconfiguring its political and institutional system but also its mentality. The current problems, poverty and redundancy, instability of the health and education systems, demand, in an abrupt maneuver, immediate and contro-versial reactions from the society. Therefore, the intervention of the state must always be equal to both the majority and the minority by means of a fair relation policy. That's why the issue of limits is given new meanings: is there a prominent difference between the two categories or will a common extension of rights for all the unitary inhabitants of a country be produced and encouraged, beyond tension, preconception and disrupting claims? In these situations the problematic of minorities and the limitation of the rights given, constitute an internal constriction, many a time incoherent and unproductive, caused by political fluctuations, extremist opinion leaders, the mass-media itself.

We find ourselves forced to admit, especially in former communist countries, the existence of real limitations of the extension of rights, dialogue and collaboration between parts, as well as the absence of limits of pretensions of any kind, of shameful propaganda of the artificial tensions maintained, on both sides, by their own leaders who sometimes find themselves in delicate positions.

The conflicts that appear, at a certain time in a country translate into the lack of access to work, to the public life, to culture and affects both the majority and the minority, which are equal in their hope for a better life. The lack of access may mean a form of exclusion, a subtle and effective presence of limits.

The same social disturbance is caused by threats, perceived as major or minor risks, with psychological and social consequences. The threat of not having any individual and collective right, houses, jobs results in the destabilization of the family, of the individual and in his marginalization.

Reality has proved that miscegenation, the joint creation of a majority with various immunities is part of Europe's history, which, throughout time, has loved and cherished the diversity of civilizations, understanding not to allow them to become antagonistic.

The immunities and the refusal to accept limits render the relationship with the other, the unknown brother, in societies organized on values, principles, on institutions at the citizen's service, who is equal to himself but also to the others. The democratic societies legitimize themselves by conferring equal rights to all minorities.

In the social and political context following 1989, the manifestations of ethnic groups in Romania have been diverse, both nationally and externally, exerting pressure in two directions: on minorities to adopt a

common conduct with that of the majority, thus removing the deviation, the lack of education and the aggressive behavior, and on the majority to understand the actions meant to change the points of view concerning these groups' situation. Somehow, the subversive enthusiasm displayed by some leaders that consider that people in Romania do not lead a live, they merely survive and that people pertaining to minorities are deprived of their minimal rights, has been proved to be erroneous. On the contrary, many actions the minority engaged in were accepted by the majority, not because of their native accents of originality, but rather because of an effort to become aware of the necessity to live together in harmony and to relieve tensions of any kind.

It is common knowledge the manner, original in her iterative nature, in which the majority relates to the power of the minority, present and active in the governing process, in public administration, as well as in the public daily life, a situation achieved, to some extent, by means of the unity and unwonted behavior displayed by the minority, which vacillated between conservatism and innovation, but also by means of the profitable agreement between the leaders of both sides, interested in either obtaining or devaluating the power.

It can be said that in the case of the minorities living on Romanian soil there has been achieved through political compromise, through reflexivity targeting the discords, delayed with hostility and internally unstable, an emancipation of the limits, whose future is uncertain and unpredictable, difficult to exculpate. For living together in a society doesn't mean sharing the same religion or the same political orientation but being an honest citizen, beneficiary of the same rights as any other fellow countryman, even if we are different in many ways, because citizenship transcends

all ethnic affiliations. Under these circumstances, there is no limit, only juridical, civil, political equality, accepting, however, the conditions of economic and social inequality. Only so, true democracy will ensure the majority and minority the splitting of exceptions, balance of requests and, in fact, the impossibility of restricting the rights, as well as the symmetry of common duties and obligations.

Diplomacy and Human Rights

Adrian BOGDAN

Abstract: *The notion of human rights diplomacy is a recent one, influenced by the experience of the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, and by Francois Mitterrand's activity as President in France. Despite its ambiguities and contradictions, it might be said that it is influenced by classical diplomatic activity, because the promotion of human rights is one of the main goals of diplomacy.*

Keywords: *diplomacy, human rights, ambiguity, contradiction, international relations.*

Diplomacy requires an approach based on legal grounds, which tries to avoid conflicting situations.

Primarily the diplomatic activity is carried out by a country in a order to develop the relations between states, and secondly to protect the citizens in the territory of that state with which that country has diplomatic relations.

In the diplomatic activity the principle of sovereignty is applied, i.e. a state composes its sovereignty over all persons on its territory.

The diplomatic missions and their staff are exempted from this rule. Consequently, the principle of sovereignty presupposes that no activity of other state can be carried out on its territory without its permission.

Without such permission no diplomatic mission could fulfill its duties and its staff could not benefit from immunity and from other certain privileges specific for the diplomatic status.

Jurists have a precise and clear language use to define the concepts, the constitutive facts and the means of the enforcement.

This is an essential condition for practicing the law, and a clear definition should prevent any ambiguity which might cause insecurity¹.

Since the legal language used in international treaties is very general and since this offers the parties involved a wide range of interpretation, the jurist Guy de Lacharrière complains about the ambiguity of the international legal stipulations and also about the complicity of the Governments².

This overlaps on the fact that the diplomats prefer ambiguity in order to avoid conflicting situations.

Robert Jervis mentioned that the diplomatic language does not use sincere and clear statements of intention for laymen, but the language is very clear for anyone who knows the code³.

Diplomatic law consists in all rules and stipulation which regulate the diplomatic activity.

These rules and regulations are under the jurisdiction of international public law.

Professor Gregory Geamanu defines diplomacy as that activity consisting in establishing and maintaining relationships between states, a special activity carried out by those organisms which represent the State in international relations.

Some doctrinaires have also defined diplomacy as “the art of negotiations”.

The establishment of diplomatic relations is grounded on the agreement of the two states which are to establish such relations.

Diplomatic relations requires the cumulative fulfillment of the following conditions:

- the status of subject of international law is obligatory, since only this status has international legal personality, which enables the subject to have of international law relations;
- mutual recognition of this status;
- mutual agreement of the two international entities to develop diplomatic relations.

This last condition is explicitly mentioned in art. 2 of the Vienna Convention of 1961: the establishment of the international diplomatic relations between states and permanent diplomatic missions are based on mutual agreement.

The length of diplomatic relations is not limited, as a close cooperation between the two states is admissible.

Some authors consider that the diplomatic speech does not have a good reputation: it is trivial and euphemistic, insincere, full of clichés.

Any diplomatic guide obsessively insists upon the fact that “an ambassador is a kind man sent abroad in order to lie for the welfare of his country?”⁴

This is invalidated by the result obtained by the diplomacy in the domain of human rights protection.

These are based on the essential values of mankind: integrity and dignity, equality, peace, non-discrimination etc..

Diplomacy for human rights diplomacy is grounded on the universal character of these rights.

The notion of human rights diplomacy itself, with all its ambiguities and contradictions, is a recent notion, influenced by the experience of the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, and by Francois Mitterrand’s activity as President in France⁵.

UN Charter opened the way for an international protection system of human rights⁶.

This⁷ founded a specialized organism for human rights protection: The Commission for Human Rights.

Maurice Schumann expressed his regret that the representative of France in Human Rights Commission can not take, in present circumstances, reasonable and generous initiatives which would correspond to the high expectations imposed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, without being sure that their results are in accordance with the principles of universality and equality imposed by the Charter to which France is loyal⁸.

The UNO General Assembly⁹ adopted the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” a political document considering the equality in rights as base for all the others human rights and freedoms.

This Declaration inspired many documents which protect human rights.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been the moral support for human relations being in the same time guarantee for human rights protection.

Among the civil and political rights stated in the Declaration, we can illustrate: the right to life, to freedom and dignity, the right not to be taken into slavery, not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments, the right not to be

arbitrarily arrested, held and exiled, the right to a fair civil and criminal trial, the right to the presumption of innocence until a sentence in a public trial is pronounced, right to a private life and to property, to travel freely, the right to a citizenship, the right to marry and have family, the freedom of thought, of speech, of assembly and peaceful association, right to participate directly or indirectly to leading and the right to be elected in public functions.

We can also mention some economic, social and cultural rights: the right to social security, to work, the right to freely choose a job, the right to be fairly paid, the right to found and to join trade unions, the right to a standard of life corresponding to own health insurance, the right to personal and family welfare, the right to aid and special protection for mother and child, the right to education and right to freely participate in cultural manifestations.

The UNO General Assembly also adopted the two pacts of human rights¹⁰:

- The Pact of civil and political rights;
- The Pact of economic, social and cultural rights.

The European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, adopted the Helsinki Final Act, which proclaimed the most important human rights.

This initiative continuing with the Human Dimension Mechanism adopted in 1989 by the Vienna Assembly.

The Moscow Assembly of the Conference on Human Dimension of 1991, adopted the similar document. "Participating States emphasized that the aspects concerning human rights and freedoms in democracy and of international interest, since the respect for these rights and freedoms represents one of the fundamentals of international order. They clearly and definitely declared that all the commitments in human dimension of the European Conference on Security Cooperation are of direct and

legitimate interest for all the participants. These commitments are beyond the internal affairs of a certain state. (...) In this acknowledge that the active participation of persons, groups, organizations or institutions is essential for progress in this aspect"¹¹.

In the same time, the diplomacy of human rights was internationally acknowledged.

In 1993 the World Conference on Human Rights of Vienna adopted a declaration and a programme where is specified "the promotion and protection of all human rights and of all human freedoms should be considered a a priority for UNO, according to its goal and principles concerning international cooperation.

Taking into account these goals and principles, the promotion and protection of all human rights represent legitimate concern of international community¹².

Along with classic diplomacy, the unofficial diplomacy has begun to play an important role.

The representatives of unofficial diplomacy are natural or legal person who do not officially represent their state, but who can directly participate in solving some diplomatic problem.

If in the past they used to be considered *enemies* by the real diplomats, now, after the Cold War, the two forms of diplomacy are co-operating.

Since the real diplomats have many responsibilities implying numerous diplomatic problems, they have sometimes charged the unofficial representatives to solve pressing problems.

Thus, the state would be "more and more in competition with organizations and groups which would escape its control"¹³.

Conclusions

The human rights diplomacy is influenced by classical of the diplomatic activity.

The promotion of human rights is one of the main goal of diplomacy.

There is a very fragile balance between the international protection of human rights and the activity of states in preventing the violation of these rights.

This is due to the fact that these rights manifest themselves in a context influenced by national culture, including also nationalist and religious extremism.

Notes

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² Guy de Lacharrière, *Law external policy*, Economica, Paris, 1983, p. 89.

³ Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970, p. 118.

⁴ Ernest M. SATOW, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, Longmans, Green and CO, Londra / New York / Toronto, 1958, p. 132.

⁵ Hubert Thierry / Emmanuel Decaux, *International Law and Human Rights (Law France Practice about the International Protection*

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⁶ Maxim Ioan, UN: 4 decades, Public house Politica, Bucharest, 1986, p. 172.

⁷ UNO Charter was adopted in San Francisco in 1945.

⁸ The Letter of April 2, 1953 (Archive MFA), document quoted by Eric Pateyron, the French contribution to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, French Documentation, 1998, p. 73.

⁹ On 10th December 1948, the UNO General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

¹⁰ The 16th of December 1966.

¹¹ Security and Cooperation in Europe (the official documents of Helsinki), French documentation, 1993, p. 328.

¹² United Nations and Human Rights 1945-1995, Blue Books Series, vol. VII, United Nations, New York, 1995.

¹³ Guy Hermet / Bertrand Badie / Pierre Birnbaum / Philippe Braud, *Dictionary of Political Science and Political Institutions*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1994, p. 103.

Energy Resources or Pure Power

Mihai Ovidiu CERCEL

Abstract: *Today more than ever, possession and control of resources, is an expression of actual possession of power which will generate a different behavior of states that depend on those who distribute these forms of energy. This article focuses on Russia which, due to its huge energy resources but also by aggregating resources from multiple states, is now a worldwide leader ship.*

Keywords: *resources, energy, power, international relations, globalization.*

Resources generally belong to a sole major player, usually the state or a company or corporation, that is to the shear power, and, if the latter has the vocation and the ability to assess and manage them properly, they can provide considerable benefits to those who own them.

The rightful owner of such property has the capacity to create a “space of appearances”, to feign situations and tensions that turn favorable as regards the action to impose its prices and conditions to the beneficiary, who remains in a situation of compensatory and unilateral expectation.

The increase in energy interdependence regionalizes or sometimes even globalizes a subject that can degenerate into a political crisis of proportions, as resources have become *pure power*, resulting in domination, often recognized by those in a situation of crisis and institutional helplessness. It is a *different type* of power which manifests itself in a fragile geopolitical space, even a means to reach the

goal proposed by defeating the resistance of those being in a deadlock in a given time.

See the case of Ukraine, and Russia's behavior towards it has over-excited the position of the European Community, regarding itself in the situation of de-substantializing its own continental politics considered as being ambiguous and without authority.

In the conditions of the current global crisis, of globalization and barbaric economy, the problem of energy resources gains another dimension which imposes in the very near future specific meanings of the concept of power and authority and will legitimate a new order world, inequality and various types of constraint. Experts consider that there are justified fears of oil depletion during the next period of time. Consequence of excessive fuel consumption in the world, 2017 will become critical for Germany and the U.S. in 2025, estimated experts in the field, because, unfortunately, were not yet identified alternatives or cheap energy.

In these circumstances, with scarce resources and needs increasing, political and structuralist analysis type provides a complex process of mobilization of various types of energy and the hierarchy of priorities in the field to avoid possible social convulsions, tension, customs and anarchy, because some countries already use *coercitive resources* as a means of imposing power.

Behold, the power can manifest in the basis of derivation of the needs principle and is obvious the fact that the satisfaction of needs requires a certain price, sometimes very delicate, affecting even the internal stability of a state.

It is clear that Russia, with its huge energy resources is a worldwide *leader ship*, a position that allows them to impose their own requirements in a stiff and overwrought competition. Despite this privileged status of Russia, more states impose economic and political supremacy in space, to obtain a substantial advantage in Moscow. "The International Herald Tribune" announced a few months ago, that in the full global crisis, China has concluded several agreements with Brazil and Venezuela in exchange of large amounts of resources naturale. Paralel with these contractual arrangements, *China Development Bank* will lent Petroleras oil giant with 10 billion dollars to guarantee the purchase of 16,000 barrels per day at market price.

Also made public its intention to take "Lez Minerals" mining zinc company in Australia against payment of the 1.7 billion dollars. By another Chinese loan worth \$ 6 billion benefit Venezuela, which has increased already exports oil to Beijing.

And in Russian space the Chinese loans are considerable: 25 billion dollars to oil companies Transneft and Rosvelt, instead of 15 billion tonnes of raw gas per year over the next 20 years.

Recently it has been opened the Xingiang pipeline linking Turkmenistan, a

strategic corridor to work around Russia, the length of 1840 km, which will be subsequently extended to 7000 km to eastern China.

The appearance of this pipeline linking two states, Turkmenistan, wich reinforces the role of regional power in the energy and China wich will become in few years a global superpower, results in reducing the quantities of natural gas to the EU through Nabucco project, which still not materialize.

Through this pipeline, Turkmenistan supplies to China will be approximately 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year, for a period of 30 years, meaning actually, half the annual consumption of Chinei. Passing across three countries: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, this pipeline has a symbolic significance as it pursues the old "Silk Road", which link Europe to Central Asia. "The pipeline built on an ancient trade routes symbolizes friendship and cooperation.", said Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, beeing present at the opening of this pipeline.

The competitive rivalry for energy resources, Russia favors a continuously on, recognized as a great power through its ability to produce and distribute huge amounts of fuel and by its power of decision.

Not long ago, the Russian Federation signed a new agreement with Turkmenistan designed by a Russian company building of a pipeline through the Karakum desert, as an alternative to the European project Nabucco, in which gas from the Caspian area is to reach Europe, bypassing Russia, however. By this project will connect gas deposits in the Karakum Desert with the gas compression station at Ylauly.

This year, the Russian energy complex Gazprom acquired , with 400 million, 51% of the Serbian oil company NIS (Nafta Industrija Svbjije), Russia having an increased visibility in several countries in South East Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova).

By aggregating resources from multiple states, Russia strengthens its leadership in Europe, for the reduction of 50 billion euros of the EU Nabucco project, the future of the pipeline, which is like an extension of the Baku-crossing Tbilisi and Evzerum, remains uncertain, adding to the lack of firm commitments by Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Iraq.

Today more than ever, possession and control of resources is an expression of actual possession of power which will generate a different behavior of states that depend on those who distribute these forms of energy, conducts that will result in unpredictable consequences and differences becoming deeper in international relations.

Paradigms of International Terrorism

Radu RIZA

Abstract: *Constant development, depending on geographical situation, political, economic, social, etc., is what makes terrorism remain in the attention of all. So, attending various stages of time, leads to the emergence of terrorist paradigm. Determination by category is intended to combat this widespread phenomenon.*

Keywords: *terrorism, paradigm, doctrine, war, diplomacy.*

The typology of terrorist groups emphasizes the detailed description of terrorist profiles and applications all over the globe, the suicidal forms and the psychology of the criminal deeds of terrorist groups. Each terrorist group is unique in its way, by its legitimizing form, either violence or terror, and behind criminal deeds terrorist groups hold a syncretic political-religious doctrine raised to divine status or stamped on their minds. Terrorist groups spread all over the world. The largest terrorist groups are in the Middle East, Western Europe, Russia, Eastern Europe, North America, South America and Africa. The study classifies foreign terrorist groups according to the following four typologies: nationalist-separatist, fundamentalist religious, new religious and social-revolutionary. This classification is based on the supposition that terrorist groups can be differentiated by their political ideology.

The social-revolutionary category has also been named “idealistic”. Idealistic terrorists fight for a radical cause, a religious belief or a political ideology, including anarchism. Although some groups

cannot be included in any of these categories, the general typologies are important because every terrorist campaign is different, and the intentions of the groups belonging to the same general category tend to have more things in common than those of different categories. For instance, IRA, ETA and LTTE all have strong nationalist motivations, while Muslim fundamentalists and Aum Shinrikyo’s groups are motivated by religious beliefs.

The fifth typology, that of right – wing terrorists has not been registered, because they do not represent the subject matter of this study. Anyway, it seems that they are not on the list of the US State Department either. Right-wing terrorists are briefly mentioned here. This does not mean that right-wing extremists in the United States do not represent a real threat to the security of the United States, which was proven by the bombing in Oklahoma City on the 19th of April 1995.

All terrorist groups have something in common, namely their strategies of individual combat or small group combat. And the categories of terrorism are of a violent

suicidal aggressive destructive type, not taking into account innocent civilians and religious or political organizations. Their operating techniques are: individual and collective assassinations, kidnappings and hostage-taking, plane hijackings, destruction of civil planes, launch of massively explosive bombs, manipulation through the mass media, persuasion means, efficient psycho-physiological training for endurance and criminal motivation.

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The task of defining international terrorism so that it can be sanctioned by using the norms of the law are incumbent on the Special Committee of the United Nations on international terrorism.

In the response given to the United Nations Secretary on the 19th of August by Romania, regarding the issue of terrorism, it was underlined that: *“in order to exist, an act of international terrorism must have in the first place a deed of actual or potential violence, which, in its turn must necessarily have elements of an international nature as far as the author, the victim, the place where the action happened and its consequences are concerned. Without the existence of the international aspect regarding one of these elements, we would be confronted with some deeds that are qualified according to the internal law rules of each state.”*

Concretely, the terrorist phenomena manifests itself through the distinct appearance of a variety of criminal deeds aimed at hurting human lives, damaging property or other interests.

Modern terrorism has the following historical causes:

- the military victory of Israel on its Arab neighbours, which led to the increase of their terrorist actions on the USA and Israel and to hijackings.

- the reappearance, after 1968, of extremist student movements (neo-marxist and neo-trotskyist) in industrialised countries, in close connection with the protests against the Vietnam war (represented by a series of groups such as “Baader – Meinhof” in the Federal Republic of Germany, “The Red Brigade” in Italy, “The Red Army” in Japan.
- the end of the Cold War, which led to a loss of ideological identity and an economic decline of the states that were former allies of the USSR, which often resulted in the intensification of the anti-american attitude and the integration in the Muslim fundamentalism.

Among the essential changes that have influenced the evolution and the globalisation of terrorism the following are worth mentioning:

- the disappearance of the communist block, which led to the elimination of the international support for the great majority of the existing “revolutionary” movements.
- after fifty years of war and terrorist actions, the Arabs and the Palestinians are committed to make the peace process work. The Palestine Liberation Organization has given up terrorist actions and most Arab states unequivocally reprove terrorism.
- the number of states that sponsor terrorism decreases constantly.
- the appearance of international consensus regarding the utter inacceptability of killing innocent people, regardless of the motivation and causes.
- the desire of the international community to fight against terrorism by any means, especially legal ones.

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The new types of challenges and their consequences for the international community

are closely connected with the doctrines developed by the extremist-terrorist groups and movements.

Currently, international analysts define the following as being terrorist paradigms of the utmost importance in elaborating anti-terrorist doctrines:

a) *The paradigm of coercive diplomacy*

From the first demonstrations certified by documents, terrorist action has been regarded as an attempt to determine changes in an existing situation by using violent means of intimidation.

Coercive diplomacy manifests itself through three basic forms, starting with the 1st century AD, with the actions led by the Jewish people in order to gain their independence from Rome, and continuing with the ever more violent manifestations of some ethnic minorities for determination. Having this paradigm as the starting point, it can be concluded that the use of mass destruction weapons is disproportionate with the ultimate goal of terrorist action. Regarding this aspect, Brian Jenkins expressed his point of view twenty years ago in the paper "*The Potential of Nuclear Terrorism*" (RABD, 1997), being contradicted by the analyst Thomas Shelling until recently, when the internationalisation of terrorism and the danger of holding mass destruction weapons has become a real threat to international security.

b) *The paradigm of war*

In the opinion of analyst Caleb Carr – based initially on the theory of Brian Jenkins ((*International Terrorism A New of Warfare*, 1974), terrorist actions can be put into practice by terrorist elements that act on their own or in the service of some states that support terrorism logistically and financially, the strategic aim being to cause large – scale losses and destructions, in the context of what terrorist – extremist groups consider to be an ongoing military

conflict. Currently, when the Information Age determines important mutations in holding the supremacy of the non-statal and transnational protagonists, terrorism, as a war paradigm, has evolved less at the expense of sponsor states, the ambiguity of this identity becoming the key element in the war paradigm. The appearance of a market destined to intermediate between the sponsor-state and the extremist-terrorist groups, as a buffer-type manifestation, make difficult the establishment of the identity of sponsor states, although methods of investigation and modern integration are used.

The new challenges raised by the war paradigm are complex and impose the thorough analysis of the manner of manifestation of the present-day terrorist phenomenon.

The multitude of viewpoints referring to the development and the dimension of certain actions situated at the juridic borderline between terrorist actions and military actions, was detrimental to international security. In this regard it is worth mentioning the Serbians's actions of ethnic purification in Kosovo, the operations of the Chechen rebels, the actions of ethnic purifications of the Albanians in Kosovo against the Serbian population in the Kosovo enclave, the gasification of the Kurd minority by the totalitarian regime in Iraq, the massacre of some minorities in Africa and Latin America by the anti-governmental paramilitary forces to give just some examples. It is certain that, as Madeleine Albright emphasized: "*the war against terrorism is the war of the future.*"

c) *The paradigm of the new world*

The paradigm of the new world (of a new social system) represents the dire perspective of the world domination by a fundamentalist religious system that aims at having totalitarian control and creating a complete chaos. This anti-humanitarian behaviour

was a feature of the terrorist attacks that took place on the 11th of September 2001 and the 11th of March 2004, that we witnessed and that have deeply concerned the international community. Groups of fanatics belonging to peripheric social categories have led to social combats in the name of justice or in the name of saving a minority, bringing about real social cataclysms, which have often been beyond the control of legally constituted authorities. On the other side, fanatical terrorism on behalf of a religious doctrine manifests itself with a view to purification, which causes a multitude of tragedies and broken destinies, with the purpose of the rebirth of a new type of society after generalised chaos.

d) The Netwar paradigm

The evolution of terrorist actions outside state borders and the internationalisation of this phenomenon in the Netwar direction has raised new difficulties of counteracting on the part of the international community.

The Netwar type of terrorism manifests itself by small-scale actions, in which terrorist groups based on modern doctrines, strategies and technologies, use organisational structures in the form of networks that are adapted to the information era. The “new” protagonists are made up of working groups spread all over the globe and which communicate, are coordinated and led through an information network similar to the internet network, without having a central and definite command centre, in order to be difficult to identify and neutralize. This manifestation has become a reality, it represents a major phenomenon that leads to the internationalization of the terrorist phenomenon.

To this purpose we have mentioned extremist-terrorist groups such as the Palestinian Hamas, the Zapatist movement (Mexico), Fidelistas (Cuba), The American

Christian Patriots, the Asian triads or organized crime structures.

Netwar actions are committed by adversaries that are known, that have modified their structures and strategies in accordance with the “working” advantages offered by the network, but also with the confidentiality they offer. According to this paradigm, the purpose of terrorist action is to desorganise political and social-economic life. In order to achieve this objective, extremist-terrorist organisations use information attacks of various intensity, but which have an immediate effect on the international community.

Since terrorists, isolated from reality, operate in an imaginary world, the connection with the initial motivation might disappear in time. Terrorist action therefore becomes an end in itself. Lutz Tauber, one of the terrorists of the former organization RAF (*Red Army Faction*) in an interview for *Der Spiegel* magazine (1998), referring to the official surrender of the organization, stated that the organization lacked ideological substance though: “*I think that you cannot kill people and spend your entire life in prison if you do not know the reason why you are doing this.[...] we have never thought things through.*”

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“New” and “Old Europe” - Where Lies the Future?

Maria-Irina RENTEĂ

Abstract: *The separation between East and West, between New and Old Europe, becomes less dissonant with every year in the more alert globalization process. In this context, the Treaty of Lisbon may improve the work of the EU and contribute to the solidarity between Member States. The author of this article sees the future in a Europe united by its diversity, as nature is in balance through diversity, in an environment not only economic but also cultural.*

Keywords: *European Union, democracy, enlargement, diversity, identity.*

Motto: *“I see great danger that is possible to remove; great evil that we can avoid or minimize and which hardens me increasingly more in the belief that, in order to be dignified and prosperous, it is enough for democratic nations to want it” **

Alexis de Tocqueville

In the spirit of Tocqueville's ideas that explore, at the level of the 1830s, the opposition between European aristocracy and American democracy on an evolutionary logic based on victory of *democracy*, I believe we can talk about the New and Old Europe.

This fragmentation really exists, which in actual expression is called Eastern and Western Europe, especially stressed by former French President Jacques Chirac by the arrogant words according to which a «big opportunity to hold one's tongue» was missed by some countries from New Europe and to stay away from the big fight (France-America in the Iraqi crisis).

Before any argument it seems significant to remember what the former

Pope John Paul II noted, on a visit to Austria, that Europe has two lungs, and in this sense there is a need for adequate breathing. Simple and truly remarkable!

On the stage of European history after 1989 the curtain was drawn between the two antagonistic political military blocks and a new work began: that of retrieval. Changes occurring in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe were only the beginning of sweeping reforms that included the state and society. The economic problems (the energy resources of the East and the need for new markets for the West) together with the low level of knowledge (there are still few people who know the languages required to receive correct information) as well as

the Central European theory represent some of the points of separation that must be harmonized.

EU enlargement to the East should must be a two-way bridge on which the heavy traffic of wishes can leave from East to West, towards higher values of democracy, market economy, rule of law, freedom, wealth...

The entry of states from Central and Eastern Europe in the EU also depended on the accession criteria. This process is in direct relationship with economic development, political and institutional reform, respecting human rights, in general the ability of states to fulfill obligations arising from EU membership.

To the 15 states with a consolidated democracy, that represent *Old Europe*, the 12 countries relatively recently received are added (*New Europe*) whose young democracies are economically and politically supported by the EU. Ongoing discussions in the case of Turkey and other countries, lead to other dimensions in geography and spirit of the EU that must be aware more quickly.

To discuss what is specific for Europe we must first answer the question: how far does Europe stretch? The answer, obviously political and propagandistic, given by de Gaulle with Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, is too wide.

European unification is primarily institutional and cultural and does not strictly have a geographical or historical positioning. Andre Philip in *For a European Policy* called the three specific concepts of European culture: the Greek concept of individuality, the Roman concept of justice and of the citizen and the biblical concept of the human person.

One belongs to the European culture when one assures the citizen, under the rule of law, the fundamental properties related to life, liberty, property.

The essence of humanity lies in what unites us. But in order to be aware of that truth we need to talk, to communicate.

European unification has progressed from an economic, legal and institutional point of view but is there a cultural identity also defined? Is this an amount or a sum of national amounts? Is this dissolution of national specific or a participation in a joint construction? Is it a view of life to which EU citizens significantly regard?

The answers to these questions lie in form but no one is able to say in what proportion.

Besides of this there is the question: what will be the role of Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union?

Still, the separation between East and West, between New and Old Europe, each year becomes less dissonant in the more alert globalization process.

Politicians and experts who practice a pro-European action are based on various categories of people: tourists who realize the advantages of the lack of borders, and of completeness of services, students and pupils who benefit from mobility during studies, qualified staff who enjoy the expansion of labor market, intellectuals dreaming of an existential remodeling, employees of European institutions.

The Treaty of Lisbon signed by the 27 EU Member States of Europe, which came into force on 01.12.2009, has shown that in spite of discordant notes (Poland, Czech Republic), by negotiation and understanding some sensitivities, it was able to achieve the principle of National unanimity. I consider that it is a victory of reason and political experience.

Now, when the great global economic crisis begins to show its limits, this Treaty may improve the work of the EU, will contribute to the solidarity between Member States and will provide «necessary tools to overcome challenges and meet future

demands of citizens» as Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, noted.

In this context, I see the future in a *Europe united* by its diversity, as nature is in balance through diversity, in an environment, not only economically but also culturally. By maintaining a rational balance we become able to understand why some people have other traditions, why they think about other spiritual types and to accept one another with the ease of the Sun passing on the sky whose light clarifies by day and opens our eyes. There are many examples: in the theaters from Old Europe there are artists from Eastern Europe, in the great clubs there are Eastern athletes, in universities there are students and teachers of various origins, as well as in economic and scientific life.

Why don't we recognize that we are close to each other?

I believe that acceptance and knowledge is more the preserve of younger generations

because they grow closer easier and live from the beginning in mixed forms of cultural expression.

My personal experience allows me to say this. I am a Romanian citizen, and I lived and was taught in Romania, I studied law in a *new* country of the EU (Poland), I had the opportunity to visit the U.S. and also countries from the old Europe. I have met people and they met me. We are not that different and we get along well.

A few years ago, when coming from America and seeing Europe from the plane I thought: "*I am home*". Then I realized with more intensity as *all of Europe is my home. It is where I have a future*. But as Alexis de Tocqueville said: "*we must face the future with that salutary fear which makes us watch and fight and not that kind of ill horror and laziness that weakens our hearts and empties them*".

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Theorizing the Marketplace of Religiosity: A Recent Literature Review

Anca Parmena OLIMID

Abstract: *This article envisages the approaches of the recent literature relevant to the study of the relation between economy and religion. The article makes appeal to the recent literature on the implications of the religious markets and the Church-State relationship. The study is also interested in the effects of economic growth on religiosity. Other comments are made on the social and economic consequences of religious beliefs.*

Keywords: *religiosity, economic development, state, society.*

Introduction

The literature on religion and economics tends to fall into two categories: studies of particular countries with respect to the verdict against the “post-modernist” theory and preconceptions of authors arguing that economics and religion are combined in the intellectual community.

Nevertheless, the past ten years have a significant progress in the interpretation of how “the rhetoric-of-economics” and the “economic theology” represent a major recent intellectual development¹. This paper begins with the discussion of the secular relation between religion and economic development as well as pointing towards some changes in the state-society relation particularly.

This article provides an overview of the recent literature relevant to the study of the relation between economics and religion. The paper also appeals to the critical review on the implications of religious

markets and church-state relation. The study argues that economic development depress religiosity. Subsequent comments will be linked to a much more comprehensive literature on the social and economic consequences of religious beliefs.

Economic personalism

The starting point for any understanding of the recent literature is Adam Smith’s economic theory. In his research, *Wealth of Nations* (1776), Smith explained the religious behavior in the context of “nonmarket exchange problems”². Motivated by a multiple belief systems, Smith’s theory was generally ignored by scientists. Two centuries later, modern economists distinguished a new topic by examining church attendance within the context of modern economics³.

Woodhead has applied Smith’s hypothesis on religion on the study of church attendance among the Muslim women in Britain.

This research gained significant attention with the public sphere becoming subject of focus when “debating whether religion still occupies a central role in the lives of some communities in Britain”⁴.

The data separated the religious patterns under the cultural or ethnic identity. This hypothesis became challenging especially for the Muslim community showing that the Muslim women have the highest rates for economic inactivity. Moreover, against many critics, the research discussed the social and religious participation of Muslim women providing a clear profile in terms of activity. The authors argue that the higher levels of economic inactivity among the Muslim communities are often associated with religious practice.

In their *Religion and economics: normative social theory*, Dean and Waterman⁵ explained the relation between economics and religion as a combination of logical and epistemological issues raised by the normative social theory⁶. They argue that “even in secular societies religion may play some in the determination of normative social theory”⁷. Furthermore, “the most obvious policy goals of a secular society are related to the production and distribution of goods and services, so may economics”⁸.

The broader theory offered recently by Santelli generally examined the economic activity in the light of a theological perspective of human person. The research suggests a new direction making a distinction between “the moral ramification of economic activity” and the “economic development within the theological context of Christian moral concerns”. The focus of this new understanding includes:

- a. a new academic subdiscipline under the topic of “economic personalism”;
- b. a “nexus between the acting person’s experience, human value, dignity, and self-interests, on the one hand; and society, the experience of people acting with

others as an extended social order, on the other”⁹.

Influenced by the theoretical framework of the economic personalism, Donohue-White *et al.* note that an analysis of theology and economics is a complicated project involving contrasts, comparisons and case studies. From a personalist perspective, the economic causality becomes more humanized focusing on the “centrality of the acting person”¹⁰ in the context of the utilitarian social analysis. Subsequently, it is sufficient to observe the obstacle that personalism encounters in the neoclassical economic theory¹¹. Moreover, Donohue-White *et al.* argue “economists raise the practical, but not unimportant issue, that they are trained as social scientist, not as theologians or philosophers”¹².

To conclude her arguments, the author indicated that this kind of association between economics and religion appears in many others perspectives in the recent years. It is for this reason important to examine economic agents as human persons. Without being able to explain all the aspects of the ethical theory, the author emphasizes the human person in the context of “value-life” and the basic health: nutrition, sanity, safety etc. More to the problem of the value-religion, Donohue-White characterizes this value function as a common experience of everyone at some time becoming a ruling principle for most the daily decisions.

Problems of Methodology

Advances in research theories and methodologies in the years 2000’s allowed social scientists to apply more frequently the extensive analysis to new topics in the relation economic performance – society development. These researches regard economic development as one direction of human development.

Prominent in the recent literature was research conducted by Evans and Kelley

who established the link between national culture as a sufficient shared concept and a economic behavioral tendency. The authors appealed to various kinds of economic, political, historical, religious and cultural key data by using surveys showing the individual religious behavior of individuals in different periods of economic development.

Obviously, each of these analyses is subject to a particular challenge due to a set of shared values shared in a unique territory. Evans and Kelley argue: “by contrast, the alternative «big tools» hypotheses and a great deal of evidence suggest that national attachment is not weakening. Institutional differentiation among nation-states persists”¹³. Nevertheless, the authors also reported that the national arguments continue to exist as a key element for economic distribution.

More generally, a vast literature used methodologies and techniques to measure the religious behavior, including specific experiments in different countries or different social categorizes. Sharma observes that the recent theoretical contributions have not reached a consensus on “feminist dialogue” or “feminist theory”. In conclusion, Sharma found that classical empirical methods and survey research only “serve to marginalize women”¹⁴. This analysis is essentially historical and political-descriptive nature.

Likewise, Ginsburgh and Throsby obtained a larger cultural expenditure of the relationship between the regional culture and the subsequent economic changes. The author also observes four values of the marketplace that are affected by overall economic performance: the option value, the existence value, prestige value, the bequest value¹⁵.

National surveys of individual respondents’ cultural and economic perceptions were undertaken on a greater scale as part of Taylor’s *et al.* work over in the lives of African Americans for more than 20 years. The results of the survey mapped a four dimension report¹⁶:

1. *first*, the religious involvement related to church attendance and denomination;
2. *second*, the examination of the socio-demographic elements of the African American population;
3. *third*, the investigation of religion in specific subgroups;
4. *fourth*, the exploration of church support and use of ministers in response to personal difficulties.

Tuma argued that religion influences economic behavior. He also tends to associate religious predilections to noneconomic factors – political, social, religious, and cultural. Moreover, the author argues that measurement can be on one of the three levels: ordinal, interval and ratio scale known also as cardinal measurement¹⁷. The author also observes that the operations of comparison and combination are the fundamental criteria. He also states “although the trend in the social sciences, including economic history, has been toward quantification, quantified data need not be held a priori superior to qualitative data for all cases of historical analysis”¹⁸.

Capitalism and religion: the marketplace of piety

In his 2002 Goodchild works on the nature of piety before contemporary European culture and reason. The author goes further by arguing that the global capitalism focuses on the market as a religion devoted to capital as the universal horizon. At least, he states “there is only a plurality of incompatible cultures, social structures, rationalities, moralities and beliefs”¹⁹.

While most social and political scientists admit a general correlation between religion and economics, the arguments of Alwin’s theory are still being argued. The author suggests new interpretations for the concepts of “satisficing” and “optimizing” behavior²⁰. Most of his critics note that

economic development is not limited to optimizing religious development.

A subsequent idea has played a key role in Douglas's theory on the variables of the relation between economics and religion as a product of a specific situation of each community beyond the "ethics of capitalism". Moreover, Douglas admits "the great merit of capitalism over the productive economic system and the moral justification of its defining institutions"²¹.

Lastly, Meyer argued that the relation between religion and politics cannot be without taking into account the new ethics of capitalism and the Christian mass culture. In his research, the author has made a distinction between the religious groups and movements in the context of the culture of neo-liberal capitalism²². The author claims that "we need to ground our understanding of contemporary religion in through ethnographic studies and broader comparisons"²³.

An early study by Laurence R. Iannaccone (1998) emphasized the line of research that "interprets religious behavior

from an economic perspective, applying microeconomic theory and techniques to explain patterns of religious behavior among individuals, groups and cultures"²⁴. The study also emphasizes the importance of religious diversity and religious participation at the regional and cross-national level.

This idea has played a key role in Coleman's subsequent theory. At one degree of detail, the author is simply expressing a macro level theory as a evidence that "the growth of this religious doctrine provided the value system"²⁵. In this set of propositions, Coleman shows a way of representing system of the effects of religious doctrine on economic organization²⁶:

- a. the generation of certain values among the protestant religious doctrine;
- b. individuals among this religious community adopt certain kinds of orientation to economic behavior;
- c. certain orientations to economic behavior characterize the capitalist organization in a society.




Figure 1: Macro- and micro-level propositions: effects of religious doctrine on economic organization²⁷

In more recent research, Cohen argues it is a "correlational rather causal analyzes" to emphasize the religion's independent effect on economy. He also notes that Weber addressed the same issue by arguing that "salvation doctrines" affected economy. Moreover, in Cohen's theory, the effects are rather behavioral than cultural²⁸.

An extension of Coleman's arguments is defined by Stout and Hart. The authors show that indeed three factors are relevant

for the tensions between the religious ideas and the economic behavior in American religious history:

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An extension of Coleman's arguments is defined by Stout and Hart. The authors show that indeed three factors are relevant for the tensions between the religious ideas and the economic behavior in American religious history:

1. the questions about religious motivation for working during the nineteenth century and the colonial period;
2. the technological innovations and global expansion of economic conditions during the twentieth century;
3. the reciprocal effects of religious commitment and economic growth in the last century.

With regard to other factors, Wuthnow and Scott suggest that "it is impossible in a brief review to take account to the full variety that has been conducted on the relationship" between the religious affiliation and economic behavior²⁹.

In addition, Lehrer elaborated a theory emphasizing two ways in which the religious affiliations matters for demographic and economic performance:

1. first, the attendance to religious schools offering a high level of compatibility between the religious affiliation and the economic status;
2. second, beyond the first argument, Lehrer associates time and effort allocated to religious practice to "crowd out time and effort that could be oriented to labor market activities"³⁰.

The author also observed the literature's findings on the effects of religiosity providing a consistent image of religious involvement³¹.

Abundant literature affirms that religious beliefs can affect economic performance at the level of the individual and groups. Second, religious affiliation serves as the original base for the social cohesion. Furthermore, Ferrante outlines the role of religious beliefs played in the origins and development of modern capitalism. The author demonstrates

that the examination of religion allows a sociological perspective. More importantly, Ferrante's theory allows us respond to the inevitable problems of human condition. The author asserts that "the many uses to which religion are turned show that this complex phenomenon cannot be discussed in isolation"³².

These three lines of reasoning - religious affiliation, economic performance and social cohesion provide the fundamental version of the Heimbrock's theory. More generally, the author found that among the factors that contribute to social cohesion is a common local identity clearly contributing to regulating the individual behavior³³. Subsequent studies have developed a more influent analysis noting the religious context is "a combination of time and space, which means... that context can be visualized using a model with two axes, where the horizontal axis is space and where the vertical axis is time"³⁴.

Conclusions

The literature reviewed in this article describes the effects of religious affiliation on different economic, social and cultural behavior. Moreover, the recent literature seeks to find a *universal model of reciprocal influences* linking religious affiliation and economic development. Future works should pay more attention to the distinct patterns of religious and economic behavior for transition democracies, whatever the religious affiliation may be. Future studies should also explore the beneficial influences of several religious involvements in economic development.

Notes

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Faith, Reason, and the War against Jihadism

George WEIGEL*

Abstract: *The purpose of this article is to identify what the Western World should have learned, in the years after 9/10, about its enemy (i.e., the jihadism) and about itself. The author formulates 15 lessons, clustering them under three headings: Understanding the Enemy. Reconceiving Realism and Deserving Victory.*

Keywords: *religion, ideology, Islam, war, jihad, enemy, struggle.*

In the late summer of 2001, a stateless man of whom most Americans had never heard sat in a cave in the mountains of Afghanistan, surrounded by a few disciples, a satellite dishreceiver, and a TV set. The TV wasn't working, so one of the disciples sought the BBC's Arabic service on a radio. There, he learned that an airplane had struck the World Trade Center in New York. He excitedly told the others, who broke into celebration; but their leader said, simply, "Wait, wait." News came of the second tower being hit, and the leader wept and prayed; Osama bin Laden also stunned his disciples by holding up three fingers. When news of the strike on the Pentagon came, bin Laden held up four fingers, amazing his disciples even further.

In this instance, they would be disappointed; because of the heroic actions of the passengers on United 93, the U.S. Capitol was spared. Yet in two hours, the landscape of twenty-first century public life had been radically changed.

Viewed through a wide-angle lens, the events of 9/11 were a particularly lethal expression of the globalization of religious passion. Yet those events were something else, and something more: for Americans saw that day represented a specific, mortal threat to our civilization. War had been declared upon us by an enemy whose motivations were utterly alien to the 21st century sensibility of the West.

That it has taken us some time to grasp this new and dominant fact of international public life should not have been a surprise. It was difficult to recognize it for what it was before it struck New York and Washington; an acute intelligence operative, studying fragments of information about al-Qaeda and its allies before 9/11, was like a biologist looking at a laboratory slide of some previously unknown virus. But now, six and a half years after 9/11, we cannot

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not understand. For unless we grasp the character of this new kind of war, its religious and ideological roots, the passions that have grown from those roots, and our current vulnerabilities to those passions, our chances of prevailing against an adversary with a very different view of the human future – and a willingness, even eagerness, to die for the sake of hastening that future – are weakened.

The war is now being fought on multiple, interconnected fronts: there is an Afghan front, an Iraqi front, an Iranian front, a Lebanese/Syrian front, a North African front, a Gaza front, a Somali front, a Sudanese front, a southeast Asian front, an intelligence front, a financial-flows front, an economic front, an energy front, and a homeland security front. These are all fields of fire in the same global war, and they ought to be understood as such. Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States and on American diplomatic and military assets were, for example, planned in the Philippines and other parts of southeast Asia; places unknown to the vast majority of Americans – Waziristan comes to mind – are now among the most evil places on earth; what happens there has direct effects on our armed forces in Iraq and elsewhere, and could have devastating effects on the homeland.

Bernard Lewis, reflecting on all this, noted the difference between our times and the days when he worked for British intelligence during World War II. Then, he said, “we knew who we were, we knew who the enemy was, we knew the dangers and the issues. It is different today. We don’t know who we are. We don’t know the issues, and we still do not understand the nature of the enemy.” Not knowing, however, is lethal. My purpose in this lecture is to identify what we should have learned, these past six and a half years, about the enemy, and about us. Let me

cluster the lessons we should have learned under three headings. *Understanding the Enemy; Reconceiving Realism; Deserving Victory.*

UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY

Lesson 1. The great human questions, including the great questions of public life, are ultimately theological.

How we think about God – or don’t think about God – has a great deal to do with how we envision the just society and determine the appropriate means with which to build it. This means taking theology seriously, which includes others’ theologies as well as the theologies that have shaped the civilization of the West. If we have not learned *this* over the past five years, then one wonders if we have learned anything. Yet that very question – what have we learned? – arises every time a commentator or statesman uses “theology” or “theological” as a synonym for “superstition” or “mindless.” Such glib usages are an impediment to clear thinking about our situation.

Lesson 2. The trope that describes Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as “the three Abrahamic faiths” obscures more than it illuminates, and ought to be permanently retired.

There is an obvious truth here, in that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all trace their origins to Abraham, and that from the perspective of a Buddhist, a Hindu, or a Shinto adherent, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam look perhaps more similar than different. But in fact the theological parallelisms are rather limited, especially with regard to Islam. It is often suggested that there is an affinity between Christianity and Islam that is virtually identical to what Rabbi David Novak calls the “common border” between Judaism and Christianity; Islamic regard for Abraham and Moses,

Jesus and Mary, is often cited as an example of this affinity. Yet as Alain Besançon has pointed out,

“The Abraham of *Genesis* is not the Ibrahim of the Qur’an; Moses is not Moussa. As for Jesus, he appears, as Issa, out of place and out of time, without reference to the landscape of Israel....

“Jesus is indeed granted a position of honor in the Qur’an, but this Jesus is not the Jesus in whom Christians proclaim their faith. The Jesus/Issa of the Qur’an promulgates the same message as the earlier prophets. Indeed, all possess the same knowledge and proclaim the same message, which is Islam. Like the rest, Issa is sent to preach the oneness of God. He is emphatically no Trinitarian; ‘do not say Three,’ he protests. Nor is he the son of God, but a simple mortal. Nor is he a mediator between earthly men and their heavenly Father, because Islam knows not the concept of mediation. Nor ... does he die on the cross; a double is substituted for him.”

In addition to these dramatic discontinuities, Islam’s deep theological structure includes themes that render the notion of “three Abrahamic faiths” less than helpful in understanding Islam’s faith and practice – particularly if this trope is understood popularly as a matter of three legs on a single monotheistic stool.

Take the question of Islamic supersessionism: Islam’s claim that it supercedes Judaism and Christianity, which are finally unveiled, in the revelation to Muhammad, as false religions. Despite the supersessionist claims that some Christians have made throughout history vis-à-vis Judaism, no orthodox Christian holds that God’s self-revelation in Christ negates God’s self-revelation in the history of the People of Israel. Islam, by contrast, takes a radically

supersessionist view of both Judaism and Christianity, claiming that the final revelation to Muhammad *de facto* negates any prior revelatory value (so to speak) that might be found in the Hebrew Bible or the Christian New Testament.

Then there is the nature of the Qur’an itself. The mainstream Christian understanding of biblical inspiration was expressed by the Second Vatican Council: “To compose the sacred books, God chose certain men who, all the while he employed them in this task, made full use of their own powers and faculties so that ... it was as true authors that they consigned to writing whatever he wanted written, and no more.” That theological understanding of “inspiration” provides for the possibility of interpretation of the sacred texts, and indeed for the development of doctrine in light of an evolving understanding of the full meaning of Scripture. The Qur’an, by contrast, is understood to have been dictated by its divine source, word for word, so that there is much less question of “exegesis” or of a post-scriptural development of doctrine. The Bible is a moral teacher which calls faithful Jews and Christians to use their reason to understand the meaning and import of its teaching, including the commandments. Islam’s holy book, by contrast, is described by an influential Egyptian Islamic activist in these terms: “the Qur’an for mankind is like a manual for a machine.” Thus Besançon does not exaggerate when he writes:

“Although Muslims like to enumerate the 99 names of God, missing from the list, but central to the Jewish and even more so to the Christian concept of God, is ‘Father’ – i.e., a personal God capable of a reciprocal and loving relationship with men. The one God of the Qur’an, the God Who demands submission, is a distant God; to call

him 'Father' would be an anthropomorphic sacrilege..”.

Thus Islam is “other” in relationship to Christianity and Judaism in a way that Christianity and Judaism cannot be to one another. The late Pope John Paul II recognized this. In the international bestseller *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, John Paul expressed his admiration for “the religiosity of Muslims” and his admiration for their “fidelity to prayer;” but prior to this he had cut to the theological heart of the matter:

“Some of the most beautiful names in the human language are given to the God of the Qur’an, but He is ultimately a God outside of the world, a God who is only Majesty, never Emmanuel, God with us. Islam is not a religion of redemption. There is no room for the Cross and... the tragedy of redemption is completely absent. For this reason not only the theology but also the anthropology of Islam is very distant from Christianity.”

That theological anthropology – Islam’s theologically-driven concept of the human person as one called to submission to a distant God of majesty – yields, in turn, a view of the just society that is dramatically different from that of Judaism and Christianity. Islamic theological anthropology is one root of what Efraim Karsh has termed “the fusion of religious and temporal authority” in Islam, which is not peripheral to Islamic self-understanding. That fusion has, in turn, led to what Karsh calls “Islam’s millenarian imperial experience” – and, one might add, the millenarian political expectations of some Muslims today. Islamic theological anthropology also helps explain Islam’s difficulties in creating the cultural conditions for the possibility of social pluralism. Whether Islam can evolve into a religion capable of providing religious warrants for genuine pluralism is thus one of the great

questions on which the future of the 21st century will turn.

Lesson 3. Jihadism is the enemy in the multi-front war that has been declared upon us.

There are many forms of Islam. Some of them, often called “fundamentalism” or “Islamism,” stress the need for a deep religious and moral reform within the House of Islam and the reestablishment of Islamic political power. The specific form of Islamism which threatens the West is best described as *jihadism*. Jihadism was recently defined by Richard John Neuhaus: “*Jihadism is the religiously inspired ideology [which teaches that] it is the moral obligation of all Muslims to employ whatever means [are] necessary to compel the world’s submission to Islam.*” That, I suggest, is naming the enemy correctly: those who hold this view are, *de facto*, in a state of belligerency against the rest of the world. Neuhaus goes on to note, “It will be objected that, in the Qur’an, jihad can also mean peaceful spiritual struggle. That is true, as it is true that those Muslims who believe jihad means peaceful spiritual struggle are not the enemy.” Indeed, much of the history of this century will turn on the question of whether the jihadists’ definition of jihad becomes the most culturally assertive definition within the many worlds of Islam. But that the jihadists understand jihad as Neuhaus describes it cannot be doubted, since this is precisely what they claim.

Lesson 4. Jihadism has a complex intellectual history, the chief points of which must be grasped in order to understand the nature of the threat before us.

Modern jihadism is rooted in a profound Islamic sense of Islamic failure: the world has not turned out the way it

should. One can see traces of that sense of failure in the inertia of the Ottoman Empire before World War I. In fact, though, the inertia has a far longer pedigree, which involved a kind of turning-off of intellectual inquiry in a Muslim world that once found ample room within itself for an incorporation of the wisdom of the classical world, and helped transmit that wisdom to the medieval West.

The causal chain that takes us from medieval debates about Islamic law and theology to the caves of Tora Bora and 9/11 involves numerous figures, among them Ahmad ibn ‘Abd al-Halim ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4-1792), and two contemporary theorists, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1903-1966).

To make a long story desperately short: At a time when the Mongols had conquered much of the Islamic *umma*, ibn Taymiyya taught that the survival of Islam requires political power; that the pursuit of that power could, indeed should, be undertaken by the use of armed force; and that jihad involved both an absolute love of God and an “absolute hatred” for all that God proscribes, which includes “not only heretics, apostates, hypocrites, sinners, and unbelievers (including Christians and Jews)... but also any Muslim who tried to avoid participating in jihad.

Ibn Taymiyya thus adumbrated the intra-Islamic civil war that has now spilled over into jihadism’s struggle against the rest of the world. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab emphasized the radical unicity (oneness) and lordship of God, whose relationship to the world is that of an absolute lawgiver: God is will, period, and there is no spiritual wrestling, so to speak, with the divine will – there is only submission. Yet Wahhab had little influence in his own time, however, or indeed for centuries afterwards; it would take a vast

transfer of western wealth to Saudi Arabia to make Wahhabism a potent force in the world. Hasan al-Banna, Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, condemned the “mental colonization” of Islam under colonial rule, and urged a struggle against a West that he perceived as having thus far won a “ruthless war whose battlefield has been the spirits and souls of Muslims...” Al-Banna proposed an Islamic social reformation. The educational, social, economic, religious, and charitable activities of the Muslim Brotherhood would be one form of this reformation. Jihad would be another, for God had given Muslims the privilege and duty of saving the world from its errors. After cleansing the House of Islam, true Muslims would cleanse their territories of infidels and unbelievers, beginning with al-Banna’s own Egypt, and then move on, until, as he put it, “...all the world shouts the name of the Prophet and the teachings of Islam spread throughout the world. Only then will Muslims achieve their fundamental goal...” Sayyid Qutb, whose formative experiences included being scandalized at the “decadence” he perceived at a church social in Greeley, Colorado, in 1949, brought these various lines of jihadist thought together in a singularly influential way. He, too, stressed the idea of God as Absolute Will, God as the unique lawmaker; thus, for Qutb, liberal political thought (even conservative liberal political thought), was a false religion, not simply bad politics. Like others before him, but in a harsher way, Qutb stressed that those Muslims who did not live authentic Islamic lives (as he understood the term) were enemies to be fought and, if necessary, killed; so were those Jews, Christians, and unbelievers whose existence was a permanent, unchanging, and necessarily aggressive threat to the success of Islam, exactly as it had been from the beginning.

Here, then, was a mind literally frozen in time, in which the Crusades and the Spanish *Reconquista* were present realities, summoning forth a perpetual struggle, violent if necessary, until the final, global triumph of Islam.

The power of jihadism derives from its theological roots. As Pope Benedict XVI pointed out in his Regensburg Lecture in September 2006, the key theological move that underwrites today's jihadist ideology (and practice) is the identification of God as Absolute Will. If God is absolute will, God can command anything – even the irrational. And so, in an extension of the thought of Sayyid Qutb, contemporary jihadists believe that the murder of innocents is, not simply morally acceptable, but morally required, if such murders advance the cause of Islam. This deeply distorted understanding of the nature of the God of Abraham leads, in turn, to other theological distortions.

Mercy, for example, comes to be understood as weakness. Justice, one of the four cardinal virtues in Christian moral theology, is traduced by jihadism's defective concept of God into revenge. Given Sayyid Qutb's conviction that Islam, rightly understood, and modernity were "utterly incompatible," and given the defective theology that undergirds Qutb's worldview, what seems incomprehensible to many westerners – the "death cult" that forms "the core of al-Qaeda" and similar entities – begins, within a jihadist frame of reference, to make a certain perverse sense.

Jihadism thus creates a theologically warranted "world without limits" in which the battlefield "now spans pizzerias, buses, public squares, commuter trains...subway stations," and a Jewish center in Seattle; in which a Turkish film, "Valley of the Wolves," depicts an American Jew harvesting organs at Abu Ghraib for resale; in which the Palestinian state press mocks the

Secretary of State of the United States for her race and appearance; and so forth, and so on, in a seeming infinity of variants on the instruction posted in Kabul by the Taliban's religious police: "Throw reason to the dogs – it stinks of corruption." The line from Taymiyya and Wahhab that would later influence Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb came to one conclusion when Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, an Egyptian and a Saudi, a veteran political operator and propagandist and a somewhat dreamy charismatic leader – joined forces to form al-Qaeda: the result was something new, and something terribly dangerous: global jihad.

Lesson 5. Jihadists read history and politics through the prism of their theological convictions, not through the prism of western assumptions about the progressive dynamic of history.

Thus jihadists read the 1990s as a moment that revealed fatal western weaknesses. To jihadists, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan (irrespective of the fact that it was made possible by western aid and technology), meant that modernity was on the run. This provoked new patterns of aggression, which were reinforced when the generally feckless response of the United States led to bin Laden's apotheosis as the jihadist champion who had taken on the Great Satan and prevailed. Then, when the U.S. failed to respond to the attack on the *U.S.S. Cole* in such a way as to ignite the war in Afghanistan in which bin-Laden hoped to trap the Americans (as, according to his own mythology, he had trapped the Soviets), he decided that something else was required: as Lawrence Wright puts it, "he would have to create an irresistible outrage." The result was a vast hole in the ground in Lower Manhattan, the loss of almost three thousand lives, and an economic cost of billions of dollars.

To understand that jihadists read history in a distinctive way leads to several other sublessons:

(1) As Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted in a September 2006 address to the Labour Party, “This terrorism isn’t our fault,” and “until we shake ourselves free of the wretched capitulation to the propaganda of the enemy, that somehow we are the ones responsible,” we will not prevail.

(2) Jihadism is not caused by poverty. Sayyid Qutb sailed to the United States in a firstclass cabin on one of the great trans-Atlantic liners. The nineteen death-cultists of 9/11 were middle-class and well-educated. Poverty, in and of itself, doesn’t turn men and women into jihadists.

(3) Jihadism isn’t caused by the fact of the State of Israel. Israel is, for jihadists, the excuse not the reason, the “deadliest of all Arab alibis” in a political culture formed in part by an ideology of victimhood. Jihadis do not hate the West because of Israel, they hate Israel because it is part of the West – hence, that standard jihadist trope, “Zionist-Crusaders.” It is a great folly to think that jihadism and the terrorism it underwrites are to be understood as a psychological aberration. Within their own theological frame of reference and the reading of history it warrants, jihadists are not crazy; they make, to themselves, a terrible kind of sense.

Lesson 6: It is not “Islamophobic” to note the historical connection between Muslim expansion and conquest, or between contemporary jihadism and terrorism. Necessary truth-telling is the pre-requisite to genuine interreligious dialogue.

In Pope Benedict’s Regensburg Lecture, the Holy Father gave the world an inter-religious and ecumenical vocabulary to engage in a genuine conversation about the threat jihadism poses: the vocabulary of “rationality and irrationality.” Criticized

at the time as a diplomatic “gaffe” the Pope’s proposal has now drawn two responses from international groups of Muslim leaders, and a meeting in March at the Vatican is planned. It is not without interest that this newfound interest in senior Islamic circles in serious theological conversation with the Pope about the right-ordering of society (which Benedict XVI has insisted be the focal point of the discussion) followed, not the usual exchange of banalities and pleasantries that too often characterizes interreligious dialogue, but a robust critique of the theological roots of jihadism. Surely there are lessons here for the future.

One is that the western media acquiescence to Muslim complaints about “Islamophobia” should stop: it is not “Islamophobic” for the Pope, or anyone else, to pray in the presence of Muslims; to defend religious freedom; or to condemn violence in the name of God – suggestions made by National Public Radio, the *New York Times*, the Associated Press, and the *New York Daily News* during Benedict XVI’s December 2006 visit to Turkey. It would also be helpful if the western press – and particularly that part of the western press that reaches the Islamic world, like CNN and the BBC – would call things by their right names: murderers in Iraq are murderers and terrorists, not insurgents or sectarians; suicide bombers are, in fact, homicide bombers; and so forth.

Lesson 7. This is a multi-generational struggle.

The below-replacement-level birthrates that prevail throughout virtually the entire western world are another factor in this global struggle for the human future. As the inimitable Mark Steyn puts it, given present demographic trends, “the Belgian climate-change lobbyist will [soon] be on the endangered species list with the Himalayan

snow leopard” – a fact that, given Belgian parallels in the Netherlands, France, Spain, and elsewhere, has already changed the political landscape of western Europe. Yet Steyn notes that birth rates are already declining in some Islamic countries, such that the jihadists’ demographic advantage will eventually decrease as well. So the historical window for the achievement of the jihadists’ most ambitious goals will likely begin to close in, perhaps, twenty-five years or so. The demographics of the Islamic world, coupled with the staying power of the passions unleashed by jihadist ideology and distorted religious conviction, thus suggest that the current phase of the contest for the human future will last at least two or three generations. This is, indeed, a long war. It is important that we understand that, acknowledge it politically, gird ourselves for it, and plan both strategy and tactics accordingly.

RECONCEIVING REALISM

Lesson 8. Genuine realism must avoid premature closure in its thinking about the possibilities of human agency in the world.

Grasping the inevitable irony, pathos, and tragedy of history; being alert to unintended consequences; maintaining a robust skepticism about schemes of human perfection; cherishing democracy without worshipping it – these elements of the Christian realist sensibility associated with Reinhold Niebuhr remain essential intellectual furnishings for anyone thinking seriously about U.S. foreign policy in the war against jihadism. Yet realism must always be complemented by a commitment to the possibility of human creativity in history.

As Dean Acheson said at another moment when history’s tectonic plates were shifting, the world which he and Harry Truman faced “only slowly revealed

itself. As it did so, it began to appear as just a little bit less formidable than that described in the first chapter of *Genesis*. That was to create a world out of chaos...” Our task today is not dissimilar. In carrying it out, we would do well to remember the counsel of Charles Frankel: “The heart of the policy-making process... is not the finding of a national interest already perfectly known and understood. It is the determining of that interest: the reassessment of the nation’s resources, needs, commitments, traditions, and political and cultural horizons – in short, its calendar of values.”

The Bush Administration’s efforts to accelerate change in the Arab Islamic world were determined by a realistic assessment of the situation after 9/11. Mistakes in implementation notwithstanding, the attempt to accelerate the transition to responsible and responsive government in the Middle East was a realistic objective, given an unacceptable status quo that was inherently unstable; that was unstable because it was corrupt; and that was producing terrorists and jihadists determined to challenge those corruptions.

Lesson 9. The objective in the Middle East is the evolution of responsible and responsive government, which will take different forms given different historical and cultural circumstances.

Bernard Lewis is, as usual, a wise guide here. As he recently wrote,

“There is a view sometimes expressed that ‘democracy’ means the system of government evolved by the English-speaking peoples... I beg to differ from that point of view. Different societies develop different ways of conducting their affairs, and they do not need to resemble ours... Democracy is not born like the Phoenix. It comes in stages,

and the stages and processes of development will differ from country to country, from society to society.”

Professor Lewis’s cautions, as well as his convictions that “there are elements in Islamic society which could well be conducive to democracy” and that the “cause of developing free institutions – along their lines, not ours – is possible” in Islamic societies suggests several sub-lessons from the still-unfolding drama of Iraq and the miscalculations of American policy there.

(1) American policy-makers miscalculated the damage done to the fabric of Iraqi civil society by 25+ years of Baathist totalitarianism.

(2) American policy-makers miscalculated the degree to which post-Saddam Iraq would quickly become a battlefield in the wider war against jihadism. The exposure of the “false world” within which Arabs had been living was intolerable – to the remaining Baathists in Iraq and Syria, to the forces of the status quo among the Arab leadership, to the apocalypics in Tehran, and to jihadists everywhere. And thus it now seems, in retrospect, almost inevitable that Iraq became a “devil’s playground:” its porous borders were a magnet for jihadists looking for a field of battle – Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, Saudis, Palestinians, Iranians, all of whom grasped the fact that, if America were to succeed in Iraq, and Iraq to succeed as a modern Islamic society, their various dreams would be dealt a major blow.

This we seemingly did not understand, or at least did not grasp quickly enough – that major combat in Iraq had only “shaped the battlefield” for what was coming next. Since March 2003, in fact, America has found itself fighting four Iraqi wars: the war to depose Saddam Hussein and create the possibility of responsible Iraqi government; the war against the remaining Iraqi Baathists

and their allies; the war against jihadists, in which the late, unlamented Abu Musab al-Zarqawi played a deadly role; and the war between Shia and Sunni that erupted after jihadists destroyed the Shia Golden Mosque at Samarra in February 2006.

(3) Inadequate resources were allocated for post-Saddam reconstruction in Iraq, a failure compounded by the American intelligence community’s failure to grasp just how much damage had been done to Iraq’s infrastructure and by a lack of bureaucratic coordination among American agencies involved in Iraqi reconstruction.

(4) American policy-makers failed to devise an effective “hearts-and-minds” strategy for post-Saddam Iraq. After dominating the information dimensions of the first of the four Iraq wars (the war against the Saddam Hussein regime), the U.S. too often left the information field to sources of misinformation and disinformation like Al-Jazeera, with serious strategic consequences – some of which are now, thankfully, being reversed, thanks to the Petraeus counterinsurgency strategy.

The difficulties of post-Baathist political transition in Iraq should not, however, blind us to the fact that the war against jihadism and the quest for freedom are linked, and neither can succeed without the other. Moreover, and without gainsaying the difficulties involved, Bernard Lewis nonetheless encourages to think that there is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other to provide the basis for an advance toward freedom, rightly understood.

Trying, through a variety of instrumentalities, to support, and perhaps even accelerate, that advance is the only realistic course of action.

Lesson 10. In the war against global jihadism, deterrence strategies are unlikely to be effective.

This is perhaps most evident in Iran, or at least among Iranians like President Ahmadinejad who believe that they can hasten the messianic age by unleashing nuclear holocaust in Jerusalem. As Adam Garfinkle asks, “How does one deter people who... are willing and even eager... to turn their country and their entire religious sect into a suicide bomb?”

It should be clear that any deterrence value or dampening of jihadist enthusiasms that we might have expected to gain from Iraq will be lost if the outcome there is widely believed to be an American defeat. Such an outcome would be little short of a catastrophe, a point one wishes were better grasped on Capitol Hill and among certain presidential candidates. It may be that the final outcome in Iraq is not, ultimately, of our determining – that the immediate future of Iraq will inevitably reduce itself to the question of whether Iraqis want a state (even a loosely federal state) more than they want to kill each other. But the premature abandonment of the effort to prevent that nightmare scenario from playing itself out would be read by global jihadists as a sign of fecklessness that will have untold, but surely awful, consequences.

DESERVING VICTORY

In my study, I keep a small postcard copy of a British World War II poster, in which Winston Churchill points a stubby finger at you over the emblazoned slogan “Deserve Victory!” What must we do, in remedying our own incapacities, to deserve victory in the war against global jihadism?

Lesson 11. Cultural self-confidence is indispensable to victory in the long-term struggle against jihadism.

The second part of Pope Benedict’s Regensburg Lecture was a reminder to the West that, if irrational faith poses one grave threat to the human future, so does a loss of faith in reason. If the West loses its faith in the human capacity to know the truth of anything with certainty, it will have disarmed itself intellectually, culturally, and morally, unable to give an account of its commitments to civility, tolerance, the free society, and democratic self-government. Saying “No” to radical skepticism and moral insouciance is very much part of homeland security.

Lesson 12. Islamist salami tactics must be resisted, for small concessions in the name of a false idea of tolerance inevitably lead to further concessions and to further erosions of liberty.

This process is well-advanced in Europe, where enclaves of shari’a law exist in Great Britain, France, the low countries and elsewhere – enclaves where the writ of local law does not run, even in the matter of “honor” killings. The path to legal surrender was paved by cultural surrender, as when (to take the most ludicrous example) “Piglet” mugs disappeared from some British retailers after Islamists complained that the *Winnie the Pooh* character offended Muslim sensibilities. The Danish cartoons controversy of 2006 was the most ominous expression of the problem to date, for here kowtowing to Islamist agitations led directly to the infringement of classic civil liberties.

The European experience of accommodation to Islamist and jihadist threats and demands has shown where the first concessions lead. Becoming a *dhimmi*, a second-class citizen, is not always a matter of accommodating to an imposed Islamic law. As the European experience demonstrates, self-dhimmitude is a danger when the nature of tolerance is misunderstood.

Not only must the West defend its core values at home; it should intensify its efforts to promote religious freedom around the world.

Lesson 13. We cannot, and will not, deserve victory (much less achieve it) if we continue to finance those who attack us. Therefore, an urgent program to defund jihadism by developing alternatives to petroleum-based energy as a transportation fuel is a crucial component of the current struggle.

Global jihadism would not be a threat if it had the West not transferred some \$2 trillion in wealth to the Arab Islamic world since the Second World War – which, *inter alia*, has allowed Saudi Arabia to spend an estimated \$70-100 billion spreading Wahhabi doctrine all over the globe. The national security threat of oil dependency is obvious. It is also self-demeaning.

This is not the occasion to get into the details of various alternative energy strategies, but there ought to be broad agreement on former CIA Director R. James Woolsey's argument that "energy independence for the U.S. is... preponderantly a problem related to oil and its dominant role in fueling vehicles for transportation." In March 2006 testimony before the Senate Energy Committee, Woolsey proposed "two directions for government policy in order to reduce our vulnerability rapidly," in both cases using existing technologies, or technologies that can be brought into the market quickly and can work within our existing transportation superstructure.

Government policy should, in Woolsey's view, "(1) encourage a shift to substantially more fuelefficient vehicles... including promoting both battery development and a market for existing battery types for plug-in hybrid vehicles; and (2) encourage biofuels and other alternative and renewable fuels that can be produced from inexpensive and

widely-available feedstocks – wherever possible from waste products."

A nation that created the Manhattan Project, Project Apollo, and the global revolution in information technology surely can, by analogous acts of will and leadership by both the public and private sectors, defund global jihadism by drastically cutting the transfer of funds related to petroleum imports for transportation fuel. It beggars belief that peoples who did not discover a resource, much less the means to exploit it and make it the source of vast wealth, have profited by its development in ways that now threaten the very possibility of world order. This is dhimmitude, if of a global economic sort, and it must stop, as a matter of self-defense as well as self-respect.

Lesson 14. Victory in the war against global jihadism requires a new domestic political coalition that is proof against the confusions caused by the Unhinged Left and the Unhinged Right.

If we are indeed "present at the creation," once again, we would do well to adopt a lesson from Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and Vandenberg and create, if possible, a domestic political coalition that understands global jihadism and is broadly agreed on the measures necessary to defeat it. There is a serious question, though, as to whether the kind of coalition that was assembled in the late 1940s can be replicated today, given the dependence of the Democratic Party on the Unhinged Left for funding and the willingness of Republicans upset about deficits, "No Child Left Behind," budget-busting prescription drug benefits for seniors, and the administration's proposals for immigration reform to throw George W. Bush over the side – irrespective of what would happen, in real-world consequences and public perception, to his administration's accurate identification of the principal threat to both U.S. national se-

curity and a minimum of world order. But were such a coalition to be formed, it should take as one of its tasks a rationalization of our homeland security policy. We have not yet reached the point of Great Britain, where one of the country's most wanted terrorists slipped through Heathrow in 2006 by wearing a burka, as Scottish grandmothers bent over to remove their shoes at x-ray machines. But we could get there, unless we decide that effective counter-terrorism is more important than political correctness in devising airport screening measures. Risk-profiling and the development of trusted-traveler identification cards would be two important elements in rationalizing homeland security.

The rationalization of homeland security will also require effective measures to rein in those parts of the federal judiciary that put irrational obstacles in the way of detecting terrorism plots. On a 2005 ruling by a federal district court, the U.S. government can alert Scotland Yard and MI-5 if the National Security Agency intercepts a phone call from Peshawar to London in which jihadists plot to unleash a dirty radiological bomb in Trafalgar Square; but any such NSA intercept of a call between Kandahar and Chicago in which terrorists plot to set off a similar bomb at 16th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue is unconstitutional and records of it must be erased. This is, quite literally, insane. And it, too must stop.

Lesson 15. There is no escape from U.S. leadership.

The challenge of global jihadism cannot neither be avoided nor appeased. The war that has been declared against us – and by “us” I mean the West, not simply the United States – can only be engaged, and with a variety of instruments, many of them not-military.

Whatever the post-9/11 incapacities identified above – and they are serious, and they must be addressed – the fact remains

that there is no alternative to U.S. leadership in the war against global jihadism. As Michael Gerson has put it, “There must be someone in the world capable of drawing a line – someone who says, ‘This much and no further.’ At some point, those who decide on aggression must pay a price, or aggression will be universal.” That someone can only be the United States. The President must insure that, whatever else happens, he leaves the American people, at the end of his term, with a clear understanding of the nature of the threat, and the magnitude of the stakes on the global table.

His successor, whoever he or she may be, will quickly learn that there is no escape from the burden of American leadership. That president, whoever he or she may be, ought also to see that burden as an opportunity for national renewal.

Politics, Terrorism, and the Sunni Divide

Samuel HELFONT*

Abstract: *The purpose of the subsequent study is to explain the divisions within Sunni Islamism (i.e., the Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood) in order to avoid mistakes and to put facts in their proper contexts. This distinction is also very important for the policymakers which must address each group separately and form distinct policies for each.*

Keywords: *religion, policy, Sunni Islamism, Wahhabism, Muslim Brotherhood.*

Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood are two distinct forms of Sunni Islamism. They have separate histories and separate worldviews. In reality they are not even the same type of movement. Their origins were largely unrelated. Their historic missions have been completely different, as are their current goals and means of achieving those goals. Unfortunately, these differences too often are overshadowed by a false Sunni-Shia dichotomy that tends to lump all Sunni Islamists together. But learning the differences between Sunni Islamists is critical to understanding politics and terrorism in the Arab Middle East.

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One could even argue that the most important division shaping Arab politics is not between Sunnis and Shias but between the Wahhabis and the Brotherhood. Before delving into current issues, however, it is first necessary to define differences between Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Wahhabism stems from the theological teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth century reformer. Abd al-Wahhab was one of several "revivalist" thinkers to emerge from that century. The mission of these revivalists was to purify and thereby revitalize Islam. They carried the banner of reform but unlike modern reformers, they wanted to transform Islam on traditionally Islamic grounds. They did not attempt to adapt it to other systems of thought, politics, or culture. Their goals did not include modernizing Islam to meet the demands of a changing world. In this sense they were pre-modern. Wahhabism is thus, at its heart, a pre-modern theological movement and Wahhabists continue to make mostly theological

arguments about the oneness of God and proper forms of worship. Their historical mission has been a call to reform Islam according to a strict and narrowly defined theology. There are, of course, political implications to this understanding of Islam, but Wahhabism is still best understood as a theological reform movement.

The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, is a political organization originating in Egypt's cosmopolitan cities during the twentieth century. The Brotherhood's Islamism is one of several political ideologies to emerge out of Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Like Pan-Arabism, nationalism, and socialism, which also emerged in Egypt at that time, the Brotherhood's Islamism is at its heart a political identity. The historical mission of the Brotherhood has been political reform based on an Islamic political identity. Just as nationalists promoted an ethno-national identity, and socialists promoted a class-based identity, the Brotherhood promoted a political identity based on Islam. Unlike the Wahhabists, however, the Brotherhood was not concerned with implementing a particular theology. It recruited members who held various understandings of Sunni Islam and its leaders were laymen, not Islamic scholars. The Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-Banna was a school teacher, as was the important brotherhood theorist, Sayid Qutb. Al-Banna's successor Hassan al-Hudaybi was a lawyer. Thus, the reforms that the Brotherhood has called for have almost always been political, not theological. In fact, they often mixed traditional Islam with modern political thought. For example, the Brotherhood has embraced nationalism, constitutionalism, and participation in elections. Its rhetoric was – and continues to be – full of anti-Imperialist arguments that are common throughout the third world. These were not strictly Islamic concepts.

It should be clear, then, that Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood are two

distinct movements. Indeed the Muslim Brothers and the Wahhabists have often been fierce critics of one another. They each consider the other to have divided the Islamic community. Wahhabists blame the Muslim Brotherhood for what it calls *hizbiyyah* (partisanship). They claim that because the Brotherhood supports the formation of political parties, it has divided the Muslim world into competing factions. Further, Wahhabists criticize the Brotherhood's theological leniency, as well as its modern political influences. As one Wahhabist recently put it, the Muslim Brothers "have consistently overlooked the principal aspect of calling their followers to *tawhid* (the oneness of God) and forbidding them from polytheism, because these are matters which require time and effort to change, matters which people do not find easy to accept. [The Muslim Brothers] were more concerned with amassing groups of people together rather than calling the people to the way of the Prophet."¹ The Brotherhood, on the other hand, has accused the Wahhabists of being so strict in their interpretations of Islam that they have caused *fitnah* (schism). They argue that this *fitnah* pits one group of Muslims against another and that Islam strictly forbids such divisions.

Regional Politics

Unfortunately, the differences and indeed the conflicts between the Brotherhood and the Wahhabists have not received the attention they deserve. In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a bloody conflict broke out between Iraq's Sunnis and Shias. This conflict has led some to see the entire region through the prism of the age-old Sunni-Shia struggle. While this conflict is certainly important, dividing the Middle East along sectarian lines is not an accurate way to assess the loyalties – or predict the actions of – various regional actors.

For example, when Israel went to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and with Hamas in Gaza in the winter of 2008-2009, the region did not divide along sectarian lines. In both of these conflicts, the Shias from Hezbollah and Iran aligned with Sunni Islamists from Hamas and other Muslim Brotherhood associated organizations. On the other side of the regional divide were Sunni Arab Nationalists, traditional Sunni monarchies, and Sunni Islamists with Wahhabist tendencies. These groupings are generally indicative of the political order in the Middle East. Indeed, on other contentious issues that are said to divide Sunnis and Shias, the divisions that were apparent during the recent Israeli wars with Hezbollah and Hamas continue to be dominant. For example, the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood has often defended Iran's nuclear program ignoring the interests of its fellow Sunnis. So while a divide does exist in regional politics, it is not between Sunnis and Shias.

One reason for the Brotherhood's alliance with the Shias is that the Brotherhood is a political movement concerned with bringing Muslims together under an Islamic political identity. It is open to differing interpretations of Islam, and is, therefore, less critical of the Shias. Additionally, Ruhollah Khomeini's political Islam in Iran was very similar to the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. Both called for *taqrib* (the bringing together of sects), both downplayed traditional theology, and both have similar understandings of an Islamic state. Iran, for example, has a constitution and holds elections. The regime, therefore, claims legitimacy based on a mix of Islamic and modern principles. If the Muslim Brotherhood were to form an Islamic state, it would probably look similar to the current Iranian state. This is despite the fact that one group is Sunni and the other is Shia. The Wahhabists, on the other hand, care more about theology than politics.

They, therefore, denounce democracy as un-Islamic and often forbid Muslims from participating in elections. They deplore what they consider deviant sects such as Shiism, and even when their interests align such as in Hezbollah's war against Israel, the Wahhabists refuse to support Shias.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabists compete for power and influence in most Arab states. Because the Middle Eastern political order is currently defined by Iran's push for hegemony, the competition between the Brotherhood and the Wahhabists has a profound affect on regional politics. Any gain the Brotherhood makes in comparison to the Wahhabists pushes the Arab states closer to Iran. Any gain the Wahhabists make pushes the Arab states away from Iran. This battle is currently taking place throughout the Arab Middle East, yet because most researchers and analysts lump all Sunni Islamists together, it has been mostly overlooked.

Policymakers, therefore, should understand that (1) the most important division in the Middle East is not between Sunnis and Shias, but the internal divisions within Sunni Islamism, and (2) the success or failure of Sunni Islamism, as a whole, is not as important to the regional balance of power as who among the Sunni Islamists are successful.

Jihad and Terrorism

The deep divisions between Sunni Islamists are not only important to the regional balance of power. The United States, for example, in trying to combat terrorism, must understand the difference between Wahhabists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Both streams of Sunni Islamism claim to carry out jihad in the name of Islam, so researchers and analysts often mistakenly lump them together. In reality, the Muslim Brotherhood's jihad is not the same as that of the Wahhabists. These two separate understandings of jihad may share several important similarities,

but they also have significant differences and are sometimes even contradictory. Understanding how each group comprehends jihad is, therefore, paramount for policy-makers concerned with terrorism. Failing to distinguish between these two groups could result in wasting valuable resources on preparing for an attack that will never come, or worse, being unprepared in the face of imminent danger.

In the modern world, the concept of jihad can be seen as both useful and problematic for Muslims. It is useful in offering a powerful and religiously sanctioned call to arms. Many modern Muslims, from both secular and religious movements, have called for jihad as a means of rallying support for war. However, for modern Muslims engaged in the battle of ideas, the legacy of jihad can be problematic. At present, there is a widely accepted stigma against offensive and expansionist warfare. This is particularly true in the Muslim world which was conquered and ruled by expansionist European empires in the nine-teenth and twentieth century. Therefore, many Muslims, attempting to fuse Islam and modernity, have trouble coming to terms with the historical practice of expansionist jihad. Consider, for example, the sermons of the prominent Muslim Brotherhood related scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi. In one sermon, al-Qaradawi insists that the "Prophet Muhammad did not carry a sword, but used the good word to preach his message."² Nevertheless, in a sermon less than a year earlier, he had claimed that the Prophet Muhammad's life "was one of continuous jihad. The ten years he spent in Medina were bloody jihad and fighting against non-belief, infidelity, Judaism, and others."³

Because of this friction between pre-modern and modern norms, the Muslim Brotherhood has reinterpreted the meaning of jihad, infusing it with modern concepts. It generally understands jihad as resistance

to expansionist warfare and imperialism. It does not consider domestic political violence to be jihad and it condemns attacks on other Muslims. The only time the Brotherhood considers jihad to be legitimate is when it takes place on Muslim land that it deems occupied by a non-Muslim force. Today, this would include Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir and other similar locales. Once jihad is declared, however, the Brotherhood uses whatever means it has at its disposal. This includes suicide bombings, targeting civilians, and the use of women and children.

Wahhabists, by comparison, care less about modern stigmas. While they may employ modern norms in their rhetoric, they refuse to have their actions constrained by modern discourse. For this reason, the concept of jihad has evolved differently within Wahhabism.

Wahhabists generally see the Brotherhood's reinterpretation of jihad as an abomination. Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab's interpretation of jihad makes no apology for aggression. In fact offensive jihad was essential for the spread of Wahhabism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The famous union between abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud was based on the idea that Saud would have much to gain from religiously-sanctioned expansive warfare.

Modern Wahhabists attempt to stay true to the pre-modern teachings of abd al-Wahhab. They do not consider modern norms and stigmas to be of any significance. In fact, they view the permeation of these norms into Islam as a grave threat to the religion. Therefore, even completely non-political and non-violent Wahhabist recognize that the principle of offensive jihad is valid, although they do not currently practice it. They are extremely critical of the Muslim Brotherhood related scholars who have argued that offensive jihad is invalid in the modern period. As one non-violent Wahhabist

argues, these Brotherhood scholars have “belittled” the Islamic tradition “in the name of ‘understanding of priorities’” and they have “declared their loyalty for the Infidels in the name of ‘creating a good picture of Islam.’”⁴ This particular Wahhabist considers the more recent attempts to reinterpret jihad unsurprising since historically, the “figureheads of the Bankrupt Brotherhood” have been known to “distort, twist and water down the objectives of Jihad.”⁵

Another important aspect of Wahhabists’ interpretations of jihad is their very limited definition of who is a Muslim. This is based on their strict theological interpretation of Islam. Abd al-Wahhab had declared the overwhelming majority of eighteenth century Muslims to be unbelievers and authorized jihad to be waged against them. Abd al-Wahhab and his followers were especially confrontational toward non-Sunni Muslims including the Shias. This type of thinking was reinforced in the modern period when it was combined with Sayid Qutb’s ideas. Qutb of course, was a Muslim Brother, but his followers formed radical offshoots of the Brotherhood that often combined with the Wahhabists and ultimately turned against the Brotherhood’s original ideology. Unlike Abd al-Wahhab, there is no evidence that Qutb himself was anti-Shia. His theory of *jahaliyyah*, however, opened the door for excommunicating Muslims who did not conform to his understanding of Islam. When Qutbism and Wahhabism were merged in the 1970s and 1980s, the result was a small but extremely violent strain of Wahhabist Islamism that produced groups such as al-Qaeda.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Understanding the divisions within Sunni Islamism will help analysts both avoid simple mistakes and put events into their proper contexts. For example, one should not expect the Muslim Brotherhood

to be anti-Hezbollah or anti-Iran and vice versa. Conversely, one should also not expect Wahhabists and the Muslim Brotherhood to work together simply because they are both Sunni Islamists. When trying to understand terrorist threats, analysts should realize that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabists have different ideas of what constitutes legitimate jihad. Analysts should not expect the Brotherhood to carry out Al Qaida style attacks on the U.S. homeland or against other Muslims. Yet, Muslim Brotherhood critiques of this type of terrorism should not be taken to indicate that the Brotherhood has renounced violent jihad. To misunderstand this would be extremely dangerous because in several cases, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Muslim Brotherhood’s understanding of jihad represents a direct military threat to the United States and our allies.

By viewing the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabism as two separate movements, U.S. policymakers can address each group separately, forming distinct policies for each.

Wahhabism presents a unique challenge for U.S. policymakers in that Wahhabists consider any epistemology not rooted entirely in traditional Islamic sources to be invalid. Therefore, it would be very difficult for the United States to engage Wahhabists in direct public diplomacy or a battle of ideas. After all, they do not accept the modern secular premises – whether liberal, realists, Marxist, etc. – that Western arguments rest upon. However, the United States does have a direct interest in limiting the influence of the more violent Wahhabists, and in empowering the most non-political scholars.

The first step is for U.S. diplomats and policymakers concerned with the Middle East to familiarize themselves with the internal arguments and language of Wahhabist debates. All Wahhabists, from the most violent to the most passive, share the same basic beliefs. What separates Al Qaeda from

Wahhabists who oppose attacks on the United States, such as the Saudi religious establishment, is that some Wahhabists consider the United States to have entered into a treaty or an alliance with an Islamic ruler. The United States is, therefore, protected under Islamic law and an illegitimate target for jihad. These are technicalities of Islamic law but they are very important to Wahhabists and can make the difference in convincing a Muslim to support or refrain from supporting terrorism. Groups such as Al Qaeda understand this and use it in their propaganda. For example, when addressing its critics in the wake of 9/11, Al Qaeda made sure to assert that "Truly, America is not, nor has it ever been, a land of treaty or alliance."⁶ U.S. policymakers and practitioners should understand these debates and in this example, make sure that the United States is portrayed as having entered into a treaty with a legitimate Islamic ruler. This can be done both by pressuring Middle Eastern governments to depict their relationship with the United States in this manner, and through public diplomacy which does the same. Of course, this type of public diplomacy will not, on its own, end the threat of Al Qaeda and other violent Wahhabists, but it can make it much easier for nonviolent Wahhabists to discourage others from attacking American targets.

Conversely, the Muslim Brotherhood, while not an organization that U.S. policymakers should support in its current form, is open to modernity and modernist arguments. The Brotherhood has made clear that, at least in theory, it accepts the validity of modern norms such as nonviolence, non-aggression, human rights, democracy, and constitutionalism. Policymakers concerned with public diplomacy should, therefore, identify where they feel the Brotherhood is not living up to these norms. For example, when the Brotherhood claims to be non-

violent, it should be challenged over its support for violence in Israel, Iraq, Chechnya, and Kashmir. When the Brotherhood claims to accept human rights, it should be shown where it falls short concerning religious minorities and women's rights. When the Brotherhood claims to be democratic, it should underscore where its proposed policies fail to meet democratic standards. Thus far, the United States has failed to articulate these types of arguments well. It has, therefore, let the Brotherhood's propaganda stand unchallenged; causing many in the Islamic world to conclude that the United States opposes the Brotherhood not because it is an undemocratic and often militant organization, but because it is Islamic. Policymakers should make clear that they intend to treat the Muslim Brotherhood as they would any other political party, regardless of religion. The more the debate focuses on the Muslim Brotherhood's politics and the less it focuses on its religion, the more successful U.S. policy will be. Through engaging the Brotherhood indirectly in the battle of ideas, the United States can challenge the Brotherhood to live up to the principles that it already claims to accept.

By refusing to favor either the Brotherhood or the Wahhabists, U.S. policymakers might neutralize the most radical elements of each movement. This impartial approach might also avoid destabilizing the regional balance of power. The United States could then form policies that pull the Muslim Brotherhood away from militancy without pushing it toward Wahhabism. Concurrently, it could attempt to limit the extremes of Wahhabism without pushing this group toward the Iranian-led anti-Western camp. The United States would, therefore, be able to pursue its interests in long-term liberalization/democratization while continuing to support short-term stability.

Notes

¹ Oliver, Haneef James. "Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood)." *The Wahhabi Myth Website*, www.thewahhabimyth.com/ikhwan.htm

² "Near/Middle East: Round-Up of Friday Sermons 22 Sep 06," *BBC Monitoring*, September 26, 2006.

³ Qatar TV, "Live Sermon from Umar Bin-al-Khattab Mosque in Doha," November 25, 2005,

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⁴ "Readings in Qaradawism: Part 4: Discontinuation of Jihaad," *Salafi Publications*, www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=NDV16&articleID=NDV160004&articlePages=1

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ "Translation of April 24, 2002 al-Qaeda document." *Middle East Policy Council*. www.mepc.org/journal_vol10/0306_alqaeda.asp

Toward a New Method in History of Ideas and Interreligious Dialogue.

Case Study: Romanian Political and Spiritual Life (1859-1918)

Anca Parmena OLIMID

Abstract: *The study deals with the evolution of inter-religious relations in Romania between 1859-1918. The initiative of the article is to comprehend the spirituality of the period and the social consequences of the new legislation adopted in order to regulate the inter-religious dialogue between the Orthodox and the Catholics.*

Keywords: *inter-religious dialogue, politics, state, methodology, legislation.*

In a century of freedom, inspired by the French Revolution, the structural change of Romanian society in its internal substance must be understood as an evolutionary process of our historical existence, granting to the state the substantial role in creating new legislative, economical, social, political and religious structures. The present article takes initiative of a natural examination, in the wish to contribute to understanding the spirituality characterizing this period. The purpose of the article is to offer to those who study the problems of institutional relations between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church the possibility to come back to a single Church, suggesting as working hypothesis a new scenario: analyzing the relations between Rome and Byzance starting from the Orient's necessities. The analyzes has a clear structure materialized in three objectifs.

I. The analyze starts with a part dedicated to the Romanian Orthodox Church. The introductory part of this analyzes the evolution of religious institutions and endeavors

to present the changes in the doctrine, organization and cult of Orthodox Church: the first church reforms of A. I. Cuza, the status of monarchism and the status of Romanian monasteries in the 19th century, organization standards of sacred monasteries, modification of legislation and administrative structure of Romanian Orthodox Church after the enforcement of the law on secularization of monastery properties.

The double election of Alexandru Ioan Cuza had as consequence the establishment of a new political order in the Romanian Principalities, that were facing not only an unification process of their structures, but also the inexorable necessity to establish the new, modern state. On the 3rd of May 1859 the government lead by Mihail Kogălniceanu was established, and the archimandrite Melchisedec Ștefănescu was appointed as head of the Cults Department (30th of April 1860); he had to help Kogălniceanu in solving the difficult problem of secularization of monastery properties.

The issue of secularization of monastery properties represents an old process between the country and Greek monks, process which started before Matei Basarab. The church establishments from the Holy Places, to which the Romanian monasteries were sacred, had the duty to watch their existence and maintenance, fulfilling all the obligations stipulated by their founders: maintenance of hospitals or asylums, schools, granting charities, so on, and for fulfilling all these requirements, they should have received a part of monastery incomes. Despite this, due to „*the indifference and greed of Greek monks and especially of despotic hegumens, the monasteries were in a lamentable status*”. The lamentable status of the Orthodox Church from Turkey and the deep veneration that Romanians had for patriarchs and for famous monasteries from Orient, especially for those from the mount Athos and Sinai, but also for Holy Places from Orient, stimulated the Romanian rulers, metropolitan bishops and founders of churches not only to make gifts and establishments in those places, but also to devote some monasteries from Romanian Lands.

On the 12/24th of December 1863, Mihail Kogălniceanu, in his quality of President of the Council of Ministers presented an evaluation¹, demanding, in the same time, the approval in order to present to the Assembly of Deputies the „*Draft law for the secularization of monastery properties*”. On the 13/35 December 1863, at the Government's proposal, the assembly approved the secularization of monastery properties with 93 votes against 3 (according to this law, over a quarter of the national territory devoted to the Holy Places was recovered).

The proclamation of the Constitution from 1866 represented an essential step on the road of completion of modern organization of the Romanian society, because not only a historical period of Romanians

was elaborated, but, by firmly stating the national sovereignty and aspiration for independency, by the tone on which it was written, by some stipulations² and especially by ignoring the Ottoman suzerainty and the warranty of great powers, it was brought out as a fundamental statute of a free country.

Thus, in the year 1867 a new draft organic law was made for the Romanian Orthodox Church for which in the year 1869 the consent of the Hegumenic Patriarch Gregory the 6th (1867-1871). The lack of synod canonical authority in the Romanian Orthodox Church that was supposed to regulate the dogmatic and disciplinary issues determined the Romanian Government, through the report no. 12693 from 1872, drafted by Christian Tell, the Ministry of Cults and Public Education, to propose to the Legislative Bodies a law for the election of metropolitan bishops and eparchy bishops and the establishment of the Holy Synode of the Romanian Orthodox Church.

This project was voted by the Chamber of Deputies (4th of December 1872) and by the Senate (11th of December 1872) and amended on the 14/16th of December 1872, under the name of *Organic law for the election of metropolitan bishops and eparchy bishops and the establishment of the Holy Synode of the Romanian Autocephalic Orthodox Church*.

The document from the 9th of May 1877 and the proclamation of Romania as Kingdom on the 14/26th of March 1881 also favoured the acknowledgement of our church's autocephaly in the year 1885, autocephaly which, although declared in the country through several prior laws, did not obtain yet the recognition of the Constantinople Patriarchy. On the 25th of April 1885, the Hegumenic Patriarch of Constantinople sent an encyclical letter, accompanied by Tomos and the respective correspondence to the other oriental apostolic

patriarchates and to the Autocephalic Orthodox, bringing to their knowledge the fact that the Hegumenic Patriarchy formally acknowledged the Romanian Orthodox Church „*autocephalic and independent in all and for all*”.

The law on the laic clergy and the seminars was amended in May 1893³ and stipulated new provisions in the following fields: salaries of clergy, maintenance of churches, establishment of parishes, appointment and training of clergy, administrative and disciplinary control in Church.

Also, the aspects related to the cultural emancipation, meaning the institutionalization of theological education (establishment of theological seminars and of the first theology faculties in Iași and București), church literature and press were established.

II. The second part is dedicated to the organization of Catholic Church in Romania between 1859-1918. It approaches in great detail the evolution of structural and functional components of the Catholic Church. The analysis starts with presenting short data related to the presence of Catholicism starting with the 13th century that can be used as general orientation and necessary introduction, ground which, historically and geographically, is limited to the Romanian territory.

At the middle of the 19th century, the South-East of Europe became a land of rivalries between the Turkish domination and the Russian religious protectorate. The Russian-Turkish war, preceded by the occupation of the Romanian Principalities (1853) and the conflict between the main European powers: France, England, Austria and Italy religiously disunited and separated from the economic and political point of view the whole European continent. Russia's defeat and the installation of peace (Paris, 1853), re-established the geopolitical balance in the region. The Treaty of Paris from March 1856 maintained the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, but the Russian pro-

tectorate had been replaced by the collective warranty of all powers.

On the 27th of April 1883, through the apostolic letter *Praecipuum munus*, Pope Leon the 13th separated the Apostolic Vicarship of Vallachia of the Nicopolis ad Istrum Bishopry, and the Monseigneur Ignazio Paoli was appointed residential bishop. In the same time, by granting the representation degree through the denomination of *Bucharest Archbishopric*, the Bucharest Archdiocese will be directly subordinated to the Holy See, through the De Propaganda Fide Congregation. On the 27th of June 1884, through the Papal Bull *Quae in christiani nominis incrementum* („*Those that exist for the Christian progress*”), the Pope Leon the 13th established the end of the Apostolic Vicarship of Moldova and the establishment of the Catholic Bishopric of Iasi and the appointment of Nicolae Iosif Camilli as Bishop of Iași.

A special interest was given to the cultural conflict between the rigid Catholic concept and the anti-clergy intransigent forces of the 19th century, including here the complex process of mobilization of masses which involved all the areas of social life: schools, universities, press, family (the issue of mixed marriages), national symbols, so on.

An important aspect of the culture of dialogue is dedicated to aspects related to the cultural emancipation, meaning the institutionalization of theological education. The Catholic educational system was influenced by Western models, but during its evolution it acquired a specific, original shape, in compliance with the cultural and social requirements of this period. The period 1859-1918 will establish a unique Romanian model of education according to the religious freedom established through the Constitution from 1866. We took into account the historical coordinates of the Catholic education at the level of universal and local church.

The Romanian Catholic books written in Romania during 1859-1918 were texts with liturgical-pastoral character (catechisms, brochures for professors and vicarage schools, Christian education books, so on) written by missionaries. The majority of these writings were translations or compilations of Italian or Latin religious books (some of which being transcribed in Latin alphabete, others in the Cyrillic alphabete⁴). Some religious texts are known only through documents, others, less numerous, were kept in archives.

III. The third aspect of this analyzes is dedicated to the the institutional relations between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Romania 1859-1918. It starts with the presentation of theological instruments of the institutional relations between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church, because the discussion on the unity of the Church comes before the study of the institutional relations between the two Churches.

The institutional dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the Roman-Catholic Church at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century is a process involving an ecclesiology with a higher number of common elements than in other ecclesiologies, but also with aspects trant need further clarification and with „insurmountable obstacles”, such as the existence of the Pope’s primacy and Pope’s infallibility.

Thus, we cannot speak about the institutional relations between the Orthodox Church and the Roman-Catholic Church without seeing the similar and different points between from the perspective become “*traditional*” for the unity of the Church.

In this dynamics of the crisis of religious subject in the modern period, the ecclesiastic orientations in the politics of the Holy See towards the Orient Churches (1859-1918) deserves a special interest,

because the popedom’s schedule without precedent in the history of papacy brought new hopes for Catholics and stimulated the Orthodox to unify with Rome.

An important aspect is related to the legislation in the field of institutional relations between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Romania 1859-1918 reveals a new view on the society and state, marking, as follows, the evolution of relations between the public authorities and confessional institutions (freedom of cults in the view of the 1866 Constitution, The rights and freedoms of cults in theview of Berlin Treaty (1878), The regulation for the church relations of the Romanian Orthodox clergy with heterodox believers or of other communion and with the believers who live in the Kingdom of Romania (1881).

The evolution of Romania took place during two centuries, starting with the end of the 18th century until the second half of the 20th century, with the end of the Second World War, being emphasized by two important periods: the first period emphasizes the transition of Romanian Principalities from Byzantine-Orthodox tradition of South-East origin to the innovative dynamism of Western origin, and the second period emphasizes the shaping of modern Romania. The separation moment between the two periods is the year 1866, in the same time with the adoption of the Constitution that will serve as fundamental law to the new state and the assertion of the Sigmaringen dynasty, branch of the Hohenzollern.

The legal provisions of art. 21 from the 1866 Constitution were completed with the provisions of articles 43 and 44 from the Berlin Treaty (13 June 1878). In its meeting from the 12th of June 1881, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church adopted the *Regulation for the church relations of the Romanian Orthodox*

clergy with heterodox believers or of other communion and with the believers who live in the Kingdom of Romania.

The end of the chapter is dedicated to features of institutional relations between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church and aims to analyze the perspective offered by the main attitudes and conflicts:

1. The project of establishment of a „national” Catholic Church in the Romanian Principalities (establishment of direct diplomatic contacts between the Holy See and the Unified Principalities, lacking the sovereignty and independence privileges that contributed to obtaining the status of international subject of law).
2. The issue of introduction of the Gregorian calendar. Another initiative of the Cuza government at the beginning of the year 1864 regarded the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar out of the need to make the connection with the Easter from Western Europe⁵. This initiative regarding the change of calendar had been mentioned since October of the previous year in the discussions between the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the country, Mihail Kogălniceanu and the Monseigneur Plyum. Ion Heliade Rădulescu fought against this proposal; he considered that this measure was against canons and church tradition. Ion Heliade Rădulescu was joined by members of hierarchy and many intellectuals. In these conditions, the church council gathered at the Metropolitan Seat, after large debates, decided to decline the proposal of the government, stating that the difference between the Julian Calendar and the Gregorian Calendar must be understood in the spirit of the Synod I of Niceea that mentioned the close connection between the Julian and the Gregorian Calendars as the establishment of holidays, especially Easter. Thus, the church year starts with the 1st of September, established by the Hegumenic Synod I held at Niceea in 325, synod which established the main dogmas of our belief, deciding the introduction of the Julian calendar for the church and the rules of determining the date of Holy Easter: thus, this great Christian holiday does not have to be feasted earlier or later than in the second day of the spring equinox.
3. The disputes linked to the mixed marriages (thus, the mixed marriage represented a factor of tensions and controversies between the State and the Church, especially between the State and the Catholic Church in the countries with confessional pluralism and where the Catholic Church could not claim to impose its own laws. We refer especially to mixed marriages between Catholics and persons of Orthodox, Protestant or Lutheran belief, which the Magister of the Catholic Church only accepted under certain circumstances).
4. „The issue of succession to the throne” and its stakes (in the 19th century, a special case in the relations between the Catholic church and the other Christian churches is the one of marriage between a Catholic part and a non-Catholic part, celebrated according to the legal provisions of the celebration place, and in Romania, the 1866 constitutional provisions excluded any religious incompatibility between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, through the unconditional acceptance to found a Romanian Orthodox Dynasty). The guarantee offered by the constitutional text of the dominant character of the Orthodox Church was justified through several reasons: the

great majority of Romanians were of Orthodox religion, the equity required that the Orthodox Church will receive a sign of encouragement and retribution for the fights and miseries from the past and, in the same time, is was a state interest, meaning the consolidation of the national Church, fully identified with the state's interests⁶.

The „*dominant*” formula does not ensure, exceptionally, a favorite status or a special legal condition for the Romanian Orthodox Church, but only a honorary spiritual priority towards other cults, due to a state of facts: the overwhelming number of believers. Thus, we have to make a special distinction between the Orthodox Church, representing a majority, statistically speaking, and the Catholic Church, with a minority condition.

5. The issue of establishment of a Roman-Catholic Archbishopric in Bucharest and the diplomatic negotiations between Romania and the Holy See for the creation of a Catholic hierarchy. Until the First World War, in the whole specialty literature, except the Orthodox Church, all the other cults were named „*foreign cults*”, and the Roman-Catholic cult was considered to be the first, from the first mentions linked to the presence of missionaries (Benedictine monks) hired to spread Roman Christianity.
6. The position of the Romanian Orthodox Church towards the establishment of the Roman-Catholic Archbishopric was expressed within the spring session of the Holy Synod from the year 1883, in the paper of the bishop Melchisedec, *Papacy and the present state of the Orthodox Church in the Romanian Kingdom*. The report had two parts: *The historic of Catholicism in Romania. II. The present state of our Orthodox Church in the Kingdom of Romania*.

The report was focused on the close connection between the Church and the nation existent within the Orthodox Church, founded on the principle granting to the Orthodox Church the character of national church.

As a conclusion, if we resume the main aspects that characterize the institutional relations between the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Romania (1859-1918), be are able to formulate the following argument that can become decisive for the future of institutional dialogue:

If Western Europe offered during the 19th century the image of a Catholicism that established a main difference at the level of relations with the society, the existence of a Magister whose authority is acknowledged by believers from every country, the East of the continent, a Europe or Orthodoxy, was characterized through the fidelity towards the Christian religion, fact that maintained confessional identity in the face of Islamism. The fracture between the Orthodoxy and the Catholicism does not mean, in essence, the establishment of two churches, but, to quote a Bulgakov remark, *a flaw in the unique body*, which continued to produce the fruits of holiness on each side.

Notes

¹ Ioan M. Bujoreanu, *Collection of old and new laws promulgated until the end of 1870*, New Publishing House of the Romanian Laboratory, Bucharest, 1873, pp. 1796-1797.

² In compliance with art. 23 from the 1866 Constitution: „*The Orthodox religion of the East is the dominant religion of the Romanian state. Th Orthodox Church is and remains independent towards any foreign authority, maintaining though the unity with the Hegumenic Church of the East, in which concerns the dogma*”.

³ Chiru C. Costescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-250. The Law was amended through: the Law from 28 February 1896; Law from 5 April 1900,

published in the Official Journal no. 73 from 2 July 1900; Law from 2 August 1907; Law from 25 February 1906, published in the Official Journal no. 262 from 26 February 1906; Law from 26 March 1909, published in the Official Journal no. 289 from 27 March 1909 and through the Law amended by the Royal Decree no. 1642 from 7th of May 1910 and published in the Official Journal no. 37 from 18 May 1910.

⁴ Emil Dumea, *Romanian Catholic books and magazines in Moldova*, Sapientia Publishing House, Iași, 2002, p. 10.

⁵ *History of Romanian Church*, vol. II, p. 505.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 112-113. Please refer to Dumitru Popescu, *Orthodoxy and the present day*, Biblical and Mission of the Romanian Orthodox Church Institute Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996; C. Yannaras, *Orthodoxy and West*, Byzantine Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995.

On the Relation between Public Organizations and the Political Environment: an Empirical Study in the Field of Education

Cătălina Maria GEORGESCU

Abstract: *The issue of the political environment determining the functioning of public sector organizations has received increasing attention the last two decades. In this article we review the literature for the most relevant constructs used in the stream of environmental research. We identify the fittest constructs to introduce in our own empirical research. Using data from the education sector over an eleven-year period, this study explores three hypotheses: that (1) wages, (2) competition for resources and (3) education units density are strongly associated to employee turnover in education. Using the multiple regression technique, this article reports on the factors that can be accounted for the variance in employee turnover in education.*

Keywords: *political environment, public organizations, education.*

Literature review

Theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding the relation between the external political environment and the management of public organizations include, but are not limited to the claim for the separation of politicians from administrators (Max Weber 1947, Woodrow Wilson 1887, Frank Johnson Goodnow, Luther Gulick 1933) on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the complementarity of politics and public administration (Svara 1999). The classical theory of the ideal type bureaucracy (Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1947) is the most cited model in the study

of public administration¹ and of the relation between elected politicians and civil servants. According to this theory, one recognizes the formal control of politics over the administration, the existence of the strict hierarchy principle, recruitment is operated within a merit-based system, while the expected result is the establishment of a body of politically-neutral, career-driven civil servants, capable to implement a set of public policies, no matter the colours of the governing party or alliance². The *Pendleton Act* (1883) introduced in the United States the principle of recruitment and promotion by competition-based examination and the probation period for civil servants, preceding the appointment³. Central to Weber's bureaucratic theory stand the authority relations

based on rationally-established rules that could be amended in order to deal with the evolution of the organizational environment⁴.

The separation theme constituted a major issue of debate while wondering whether it was possible to accomplish a complete separation of roles and tasks between politicians and bureaucrats. James H. Svara expressed a different view when assessing the relation between administrators and politically-elected or appointed leaders and concluding that they exert “ongoing interaction, reciprocal influence, and mutual deference”⁵ in the political process. The author further claims that what presently is styled as the politics-administration dichotomy differs greatly from the early literature which laid the foundation for the study of the public sphere⁶.

Other empirical studies on the role of the leadership of public organizations in the political process have dealt with the administrative reform process and the New Public Management⁷, the institutionalization of political discretion in the civil service⁸, the relation between technical expertise and political power⁹, comparative spending preferences of politicians and administrators¹⁰, or whether there is a conflictual relationship between them¹¹. Others have concentrated on competency management of higher civil servants (the *Public Administration Revue* dedicated an entire number to this issue in 2005¹²; see also the study report commissioned by the Slovenian Presidency of the EU in 2008, *Leadership competencies for successful change management*). One particular aspect received special attention as it deals with holding some public offices in the administration by representatives of the political field considered to be a source of malfunctioning in the system¹³.

The specific character of public sector organizations, as well as determinant factors and the relation to the political sphere have all been covered in a huge body of

work (Berman, Evan M., James S. Bowman, Jonathan P. West, Montgomery van Wart, *Human Resource Management in Public Service: Paradoxes, Processes, and Problems*, SAGE, 2005; Henry, Nicholas, *Administrație publică și afaceri publice*, Chișinău: Editura Cartier, 2005; Hood, Christopher, Gunnar Folke Schuppert, *Delivering public services in Western Europe: sharing Western European experience of para-government organization*, London, Sage, 1988; Kramer, Fred A., *Dynamics of public bureaucracy: an introduction to public management*, Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop, cop. 1981; Mosher, Frederick C., *Democracy and the public service*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982; Nunberg, Barbara, Luca Barbone, Hans-Ulrich Derlien, *The state after communism: administrative transitions in Central and Eastern Europe*, World Bank Publications, 1999; Pierre, Jon, *Handbook of Public Administration*, Sage, 2003; Pollitt, Christopher, Johnston Birchall, Keith Putman, *Decentralising public service management*, Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1998; Rabin, Jack, *Handbook of Public Personnel Administration*, CRC Press, 1995; Rosenbloom, David H., Deborah D. Goldman, *Public administration: understanding management, politics and law in the public sector*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993; Sekiou, Lakhdar, Louise Blondin, Bruno Fabi, Mohammed Bayad, Jean-Marie Peretti, David Alis, Françoise Chevalier, *Gestion des ressources humaines*, Edition: 2, De Boeck Université, 2001; Thuy, Phan, Ellen Hansen, David Price, *The public employment service in a changing labour market*, Geneva: International Labour Office, 2001).

Political dynamics can be a factor of producing uncertainty¹⁴, the changes undergone at political, decision-making level, with a certain frequency determined by the electoral cycle or randomly, as well as the influence exerted by politicians might affect the coherence and continuity of

policies and strategies essential for the modernization of the public sphere¹⁵. The environment in which public sector organizations have to perform their activities is very complex. This statement is the more valid if we are to think of the Romanian pluralist society. The framework offered by the environment explains the successes and/or failures of some public policies or public management activities, by this understanding that the environment surrounding the organization offers both opportunities and challenges for public sectors managers¹⁶. Hal G. Rainey explored the influence of the political and institutional environment on public organizations¹⁷.

Fred Kramer, in his study on the dynamics of public sector organizations in the United States has created a scheme to assess and explain the influences of political, social and economic environments especially through three types of factors: (1) governmental (through all the three branches: the action of elected or appointed members of the executive, of the legislative, the judiciary, other governmental agencies, and federalism), (2) non-governmental (political parties, interest and pressure groups, the media, citizens), and (3) intraorganizational (abilities, values, ethics, human rights policies) to which he added the influence of technology, science and ideas¹⁸.

The social and political environment of a public organization also reflects on organizational communication. Connected to this issue, Dayna Finet (2001) presents a new model of socially and politically oriented communication which refers to organizational communication under the terms of a conversation and presents organizational discourse as a sort of institutional rhetoric which works in the benefit of the organization as it „serves to strategically position organizational actors within the normative opinion in a debatable issue”¹⁹. Political environment factors

have a major importance in determining the priorities and establishing the directions to follow by state-owned organizations, in this sense organizational communication offers support for this approach, contributes to easing the whole process. In our opinion, one of the most important influence comes from the legislative through budgetary constraints. The manner in which each public organization reacts to the budget allocated through annual laws on state budget can often materialise in personnel cut-offs. Other financial constraints, this type coming from abroad (IMF, World Bank, EU) can determine the number of structures and the figures on the employees in the public field²⁰. Public organizations can also find themselves under the influence of the media, public opinion, and other state authorities. Moreover, there has been recently spotted another source of influence under the form of pressures from the consumer²¹.

Methodology

In this article we shall perform a multiple regression analysis using MS Excel in order to statistically assess the influence of the political environment on a management process. We consider that the factors that can be accounted for the variance in the level of human resources were not sufficiently explored. By making use of the multiple regression technique we attempt to model the connection between the phenomenon and the factors. In an empirical study unfolded in three Swiss cantons, researchers David Giauque, Fabien Resenterra and Michaël Siggen made use of two dependent variables – *strategic elaboration* and *implementation of public policies* – and four independent variables – *minister’s attitude*, *government style*, *pressure on financial results* and *minister’s interventionism* – to account for the type of relationship established between

political actors and public managers – either complementarity, or separation – through multiple linear regression technique²². Rhys Andrews, George A. Boyne, Jennifer Law and Richard M. Walker chose both economic and political constraints (“*political disposition*”) in performance assessment of English local services²³.

Research questions

In order to guide our work into conducting a rigorous empirical assessment of the influence of political environment on the management of public organizations we have established a set of four research questions:

Q1: How can one best describe the relation public organizations in the field of education have with the political environment?

Q2: How can one explain the variance in the number of public employees?

Q3: What are the factors that determine a change in the number of employees in education? More specifically, what is the relationship between governmental decisions and legislative regulations, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the situation of employees in education?

Q4: Is there room for improvement in the methodology of the study of this issue?

Dependent variable

We have searched for a variable that could be used in a study of the influence of external factors on a public management process – ensuring public organizations with the necessary human resources in order to effectively and efficiently perform their tasks, deliver public services etc. In our quest for defining the dependent variable we came across the article of Kenneth J. Meier and Alisa Hicklin, “Employee Turnover and Organizational Performance: Testing a Hypothesis from Classical Public Administration”, (in *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Oxford

University Press, Nr. 18, 2007, pp. 573–590) where *employee turnover* is used as an independent variable, though the authors recognize that it is rarely used in this capacity. We thus consider appropriate to use this variable – in our case as a dependent variable – to account for the restructuring process in public sector organizations in the field of education (EMPLOYEE TURNOVER). The variable is measured in this paper through the average number of employees per year working in education in the period 1996-2006.

Independent variables

This paper aims at assessing the influence of the hostility of the political environment – viewed as competition for budgetary resources among public sector organizations, the reorganization of the education field through government intervention and the level of wages of employees in education (as a record of government decisions as regards the remuneration of public employees) – upon employee turnover in education. This relation is modeled by making appeal to a set of three independent variables:

- (1) The first independent variable deals with the level of wages in the period we study received by employees in education (WAGES-TIME), viewed as a result of government commitment in the social field. The level of wages can also be put in relation to the degree of motivation of public employees. Other researchers have related the wage variable to the representation of women and minorities in the public sector²⁴. However, we have chosen this variable for its political implications, as a record of a dimension of governmental determination of the public sector – government regulations affecting employees pay, benefits and working

conditions²⁵, and employees contracts²⁶. Law no. 130/1996 and the collective labor contract at national level used to regulate the types of stimulants and benefits applicable in public organizations²⁷. The establishment of the level of wages in the public sector differs from determining the level of remuneration in private enterprises. On the other hand, we recognize the role played by collective bargaining at national level on the process of wage formation, most public employees in Romania being affiliated to unions. However, national level collective bargaining is regulated through law and establishes the minimum wage at national level, as well as the employment conditions applicable to the entire economy. Relatively recently, the Parliament adopted the framework-Law no. 330/2009 regarding the unitary remuneration of the personnel paid from public funds. The independent variable WAGES-TIME is operationalized in this study through the average net monthly earnings in the education sector.

Hypothesis 1: Employee turnover in education is strongly related to the level of wages in education.

Null hypothesis 1: There is no association between the level of wages and employee turnover in education.

- (2) We have chosen to name our second independent variable COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES as it aims at describing the competition for budgetary resources that public organizations must face in order to effectively perform their public services delivering activities. Thus, this measure can be understood as budgetary constraints which are likely to affect public organizations acting in the education field. According to Hal

J. Rainey (2009), this aspect is a dimension of the environment that Dess and Beard (1984) styled as “*munificence*” and defined it as “*availability of needed resources*”²⁸ and Aldrich (1979) as “*capacity*” and defined it as “*extent to which the environment affords a rich or lean supply of necessary resources*”²⁹. For a critique of the Dess and Beard approach, we recommend the study of Mark P. Sharfman and James W. Dean, Jr. from the private sector literature “*Conceptualizing and Measuring the Organizational Environment: A Multidimensional Approach*” (in *Journal of Management*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1991, pp. 681-700). Instead of Dess and Beard’s measures – *munificence*, *dynamism* and *complexity* –, Mark P. Sharfman and James W. Dean, Jr. proposed *competitive threat*, *revised complexity* and *revised dynamism*. Since the Romanian legislative controls the budgets that public sector organizations need in order to function³⁰, through its prerogative of issuing the state budget, and since *budgetary constraints* are known to affect the activity and shape of public organizations, we have considered fit to introduce this dimension in our model. We have operationalised this *competition for resources* variable as national spending with the education sector, as revealed by the financial resources granted to education in the yearly national budget. Although the value in absolute numbers of the budget allocated to education in the period 1996-2006 has increased, it has lagged behind the shares granted to other domains in the state budget. Thus, although the graphics shows a growing trend (with some exceptions), in relation to other fields covered by state budget, education along with health have always been disadvantaged

in the struggle for resources. Having this observation in mind, we can now state our second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2: There is a strong association between budgetary resources allocated for education and the employee turnover in the education field.

Null hypothesis 2: There is no association between budgetary constraints and our dependent variable.

- (3) Our last variable deals with the reorganization of the education field (EDUCATION UNITS DENSITY) through executive decisions, operationalized in this study as the number of education units per year. In choosing a proper variable we started from Aldrich's *concentration-dispersion*³¹ dimension of the environment.

Hypothesis 3: There is a strong direct association between the reorganization of the public sector through governmental decision and the employee turnover dependent variable.

Null hypothesis 3: There is no direct linear association between the independent and dependent variables.

Interpretation of results

Descriptive statistics


At this point we list the variables and indicators used in order to demonstrate our hypotheses, as well as the descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation) and sources of the data used for all the variables in Table 1, below.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and data sources for all variables^a.

Concept	Variable	Indicator	Min.	Max.	Mean	S.D.	Sources
Management process	EMPLOYEE TURNOVER	Average number of employees per year	381 (2004,2005)	432 (1996)	401.72	17.91	Romania's National Yearbook 2007
Hostility of political environment	WAGES-TIME	Average net monthly earnings per year	27.55 (1996)	1067 (2006)	383.84	340.08	Romania's National Yearbook 2007
	COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES	National spending with education	3004.7 (1996)	25322 (2006)	14184.96	6848.81	Law no. 29/1996, Law no. 72/1997, Law no. 109/1998, Law no. 36/1999, Law no. 76/2000, Law no. 216/2001, Law no. 743/2001, Law no. 631/2002, Law no. 507/2003, Law no. 511/2004, Law no. 379/2005.
	EDUCATION UNITS DENSITY	Number of education units per year	12587 (2005)	27558 (1996)	22420.45	5808.18	Romania's National Yearbook 2007


^an = 11.

Figure 1. Variance in the average number of employees per year in the period 1996-2006*




*Source of data: National Institute of Statistics, *Romania's National Yearbook 2007*, labour market section.


Figure 2. Allocated budget for education per year (1996-2006)*



*Own processing based on the figures for the budget allocated for education in Law no. 29/06.05.1996 on 1996 state budget, Law no. 72/29.04.1997 on 1997 state budget, Law no. 109/03.06.1998 on 1998 state budget, Law no. 36/08.03.1999 on 1999 state budget, Law no. 76/04.05.2000 on 2000 state budget, Law no. 216/26.04.2001 on 2001 state budget, Law no. 743/06.12.2001 on 2002 state budget, Law no. 631/27.11.2002 on 2003 state budget, Law no. 507/28.11.2003 on 2004 state budget, Law no. 511/22.11.2004 on 2005 state budget, Law no. 379/15.12.2005 on 2006 state budget.

Figure 3. Average net monthly earnings per year in education*

*The processed data comes from the statistics on the population's earnings and incomes issued by the National Institute of Statistics (*Romania's Statistical Yearbook 2007*).

Figure 4. Educational units per year (1996-2006)*

*Source of data: National Institute of Statistics, *Romania's Statistical Yearbook 2007*, the enterprise's activity section.

Regression analysis

Table 2 presents the correlation matrix among the dependent variable (EMPLOYEE TURNOVER) and the independent variables

(WAGES-TIME, COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES and EDUCATION UNITS DENSITY) and among the independent variables themselves taken two at a time.

Table 2. Pearson's coefficient of correlation

	EMPLOYEE TURNOVER	WAGES-TIME	COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES	EDUCATION UNITS DENSITY
EMPLOYEE TURNOVER	1.00	-.88697*	-.82083**	.861071*
WAGES-TIME	-.88697*	1.00	.858364*	-.96422*
COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES	-.82083**	.858364*	1.00	-.85406*
EDUCATION UNITS DENSITY	.861071*	-.96422*	-.85406*	1.00

Note: $n = 11$; significance levels: * $p < .001$ ** $p < .01$

We have noted in each cell of the correlation matrix the value of the coefficient of determination, the number of cases (n equals the number of years for the period our study refers to) and the statistical significance. The table presents the results of bivariate correlations between the dependent variable (placed first) and each of the independent variables and between the independent variables themselves. Notice that the value of Pearson's coefficient of correlation equals 1, when we correlate the same variable with itself, which can only mean that the variable is perfectly associated with itself.

We have also noticed that the values of the *significance F* are smaller than 0,001 (with only one exception; however, they are still lower than the level of .01 accepted by researchers in their studies on public administration³¹). *Significance F* is an indicator which shows whether the calculated value for the coefficient of correlation is statistically significant for the entire population, consequently allowing us to reject the nule hypotheses according to which there is no liniar association between variables (in other words that

Pearson's coefficient of correlation equals 0) and to accept the fact that there is a strong direct association between our dependent variable and each of the three independent variables. However, since the data we have used for our correlations is collected from the Statistical Yearbook of 2007 which depicts the situation at national level, it means that this model is totally significant for the entire population, thus, we feel entitled to recognize the values of the coefficients of correlation.

The summary outputs for the correlations among variables showed a relatively high value for each one of Pearson's coefficients of correlation. The values for this coefficient can vary from -1 (suggesting a strong negative association) to +1 (a strong positive association). Values equal or closer to 0 show faint or insignificant association between variables. However, we have to keep in mind that the coefficient can only show the intensity in regressions and correlations, which places a great deal of responsibility to the researcher when choosing his/her working dependent and independent variables.

Returning to our model, since the value of Pearson's coefficient of correlation (r) for the relation between our dependent variable (EMPLOYEE TURNOVER) and the independent variable WAGES-TIME is $-.88697$, we can interpret that there is a strong negative linear association between variables. Another strong negative linear association can be reported between the dependent variable EMPLOYEE TURNOVER and the independent variable COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES, as $r = -.82083$. However, in the case of the correlation between the dependent variable EMPLOYEE TURNOVER and the independent variable EDUCATION UNITS DENSITY, the value of Pearson's coefficient is $.861071$, consequently we can rightfully argue that there is a strong positive (direct) association between the two variables.

Multicollinearity

The correlation matrix reveals a situation that confirms our expectations:

our dependent variable is strongly associated (either directly or indirectly) to all the three independent variables. However, we can also notice high values for Pearson's coefficient of correlation for the relations between the three independent variables taken two by two. Looking back at the correlation matrix we also observe high values of the coefficient of correlation which we computed in order to see whether the three independent variables are also correlated themselves. In our case, due to the reasons stated above, there is no need to take into consideration the value of the *F significance*. Moreover, we find evidence of multicollinearity since all the values of r are higher than 0.7 (the $+/-$ sign only shows the direction; we are interested in the intensity of the association). Also, our model indicates the strongest association between independent variables WAGES-TIME and EDUCATION UNITS DENSITY ($r = -.96422$).

Table 3. Results of multiple regression analysis

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	.894519
R Square	.800163
Adjusted R Square	.714519
Standard Error	9.573115
Significance F	.007631*
Observations	11

* $p < .01$

The coefficient of determination (r^2) depicts the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable, the explained variable, influenced by the independent variable. In other words, the changes in EMPLOYEE TURNOVER are explained by variances in the independent variables in a proportion of 80%, certifying for the fact that there is

a strong association between the dependent and independent variables. In other words, our independent variables account for 80% of the variance of the dependent variable, the rest of 20% in the variance have to be explained through other factors. This leads us to conclude that we have succeeded in validating our hypotheses.

Limitations of the study

Regression in MS Excel does not allow researchers to perform hierarchical or other types of regression analysis for dependent variables, nor does it supply the standard diagnostic graphs as offered by SPSS. Moreover, we had to comply to the scarcity of the data (i.e. the National Institute of Statistics does not supply data prior to 1996 as regards public organizations' units).

Notes

¹ Mihai Păunescu (coord.), *Management public în România*, Iași, Polirom, 2008, p. 10.

² Androniceanu, *Noutăți în managementul public*, Bucharest, Editura Universitară, 2008, p. 73.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 74.

⁴ Kramer, Fred A., *Dynamics of public bureaucracy: an introduction to public management*, Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop, cop. 1981, p. 85.

⁵ James H. Svara, "The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and Administration in the Past and future of Public Administration", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2001, p. 180.

⁶ James H. Svara, "Complementarity of Politics and Administration as a Legitimate Alternative to the Dichotomy Model", *Administration and Society*, Vol 30 No 6, 1999.

⁷ B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre (eds.), *Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative Reform*, Routledge, 2001.

⁸ Meyer-Sahling, Jan-Hinrik, "The institutionalization of political discretion in post-communist civil service systems: the case of Hungary", *Public Administration*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 84, Nr. 3, 2006, pp. 693–716.

⁹ Batten, Ella et al., "Expertise and policy-making: legal professionals in local government", *Public Administration Review*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 84, Nr. 3, 2006, pp. 771–781; see also Bourdeaux, Carolyn, "Politics versus Professionalism: The Effect of Institutional Structure on Democratic Decision Making in a Contested Policy Arena", *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Oxford University Press, Nr. 18, 2007, pp. 349–373.

¹⁰ Jacobsen, Dag Ingvar, "Public sector growth: comparing politicians' and administrators' spending preferences", *Public Administration Review*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 84, Nr. 1, 2006, pp. 185–204.

¹¹ Hacek, Miro, "The relationship between civil a case of Slovenia", *Public Administration Review*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 84, Nr. 1, 2006, pp. 165–184; see also, Kasper M. Hansen, Niels Ejersbo, "The relationship between politicians and administrators – a logic of disharmony", *Public Administration Review*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 80, no. 4, 2002, pp. 733–750.

¹² For a coherent discussion of the situation see the study of Lodge, Martin, Christopher Hood, "Competency and higher civil servants", *Public Administration Review*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 83, Nr. 4, 2005, pp. 779–787.

¹³ Androniceanu, Armenia, op. cit., p. 208.

¹⁴ Poul Erik Mouritzen, James H. Svara, *Leadership at the apex: politicians and administrators in Western local governments*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2002, p. 265.

¹⁵ Ministry of the Interior and Administrative Reform, *Strategic Plan of the Ministry of the Interior and Administrative Reform*, Annex to the Order of the Ministry of the Interior and Administrative Reform, no. 297 din 21.09.2007, p. 14.

¹⁶ Lakhdar Sekiou, Louise Blondin, Bruno Fabi, Mohammed Bayad, Jean-Marie Peretti, David Alis, Françoise Chevalier, *Gestion des ressources humaines*, Edition: 2, De Boeck Université, 2001, p. 451. See, also, Fred A. Kramer, op. cit., pp. 7-15.

¹⁷ Hal G. Rainey, *Understanding and managing public organizations*, John Wiley and Sons, 2009.

¹⁸ Kramer, Fred A., op. cit., pp. 7-15.

¹⁹ Dayna Finet, "Sociopolitical Environments and Issues" in Jablin, Fredric M., Linda L. Putnam (eds.), *The new handbook of organizational communication. Advances in theory, research, and methods*, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage Publications, 2001, p. 278.

²⁰ See, for instance, Law 329/2009 regarding the reorganization of some public authorities and institutions, public spending rationalization, supporting the business environment and res-

pecting the framework-agreements with the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund.

²¹ Lakhdar Sekiou et al., *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²² David Giauque, Fabien Resentera, Michaël Siggen, “La relation entre les acteurs politiques et les gestionnaires publics: complémentarité ou séparation? Le constat dans trois cantons suisses”, *Télescope*, vol. 15, no. 1, 2009, pp. 103-117.

²³ Andrews, Rhys, George A. Boyne, Jennifer Law, Richard M. Walker, “External constraints on local service standards: the case of comprehensive performance assessment in English local government”, *Public Administration Review*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 83, Nr. 3, 2006, pp. 639–656.

²⁴ Llorens, Jared J., Jeffrey B. Wenger, J. Edward Kellough, “Choosing Public Sector

Employment: The Impact of Wages on the Representation of Women and Minorities in State Bureaucracies”, in *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Oxford University Press, Nr. 18, 2007, pp. 397–413.

²⁵ Kramer, Fred A., *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁶ Lakhdar Sekiou et al., *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁷ Androniceanu, Armenia, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-257.

²⁸ Hal G. Rainey, *Understanding and managing public organizations*, John Wiley and Sons, 2009, p. 95.

²⁹ Kramer, Fred A., *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³⁰ For its definition see Hal G. Rainey, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

³¹ See, for instance, the extensive discussion on public administration methodology in Gerald J. Miller, Marcia L. Whicker (editors), *Handbook for research methods in public administration*, New York, M. Dekker, 1999.

The Idea of *Asymmetric Power Dispersion*. Conceptual Issues

Mihai GHÎȚULESCU

Abstract: *This article aims at drawing a theoretical overview of the research in the field of the asymmetric power dispersion (a more comprehensive alternative to the well-known concept of asymmetric federalism). Several fundamental concept will be discussed in order to emphasize the general confusion and the necessity of a systematic revision of the theoretical issues.*

Keywords: *authonomy, federalism, decentralization, (a)symmetry, (in)congruence, federacy.*

Words like *local public administration, authonomy, decentralization* etc. are very frequent in the Romanian political debates during the last two... centuries, exhibiting the existence of a problem that nobody really and precisely identified. Today, we talk about the necessity of reform of the *administrative organization* in relation to three main issues: (1) the efficiency of the public services; (2) the political participation/representation of some particular groups (ethnic minorities, especially); (3) the European integration.

The whole debate seems very general and confuse, giving the impression of a simple chaotic rhetoric. Stereotypes merging illogically with contradictions, nationalistic obsessions matching instinctively with Western ideals, authoritarian tendencies mitigated by the fear of responsibility etc. For example, everybody likes the word *decentralization* but also hates *authonomy*, not to mention *federalism*, although they

are not aware of the exact meaning of these terms.

In this context, I think it is not necessary to argue the practical importance of a good knowledge of the theoretical matter and of the foreign patterns. What I intend in this article is to draw a brief and general overview of the actual stage of the research in the field of the *asymmetric power dispersion*. I prefer this concept to the well-known *asymmetric federalism*, due to its larger sphere: it is appropriate for the classical federations as well as for the unitary states and for the supranational structures (i.e., the European Union).

The cornerstone in this area was laid by Charles D. Tarlton, in 1965¹. Within the last decades, several scholars paid attention to the subject and published general works (e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, *Exploring Federalism*, University of Alabama Press, 1987, Robert Agranoff (ed.), *Accommodating Diversity: Asymmetry in Federal States*, Baden-Baden, 1999, R.L. Watts, *Comparing Federal*

Systems, McGill-Queen's Press, 1999)² or various case studies (we must notice here all the studies from the *Assymetry Series*, published by the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, Canada: Guy Laforest, "The Historical and Legal Origins of Asymmetrical Federalism in Canada's Founding Debates: A Brief Interpretative Note", Saskia Jung, "German Federalism – Still a Model of Symmetry?", Robert Agranoff, "Federal Asymmetry and Intergovernmental Relations in Spain" etc.).

Looking at the "classical federations" (e.g. USA, Switzerland, West Germany), Charles Tarlton noticed that, despite the constitutional provisions which granted an equal status for all the constituent units, there were always particular factors (economic, social cultural, historical) that produced functional differences. And he called that *federal asymmetry*. Today is generally accepted that "symmetry refers to the uniformity among constituent units in their powers and procedural opportunities within a federal system" and asymmetry is the result of a "differentiation... in the degrees of autonomy and power among the constituent units"³. But this distinction was obviously insufficient to describe the great diversity of real situations. That is why the next step was to distinguish between *de jure* and *de facto* asymmetry. The first type corresponds to those countries where the differences are formally set (by the constitution or, at least, by the ordinary law), while the second is just a practical difference of functioning, as a result of the cultural, social or economic diversity. Today, it seems very clear that the *de facto* asymmetry is unavoidable in every state with a minimum level of power dispersion. Perfect symmetry is practically impossible. Even the German case, considered for a long time as an example of "constitutional symmetry" (all *Lander* having the same legislative power and a uniform judicial

system)⁴, presents more signs of asymmetry, especially because of the East-West disparities⁵.

Assuming that Tarlton's dichotomy was already used in relation to the different process of *power distribution*, Arend Lijphart advanced the alternative *congruence-incongruence*. In his opinion, a federation (but we can extend the model to all more or less decentralized states) is *congruent* if the constituent units are small reflections of the whole federal system and *incongruent* if the parts have a social and/or cultural composition different from the others and from the whole. In other words, the logic of an *incongruent organization* is to overlap political and social/cultural boundaries within the country, aiming at attenuating the general heterogeneity by creating several smaller and relatively homogenous areas⁶.

But Lijphart's taxonomy is not actually an alternative to the one of Tarlton, because the terms *symmetry* and *congruence* are not synonyms. Both concepts refer to the same thing (differences among units) but they do it differently: the former takes account of the various *functional* issues (formal competences and/or actual practices), while the latter expresses a *structural* diversity (ethnic, cultural, economic differences). That is why some authors consider important to distinguish between the *conditions* and the *outcomes* of the asymmetry⁷. Despite the appearance, this distinction will never be very precise because of the mutual determination: it is clear that the *incongruence* determinates an *asymmetry* and, eventually, motivates its formalization, but, although it is less obvious, the asymmetry accentuates (and even creates?) the incongruence. For the moment, this is only an assumption that must be tested by a comparative study of the processes of power dispersion. All that we can certainly say is that *asymmetry* and *incongruence*

are two inseparable realities, the problem being to evaluate the report between them.

Another conceptual issue that must be discussed is the distinction between *federalism* and *decentralization*, the two forms of power dispersion. The main difference consists in the degree of formality: *federalism* is generally considered as more formal, having constitutional origins, while *decentralization* is created by the ordinary law. As regards *federalism*, for this stage of the discussion, I consider that it is sufficient to note William H. Riker's definition: "a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions"⁸. By contrast, *decentralization* would imply no division of the activities of government, but a simple *devolution*⁹ and the regional authorities will not make any final decisions. This assumption is the basis for the common opinion which, beyond the formal distinction, considers that the difference between the two concepts is given by the intensity of the power dispersion. Lijphart categorically rejected this conception by arguing that countries must be analyzed in relation to both *federal-unitary* and *centralized-decentralized* contrasts. He consulted the constitutions of 36 democracies, he created and calculated an index of federalism and he identified five types of countries: federal and decentralized (the "classical federations": USA, Germany, Australia, Canada), federal and centralized (Venezuela, Austria, India), semi federal ("imperfect federations": Israel, Netherlands, Spain), unitary and decentralized (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Japan), unitary and centralized (France, United Kingdom, Portugal etc.)¹⁰. More than ten years after, several countries changed their system and passed to another type, but the methods of analysis and the typology still resist.

Unfortunately, Lijphart's seminal contribution serves only to generally evaluate and compare countries without taking too much account of their internal singularities (i.e., [*a*]symmetry, [*in*]congruence).

Under the circumstances, the concept of *federacy*, although not really clear, is important because it offers the possibility to make some order in the variety of cases of power dispersion. The concept generally refers to an intermediary category, a "variation between unitary states and federal states". From one point of view, a *federacy* is defined as "a political system in which an otherwise unitary state develops a federal relationship with a territorially, ethnically, or culturally distinct community while all the other parts of the state remain under unitary rule"¹¹. This perspective is the most popular, being vehiculated by the online encyclopedias, which argue that, within federacies, one of the constituent units is autonomous while the others are "either not autonomous or comparatively less autonomous"¹². It is obvious that "the difference between asymmetric federation and federacy is indistinct"¹³ and that "to some extent, such an arrangement can be considered as similar to asymmetric federalism"¹⁴, but beyond that, everything remains ambiguous". I have a reticence in accepting that. "a federacy is essentially an extreme case of an asymmetric federation"¹⁵, because this means an exclusive association between the concepts of *federation* and *federacy*; in other words, a state cannot be labeled as *federacy* if it is not formally federal. Or, such an assumption would be in total disagreement with professor Stepan's restrictive definition ("while all the other parts of the state remain under unitary rule"). Finally, things become more unclear when we notice the existence of a second perspective. Some authors¹⁶ consider that a federacy is a "federal arrangement that is not part of a system-wide federation"

and, more specific, a “semi-sovereign territory different in its institutions and constitutional competencies from the rest of the state”. This definition does not seem to differ substantially from the previous, but when we are told that this arrangement “creates a division of powers between the federacy and the central government”, we realize that scholars approach the same reality from a different angle.

This brief review is sufficient to reveal a semantic dilemma: what do we call *federacy*: a whole state in which one (some) of the constituent parts is (are) autonomous or the autonomous parts only? Or, to take some practical examples, which is the *federacy*? France or the overseas lands, Denmark or the Faroe Islands, Iraq or Kurdistan, Ukraine or Crimea, Serbia or Vojvodina? All these are formally unitary states, but can we speak of *federacy* in the case of the United States (because of Puerto Rico), Australia (because of the Norfolk Island), India (because of Kashmir) or other federations because of their various particular territories?

The only conclusion that we can draw from this overview is the necessity of a systematic revision of the theoretical issues regarding the *power dispersion* and the creation of some instruments of analysis in order to evaluate the diversity of contemporary phenomena and, if possible, to make some predictions and/or recommendations.

Notes

¹ Charles D. Tarlton, „Symmetry and Asymmetry as Element of Federalism”, *Journal of Politics*, no. 27, 1965, pp. 861-874.

² For more details see Ronald L. Watts, “A Comparative Perspective on Asymmetry in Federations”, *Asymmetry Series* 2005 (4), IIGR, Queen’s University (<http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/working/asymmetricfederalism/Watts2005.pdf>)

³ *Ibidem*. See also Carolin Zwilling, “What Does Asymmetry Means in Today’s Europe”, <http://www.google.ro/#hl=ro&source=hp&q=What+Does+Asymmetry+Mean+in+Today%E2%8>

0%99s+Europe%3F&btnG=C%C4%83utare+Google&meta=&aq=f&coq=What+Does+Asymmetry+Mean+in+Today%E2%80%99s+Europe%3F&fp=52d5788de404de36

⁴ Saskia Jung, “German Federalism – Still a Model of Symmetry?”, *Asymmetry Series* 2005 (11), IIGR, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, (<http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/working/asymmetricfederalism/Jung2005.pdf>)

⁵ Arthur Benz, “From Unitary to Asymmetric Federalism in Germany: Taking Stock after 50 Years”, *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 29:4 (Fall, 1999), pp. 56-57 (http://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2005/EUP405/Germany_Benz.pdf)

⁶ Arend Lijphart, *Modele ale democrației. Forme de guvernare în treizeci și șase de țări*, Polirom, Iași, 2000, pp. 184-185.

⁷ Ronald L. Watts, *op. cit.*

⁸ William H. Riker, “Federalism”, Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. V, p. 101, *apud* Arend Lijphart, *op. cit.*, pp. 177. See also “Riker: Federalism, in *Handbook of Political Science*”. From WikiSummary, the Free Social Science Summary Database (http://wikisum.com/w/Riker:_Federalism,_in_Handbook_of_Political_Science#Conceptual_Definition_of_Federalism)

⁹ Defined as a “statutory granting of powers from the central government of a sovereign state to government at a subnational level”, “powers devolved temporary and ultimately residing in central government” (“Devolution”. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devolution>)

¹⁰ Arend Lijphart, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-179.

¹¹ Alfred Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1999, pp. 19-34 (https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/fesnic/fspub/6_7_Stepan_1999_Federalism_J_of_Dem.pdf)

¹² See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federacy> and <http://wapedia.mobi/en/Federacy#2>.

¹³ http://wapedia.mobi/en/Asymmetric_federalism.

¹⁴ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federacy>

¹⁵ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federacy>

¹⁶ Brendan O’Leary, “Multi-national Federalism, Federacy, Power-Sharing & The Kurds of Iraq”, p. 20. David R. Rezvani (2003), *Federacy: The Dynamic of Semi-Sovereign Territories* (unpublished manuscript), quoted by Brendan O’Leary.

Eneahoric Correlation Coefficient. Applicative Program

Mihai Radu COSTESCU

Abstract *A statistic method used in order to determine the relations between two or more variables is correlation. In the analysis of correlation, powerful methods can be used, depending on the roughness of demanded results, which can confirm/refute with a certain probability the existence and intensity of the connection, or simpler methods, which are not as precise in the confirmation/refutation of this connection. If the data of the two studied series are not classified in detail, meaning that they are divided only into three categories, the eneahoric correlation coefficient will be used. For its determination, as well as in order to test its meaning, a procedure was developed that can be easily used if it is attached to a program.*

Keywords: *phenomena, correlation, eneahoric, procedure.*

The variability of social-economic phenomena is determined, in most of the cases, by the simultaneous action of several factors; some of these factors allow the evolution of a phenomenon, others hamper it or act reversely.

The meanings and intensities of various factors change in conditions of time and space, so related phenomena evolution records trend that are different as compared to previous ones.

The causality relations between the social-economic phenomena can be quantified and analyzed with the help of correlation. Resulted information is very useful, especially because the specific methods that statistics provides the researcher give the

possibility for mainly knowing the following aspects:

- I. Existence of causality relations between phenomena.
- II. The contribution of every factor to the global variability of the effect phenomena.
- III. The intensity of causal connections between the social-economic phenomena and processes.
- IV. The evolutive trends of correlation between phenomena.

The analysis of correlation provides a wide range of information, being preferred to other study methods of the connections between phenomena, although the determination of correlation specific indicators is more difficult.

In some cases, from various reasons, the detailed classification of continuous data is abandoned, these being grouped for every variable in three classes (inferior-medium-superior, disagreement-unimportant-agreement, below the average-average-over the average, large-middle-small etc.). in this case in which we are interested in extreme classes, data are arranged in

a particular table. We will calculate in this case the *eneahoric* correlation coefficient for a number of subjects.

In order to calculate the calculation formula of this correlation coefficient, let's accept, for both variables, the inferior-medium-superior classification.

Data will be grouped into a table, as follows:

Y \ X	Superior	Medium	Inferior	
Superior	n_1	a	n_2	$A = n_1 + a + n_2$
Medium	b	c	d	
Inferior	n_4	e	n_3	$B = n_4 + e + n_3$
	$D = n_1 + b + n_4$		$C = n_2 + d + n_3$	

The formula according to which r is determined in this particular case is:

$$r = \frac{n_1 + n_3 - n_2 - n_4 - \frac{(A - B)(C - D)}{n}}{\sqrt{\left[(A + B) - \frac{(A - B)^2}{n} \right] \left[(C + D) - \frac{(C - D)^2}{n} \right]}}$$

where n is the total number of subjects (as we notice, the calculations do not include the medium-medium variant).

In order to decide whether this calculated value is significant or not, it is compared to a related theoretical value at $n - 2$ degrees of freedom and related to the meaning level chosen.

The following procedure determines this correlation coefficient and decides whether it is significant or not. The significance level operated with is chosen from 0,10; 0,05; 0,02; 0,01 or 0,001 values, and the total number of studied subjects can be of 12, 22, 32, 42, 52, 62, 72, 82, 92 or 102.

procedure

eneahoric(n,n1,n2,n3,n4,a,b,d,e;in teger;alfa:real;var r:real);

{The procedure calculates the eneahoric correlation coefficient

for a given number of subjects;

Once this coefficient is calculated, its meaning will be checked

for a chosen meaning threshold : 0,10; 0,05; 0,02; 0,01 sau 0,001;

Parameters meaning is:

n = the total number of subjects (12,22,32,42,52,62,72,82,92 or 102)

```

variabila X: mare mediu mic
           mare n1 a n2
variabila Y: mediu b d
           mic n4 e n3

```

alfa = pragul de semnificatie ales
r = coeficientul de corelatie}

```

var aa,bb,cc,dd:integer;
v:array[1..100] of real;
begin
if alfa=0.10
then
begin
v[10]:=0.4973; v[20]:=0.3598; v[30]:=0.2960;
v[40]:=0.2573; v[50]:=0.2306; v[60]:=0.2108;
v[70]:=0.1954; v[80]:=0.1829; v[90]:=0.1726;
v[100]:=0.1638;
end;
if alfa=0.05
then
begin
v[10]:=0.5760; v[20]:=0.4227; v[30]:=0.3494;
v[40]:=0.3044; v[50]:=0.2732; v[60]:=0.2500;
v[70]:=0.2319; v[80]:=0.2172; v[90]:=0.2050;
v[100]:=0.1946;
end;
if alfa=0.02
then
begin
v[10]:=0.6581; v[20]:=0.4921; v[30]:=0.4093;
v[40]:=0.3578; v[50]:=0.3218; v[60]:=0.2948;
v[70]:=0.2737; v[80]:=0.2565; v[90]:=0.2422;
v[100]:=0.2301;
end;
if alfa=0.01
then
begin
v[10]:=0.7079; v[20]:=0.5368; v[30]:=0.4487;
v[40]:=0.3932; v[50]:=0.3541; v[60]:=0.3248;
v[70]:=0.3017; v[80]:=0.2830; v[90]:=0.2673;
v[100]:=0.2540;
end;
if alfa=0.001
then
begin
v[10]:=0.8233; v[20]:=0.6524; v[30]:=0.5541;
v[40]:=0.4896; v[50]:=0.4433; v[60]:=0.4078;
v[70]:=0.3799; v[80]:=0.3568; v[90]:=0.3375;
v[100]:=0.3211;
end;

```

```

aa:=n1+a+n2;
bb:=n4+e+n3;
cc:=n2+d+n3;
dd:=n1+d+n4;
r:=(n1+n3-n2-n4-(aa-bb)*(cc-dd)/n);
r:=r/sqrt((aa+bb-sqr(aa-bb)/n)*(cc+dd-
sqr(cc-dd)/n));
writeln('r = ',r:5:4);
if r > v[n-2] then writeln('Coeficientul
de corelatie este semnificativ')
else writeln('Coeficientul
de corelatie nu este semnificativ')
end;

```

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About the Condition of the Romanian Journalist after 20 Years of Free Press. Elements of Context

Xenia NEGREA

Abstract: *In this article we presented a number of contextual factors that have assisted the creation of the consciousness of belonging to the guild of journalists. In Romania, it was only towards the end of 2009 that a single code of ethics was discussed and enforced. Its application and enforcement are themes of reflection for the coming years. So far, the Romanian journalist was in a perpetual search and attempt delineate the professional identity, having as main objective the synchronization with the values of the Western media.*

Keywords: *journalism, professional identity, post-communism.*

Since December 1989, Romanian society began a long journey of institutional transformation and hence transformation of mentalities. This process of repositioning, of building an identity also had to be assumed by the media. Unlike many other areas, which received a longer reaction time, the journalist was forced to adapt quickly to new realities.

The switch from a controlled and one-way communication system to an absolute freedom of the message mediated by a press institution was sudden and violent. Launched in the process of recovery and synchronization with Western values and operating systems, the Romanian journalist was put in front of unprecedented qualitative and quantitative leaps. He had to preserve and to meet the requirements imposed by the position of main source of information for an ever changing society – a change

often quantifiable in months, quarters and semesters. At the forefront of major social changes, of the import and diffusion of Western values, the journalist (and the mass-media institution) had to reinvent his professional identity without having the time for discernment, often relying on a rapid imitation, on indigested and unpracticed systems. If in the first years after the revolution, one of the main sources of pressure was the need for information of a society which itself was in the process of rediscovering, of reinvention, of reorientation, gradually the journalist and the media institution for which he was gathering news has multiplied the sources of pressure. As society was borrowing by imitation and began the long process of assimilation and learning of the democratic system, the journalist had to withstand competitive pressure, but also economic pressure. In our

opinion, media development is symptomatic (and also, along with other professional sectors, it is responsible) for how the entire Romanian society has operated and managed its own metamorphosis.

In the context of exit from totalitarian pressure, some of the major social phenomena were, in our opinion, the retraining of many stakeholders and the creation or recreation of entire fields of activity. One of these areas was the press. From only a few publications (of different types: daily, weekly, etc.) the press suddenly meant tens, hundreds, tens, hundreds of publications. The social euphoria and the institutional boom allowed, inter alia, the penetration of masses of non-specialized people, forced to find their work-tools on the spot, to discover the journalism profession while producing “journalistic texts” to meet the demand for information.

The abuses, the slippages, the adjacent errors during this period were criticized very strongly by theorists of the field.

Mihai Coman, one of the founders of higher post-Revolutionary Romanian journalistic education, explains this process in terms of the struggle for control over the information: “Regardless of the time-cut proposed, regardless of the pace of developments in various sectors of the media, whatever the degree of ‘Westernization’ or ‘autochthonization’ of the messages, regardless of other forms of development during the “transition” of the media in post-communist Romania, I believe that the specific of this period is given by *the efforts of the different actors to gain and retain control over the media field*” (s.a.)¹.

S. Splichal considers that taking by imitation the Western professional forms is the main obstacle in building the professional identity of journalists in former communist countries: “The imitative nature of the new systems can be an enormous

obstacle in the development of more democratic systems in the region”².

According to the major researchers of the media phenomenon in ex-communist countries, it can be established that the general features of the professional frame are the following: “1) The group of journalists is numerically dominated by young people who were integrated in the media after 1989. In most cases, they do not have appropriate professional training. They have won by opposition to the old guard, which determines them to promote: a) an ideology of “denial” of everything that pre-cedes them, b) a sense of superiority based on the idea that those who haven’t worked in the communist media have not been touched by the communist ideology, c) a certain professional self-sufficiency, based on the idea of a “mission” on behalf of which they chose the press, a mission that does not require any critical self-evaluation, any kind of training 2) They considered themselves to be an “elite” of society, not through civic responsibilities, but due to their social position and the tasks which they undertake; 3) The heterogeneity of the group is reflected by the dispersion of professional organizations, 4) The inability to impose a professional culture, a set of common values and rules of behavior, 5) The manner of education; 6) Division of the profession: the conception of the role of the journalist and social position”³.

After 20 years of institutional seizures, the press in Romania is still in the process of building its identity. After the enthusiasm with which the first post-revolution publications were received, the press institution had to face the untrustworthiness, the system of competition, the lack of appropriate professional training. The non-professionalism, also noted by Mihai Coman, generated, in addition to a required flow of information, also the loss of credibility of the institution before society. Equally, the press institution

had to face social changes towards consumerism, towards entertainment, the sensational, the current liberalization of communication, a reality also faced by the mass-media in the societies with a democratic tradition and with a deep and assimilated professional culture. This justifies the observation of P. Gross, that the “Western-style press, based on information journalism, requires journalists to work hard. The style of journalism practiced in Romania, based on opinion, sensationalism and incomplete information is far more convenient for journalists and in line with pre-communist and communist traditions”⁴.

In parallel with researchers, even the professional environment felt the need to reorganize itself, of theoretical reconsideration of some regulations. For this purpose several professional monitoring centers have been established and the general trend is towards clearing the status of the journalist, to create a unique code, to adopt a system of universally recognized values and professional requirements. We hasten to say that we are still in the process of professional sedimentation. In addition to the guild's efforts, the journalistic national teaching system is currently developing, which should contribute decisively to create a thorough and deep professional profile, to give society an alternative to short training courses. Currently, all major academic centers in Romania have areas of study in this profile, and as a result, people with university education in the field have already entered the guild of journalists, many of whom have followed even training in academic environments abroad.

Moreover, even internationally, this open profession raises many difficulties in conceptual configuration. The definition of the concept of “journalist” has proved extremely difficult for researchers in this field. French sociologist Remy Rieffel argues

that: “we cannot talk about journalism in the singular, but of journalisms, in the plural”.

The heterogeneity of the activities subsumed to journalism is at the foundation of “weak social identity” perceived as such both by journalists and the public. Remy Rieffel and Denis Ruellan repeatedly stress the ambivalence of the profession: the first one sees both as a profession and as a vocation, and the second one sees it as liberal in its spirit and pecuniary in its practice”.

Remy Rieffel⁵ explains this crisis of identity by four factors:

1. The fascination for external models. Not infrequently, journalism is seen as a springboard to other professions or as a refuge after failure in other professions.
2. The failure of the journalistic environment to achieve an effective self-control and a convincing self-definition: clear rules of professional conduct are not yet set and the society of journalists in itself is not self-critical enough.
3. The heterogeneity of access routes and professional itineraries – in journalism people with different training levels have access.
4. The gap between journalists’ image of themselves and the public’s image about journalists. If the first do not get tired of emphasizing their independence and professionalism, the last suspect a lack of verticality of journalists.

In the Statute of the International Federation of Journalists it is stated that the journalist is “any person who regularly and based on remuneration, make an activity which consists in contributing by word or image to one or more mass-media forms”.

The Journalists’ Protocol, signed in 1980 under the auspices of UNESCO, states that the term journalist “means any person, regardless of nationality, which has a paid job and regulated by the editor, reporter, photographer, cameraman or technician

in printed press, radio, television, who exercises his profession in accordance with ethical principles and rules established by the profession; his professional activity is seeking, receiving or distributing information, opinions, ideas, studies and commentaries for periodicals, press agencies, television and radio services or filmed news”.

The professional status of journalism has generated much discussion and debate in the academic world. We can detect two directions of representation of this theme. They are most clearly illustrated by the controversy between Everette Dennis and John Merrill. They started from the characteristics of the professions listed in *Profession in America*:

1. a member of the profession must think objectively and critically about problems which, for someone outside the profession, seem to be subject to prejudice and subjectivity;
2. a member of a profession can be trusted, since he practices it, because he has some experience inaccessible to the un-specialist;
3. a member of a profession believes in solidarity with other members and in the advantage of creating a common front against those outside the profession;
4. a member of a profession accepts certain standards of entry into the profession: such as forms of obtaining a university degree that would identify him as a member;
5. a member of the profession may be not only registered as such in a certain professional catalog made by a generally recognized professional association, but can also be removed from the profession if he violates its standards;
6. a member of a profession takes part in a system of remuneration for professional performance and can benefit from forms of gratification and public

recognition of the prestige, if he complies with the code of professional ethics;

7. a member of a profession shares a substantial body of knowledge available only to those within the profession.

Based on these coordinates, John Merrill does not consider journalism as being evidently a profession. According to him, professionalization would also attract professional deformation. Among the characteristics which bring journalism closer to the status of profession, John Merrill admits:

1. there isn't a direct relationship between journalists and their clients; journalists work for an employer and are responsible only to him;
2. there aren't, in journalism, minimum requirements to enter into the profession; anyone can be a journalist if he can get hired, regardless of experience or expertise in any one editorial;
3. journalists are not a homogeneous community and are not required to comply to an ethical code;
4. no journalist has a professional license;
5. there are no professional standards on which to agree unanimously or which are followed by all journalists;
6. journalists do not share a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge;
7. journalists do not claim exclusive right to practice this activity.

On the other hand, Everette Dennis believes that journalism should be regarded as a profession made up of professional communicators, committed to uphold professional standards. From her point of view, journalism has almost all the characteristics of a profession:

1. journalism is a public service, and the free flow of information is protected by law;
2. a journalist may address issues objectively and interrogatively: one of the purposes of journalism is to give

- an impartial, disinterested synthesis of information;
3. journalists are experts in gathering information and presenting them in accessible forms; the definitions of mass communication specify that not the amateurs, but professional communicators are needed for the proper achievement of an objective;
 4. there is a close solidarity among journalists, although maybe not as strong as that which exists between doctors;
 5. journalists are organized by professional associations (example of solidarity: when one of them is arrested);
 6. although there is no formal way of registering in the profession, most media organizations, however, require minimum standards of education or experience before they hire someone;
 7. there is considerable agreement among journalists on a wide range of occupational values and attitudes – journalism is not the kind of profession, “one man - an island”;
 8. someone who constantly violates the professional rules and standards will be removed by the impossibility of getting employed;
 9. journalists have a code of ethics that helps define professionalism and which assists them in case of ethical dilemmas;
 10. the criterion of a “substantial body of knowledge” is more difficult to sustain.

In general, the profession of journalist is shaped around the collection and dissemination of information in the name of objectivity and equidistance.

We presented in the above the theoretical profile and the professional ideas that are accepted internationally.

One of the necessary ideas that K. Jakubowicz⁶ considers necessary for the transition from a closed, communist society to a democratic one is “the professionalization of journalists through laws and

rules to ensure professional autonomy, through codes of ethics and through ways of implementing them and of accountability of the profession; creating systems of ‘observation’ and monitoring of the press by civil society representatives, the development of journalistic education and of the basic and continuous training systems”. In Romania, the debates surrounding professional identity are in the process. However, the thematic is quite limited, the number of articles are fairly easy to count, with effects to match.

The main topics of debate concerning the conditions of journalists in the Romanian post-revolutionary press are: the relationship between employers (“moguls”) and journalists and the interference of the secret services in the journalists' guild. As recent sub-themes: the relationship between the press and the presidency, as well as the creation of a unique code of ethics. Interventions regarding professional education, quality of the issues, quality of the approach of the issues are marginal and sporadic.

We note that self-references, self-evaluation of Romanian journalists are currently performed in impersonal terms, by broad formulations, generalized, un-assumed and unspecified, often avoiding a qualitative analysis of content, style, materials and publications: “the press”, “journalists”, “some” etc. The debates in Romanian media, those who have a self-evaluation stake, are kept in the area of general topics, of the moral theme, and do not analyze concrete, specific actions.

In addition to the recovery process and construction of professional identity, Romanian journalism also had to regain its credibility with the public. The identity of the journalist is so vulnerable that, in a quality national newspaper, “Cotidianul”⁷, one of the most visible signatures in the Romanian post-revolutionary press, Robert Turcescu states: “The status of the press-man, heavily eroded also by the repeated statements made by

Traian Bănescu...". We define now one of the main current problems of the Romanian post-revolutionary press: the loss of credibility. The other problem is the financial situation.

Regarding credibility, it can be seen in the pages of publications that we have analyzed a deep and systematic concern. Equally, the written press continues not only the style of sensationalism, entertainment, but we can also note significant shifts in the linguistic level of the texts. We take the example of the text signed by Cornel Nistorescu in "Cotidianul"⁸. Although he seems concerned about the image of the media and the very familiar "clause of conscience", he signs formulations such as "sheet of cattle, « National Courier »", "drafts of a drunkard scribbler", "the revolt of the sheets with talent for washing the steps of the Cotroceni actually invites us to have suspicions", "hairy Radu Morar "etc. Having the alibi of stylistic journalistic exigence, according to which vocabulary must be also built on elements of the colloquial, the author pushes the colloquialism to triviality. We chose this example because it is symptomatic for the quality of writing in the press, be it national or local press.

Another journalist with credibility in the local media landscape, Cristian Tudor Popescu, tried to initiate topics for discussion in the editorials he signs in the daily newspaper "Gandul". He noted the absence of "professional censorship"⁹, the dependence of the contemporary journalist on citizen journalism¹⁰, as he lamented in violent terms of the tabloidization of contemporary press.

An important event for the way in which self-regulation in printed press is attempted was the adoption of a common code of ethics. The most important newspapers gave large spaces to this event. The thematic was, however, restricted to the relationship between the guild of journalists with the secret services and the attacks

launched on the media by the Romanian presidency.

The adoption of this code resulted from studies conducted over several years. In drafting this document, over 20 press associations and institutions involved in the press have been involved. A Group of good journalistic practices was also founded at that time. One of the main objectives of this project was, according to the statements of those involved in its accomplishment, creating solidarity, fueling the feeling of belonging to the guild of journalists, organized until that moment in associations of different sizes, with more or less impact in the control of the quality of mass media. For the first time in 20 years since the Romanian Revolution, a dialogue on the subject was successful and this code was adopted.

Conclusion

We have reviewed in this article the context in which the evolution of the press in Romania is taking place. Bound by historical circumstances to train in jolts, Romanian journalists recreate their identity and are synchronized with the Western press, in the same way in which the entire Romanian society is evolving and attempting to synchronize. In the late 2009 and early 2010 even appeared materials that problematize issues synchronous with Western press. One of the topics currently open and which we will pursue in future studies is the survival of the written press in the context created by the virtual environment.

Notes

¹ Coman, *Mass-media în România comunistă* (Mass-media in Communist Romania), Polirom, Iasi, 2003, Col. Collegium, Media, p. 10.

² Splichal, Slavko, "Imitative Revolutions: Changes in the Media and Journalism in East-Central Europe", in Coman, p. 20

³ Coman, *Mass-media în România comunistă* (Mass-media in Communist Romania), pp. 35-38.

⁴ Gross, Peter, Hiebert, Ray, „Departures on an Old Fashion Track: Broadcast Laws in Romania, Poland and The Czech Republic”, in „The Global Network”, nr. 4-5, 1996, p. 97, cf. Coman, 2003.

⁵ Rieffel, Remy, *L'élite des journalistes*, Presses Universitaires Françaises, 1984; see also *Sociologia mass media*, trad. de Ileana Busuioc, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2008, Col. Media Sociologie.

⁶ Jakubowicz, Karol, “L'évolution vers des médias démocratiques et libre en Europe Centrale:

combine faudra-t-il de temps pour y parvenir”, in “L'autre Europe”, nr. 32-33, in Coman, 2003; see also Karol Jakubowicz, “Post Communist Media Development in Perspective”, in “Internazionale Politikanalyse. Europäische Politik. PolitikInformation Osteuropa”, März, 2005, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/02841.pdf>

⁷ Cotidianul, 30.06.2009, www.cotidianul.ro

⁸ Idem, November 11th 2009

⁹ „Gândul”, August 12th 2009, www.gandul.ro

¹⁰ idem

Q&A - In Search of the Perfect Interview

Davian VLAD

Abstract: *This article is a theoretical overview of the concept of journalistic interview. The author approaches several important issues (e.g., the techniques of interviewing, the various types of interviews, the categories of questions).*

Keywords: *interview, question, answer, reporter.*

Interviewing someone is not the simple task some might think it is, it's definitely the outcome of an elaborate plan and a proper research, the final result of a scrupulously designed strategy that the interviewers use in order to receive the aimed answers to their specific questions. The general perception is that the interview is a more difficult issue for the interviewee than the interviewer, which is in general a correct assumption, but an interview may be gloriously failed if the reporter isn't prepared appropriately for this complex journalistic process.

The interview is not a simple conversation, it is a journalistic investigation, an attempt to get as much information as possible from persons (personalities) who sometimes may be reluctant to make public their thoughts, intentions or opinions about a certain matter. In this case, the interviewers have the duty to do their best to overcome that reluctance and get the proposed answers from their interlocutors, otherwise the interview at large would be a flop.

The interviews could be good or bad, and to the success or the failure of an interview concur both of the parts involved, but

in the end the skills of the interviewer will be decisive for the result. Albeit the perfection, in any field of activity, is still far for being considered a standard (it is only an ideal, after all), a good TV, radio or newspaper reporter should at least aspire to do someday the perfect interview. Some hints for realizing not a perfect but a (very) good interview are to be emphasized here, and a list of golden rules for a reporter will be drawn in order to be consulted by the future young journalists, now students. Though there are specific features for each media channel (TV, radio, written media etc.), we shall focus on the general characteristics of the interview, applicable to each and every means of transmitting the information.

As the reporters are not (can not!) be Mr. Know-It-All, it is obvious that they have to make a rigorous research prior to the moment when the interview is supposed to be held. The interviewer must be aware of all the aspects regarding the interviewee and the topic which is to be tackled. Thus the reporter should find all the useful information by looking up the Internet, dic-

tionaries, encyclopedias, books, leaflets, newsletters, newspapers and so on.

The journalists should be well-informed while taking the interview so that they can cope with the topic and the personality of the interviewee. The interlocutors, especially when they are certain personalities, no matter the field, must realize that the reporter is not an amateur and the person asking them obviously knows very much about their activity and achievements.

Although the interviewer could be able to use specialized terms and pretentious ways of speaking while discussing with a scientist, academic, artist etc., they must be always aware of the fact that they are the representatives (middlemen) of the wide public and the interview is not a conversation between two experts. Thus they should always try to translate the messages for everyone and resist the temptation to show off their knowledge and competences. The journalists should not attempt to prove that they are the specialists of that particular tackled field, no matter how well prepared they are, the interviewee is to be considered the specialist, although the reporter is in charge of the interview.

The research is one of the most important phases of the preparation of an interview, an indispensable one undoubtedly. The result of a good research is a preliminary list of pertinent questions. But these initial questions should be regarded only as a starting point for an interview. Some of the answers received while doing the interview itself might change completely the questioning plan of the journalist. Thus we can identify two techniques of interviewing:

- following strictly the previously drawn up list of answers, a technique advisable for the interviews which are constructed only for getting certain information;
- the so-called "logical interlinks technique" consisting of launching some very well

prepared questions at the beginning of the interview and adding later on some spontaneous questions, in accordance to the answers received.

Regardless the technique we use, the first question is the most important. It is the question which will set the course of the entire interview, a "make or break" question. The first step of an interview can either open the way for a successful journalistic act or lead to a resonant failure. So it is fundamental to have a very good question prepared for the start of the interview, preferably a precise and challenging one, a question which matches the concerns and the temperament of your interlocutor. Although the start is essential, a good first question is obviously not enough for realizing a good interview. There is still a long way to go.

We must always remember that clarity is one of the most important features of a good interview and the exhibition of the (linguistic) competences of the reporter can only ruin the main reason of taking the interview after all: to accurately inform the public. In conclusion, a proper research is instrumental for making a good interview. But sometimes you cannot have the time you need to make a fair preparation, so you have to use your interlocutor as a research source.

Before starting the job, you must decide what type of interview you are about to do, according primarily to the purpose. The British experts summarized the many different types of interviews and came up with only three types:

- Informational interviews;
- Interpretive interviews;
- Emotional interviews.

The informational interviews aim to reveal facts and/or opinions. They usually are constructed by making use of open questions (starting with the words "who", "what", "where", "why", "when" and "how"). The subject of the interpretive interview needs

to interpret some facts which are already known. The emotional interview covers all shades and colours of human emotional experiences (happiness, grief, anger, disgust, relief, etc.).

The interviews have also been classified by the journalism (communication) theoreticians into five categories, according to their structure:

- The cone type interview;
- The inverted cone type interview;
- The tunnel type interview;
- The interview with a hidden order;
- The interview with a free form.

Although the best interviews are those which combine some of the types above, the journalists must take an anticipatory decision before making their approach. It is all about strategy: for reaching their goals, the journalists must outline the tactics which can lead to the desired outcome. The cone type interview starts from general to particular; the inverted cone interview starts *ex abrupto*, from the particular topic to the more general ones; the tunnel type interview consists of questions regarding the same topic (event); the interview with a hidden order consists of easy and difficult questions, in a random order; finally, the interview with a free form requires only open answers and it is used mainly in the interpretive and emotional interviews.

The French journalistic school identifies five types of interview:

- the statement interview;
- the confession interview;
- the opinion interview;
- the analyze interview;
- the portrait interview. (Yvan Charon, 1991).

The American journalistic school adds the following types of interview:

- the explanatory interview;
- the justificatory interview;
- the directive interview;
- the hypothetical interview;
- the alternative interview;

- the coordinative interview. (C.D. MacDougall, 1982)

Sometimes you are not the one to decide which type of interview you are about to do, the specificity of the event is the one which requires a certain way of approach. If there is an interview with the mother of a missing child, there will definitely be an emotional interview, if you are interviewing a financial expert about the consequences on the market of a governmental decision, the interview will be interpretive and when you interview a member of the Parliament about the vote for a law, there will definitely be an informational interview.

The question “What do we choose first: the topic or the interlocutor?” has only one answer: definitely the topic. Someone, a politician for example, can be a very good orator, he might always find something interesting to say, but in case the events do not require their statement or opinion, the interview will be of little or no interest at all for the public. That leads to the next question: “How do we choose a certain interlocutor at a certain moment?”. The persons interviewed must be, first of all, connected to the event or the theme, then they must be personalities in a field of activity or they should have achieved something important. Sometimes the persons who only know personalities or who witness a certain important event can become the subject of an interview.

The question is the groundwork or the key of an interview. The quality of the question determines the quality of the answer. While you can definitely get a poor answer to a good question, a bad question can never determine a good answer. The quality of a question is caused by the constant and accurate relation of the reporter to their interlocutor and public. The interviewer tries to always get the explicit information from the interlocutor, the exact information required by the targeted public.

There are different types of questions. According to the answer they get, the questions can be:

- A. - heuristic;
- rhetoric.
- B. - open;
- closed.

The heuristic question leads to finding out new information and truths from the interviewee, while the rhetoric one requires no answer at all, as it is already contained by the question itself. It is more or less the same situation with the open or closed questions: the open ones force the interlocutor to detail, while the closed ones are to be usually answered to with "Yes" or "No". Obviously, the recommendable questions for a proper interview are the heuristic and the open ones, as the reporter is, above all, the representative of a curious public who wants to find out more and more details about a certain topic.

It is not advisable for the interviewers to conclude before getting an answer, so they should ask almost always the questions that permit the interlocutor to argue comprehensibly and give as much information as possible. We say "almost" because, in certain situations, a rhetoric question may be compulsory as the interviewee keeps on avoiding the required answers or, rarely, when the reporter intends to achieve an assured stylistic effect.

Apart from this dichotomy heuristic-rhetoric and open-closed, the questions can also be grouped into four categories, according to their goals:

- the current questions which require direct, explicit answers;
- the opinion questions which give the opportunity for the interviewee to express an opinion, an appreciation, a reaction;
- the motivation questions which emphasize the motivations behind the opinions expressed by the interlocutor;

- the statement questions which are usually addressed to the spokesmen of the organizations, institutions, communities and so on.

Jacques Larue Langlois considers that, according to the target set by the journalist, there are no less than eight types of interview:

- the information interview;
- the description interview;
- the analyze interview;
- the commentary interview;
- the opinion interview;
- the interview with a personality;
- the promotion interview;
- the interview on a major issue.


Which are the best questions to be asked? While researching for an interview, the only stupid question is the one you don't ask, according to a well-known apothegm. It's a different story when you actually do an interview. In this respect, the famous American journalist Abbott Joseph Liebling gave a highly suggestive definition: "A good question is the one which doesn't miss the only moment when it can be asked". In just a few words, Liebling actually emphasizes some of the fundamental qualities of a good interview and a quality interviewer: flexibility and sharpness.

The reporters must always be alert during an interview, they will all the time be attentive to the words of the interlocutor in order to be able to ask the next question accordingly. They should often give up the list of questions previously sketched, following the perspectives drawn by the answers of the interviewees. The interviewers must define (or ask to be defined) the ambiguous or cryptic sentences, terms or ideas and they should avoid metaphoric or complicated formulations. The reporters have to always be inquisitive: they should keep on asking until receiving the desired answer, they must demand examples and comparisons and try to force the inter-

locutor to tell the truth (in case of an obvious reluctance of the interviewee).

The question in a good interview must be *explicit* and *specific*, showing that the interviewer is well prepared for the job, properly informed about the topic of the interview. The question should be the consequence of the same curiosity as the one of the public the reporter represents (“This is exactly what I would have asked” must say the reader/listener) and it must be, nonetheless, *well-timed*.

While having good questions, there are also bad questions you can ask. The avoidable questions are those that show a lack of preparation from the reporter and those which lead nowhere. Thus, the general, vague questions must be elided, as well as hypothetical ones. There are also not recommended the long questions. You must avoid as well the sentences which consist of more than one question and the questions which need to be rephrased or even explained by the interviewer.



Anca Parmena Olimid, Irina Olivia Popescu, *Politics and religion in EU and USA: legal commentaries and social controversies*, Craiova, Aius Publishing House, 2010, 307 pages

Religion and politics have often been described as the two topics that should not be in the same company. *Politics and religion in EU and USA: legal commentaries and social controversies* offers a groundbreaking, cross and inter-disciplinary approach of the incitements and threats against the religious pluralism in the last twenty years.

In this readable synthetic volume, Parmena Olimid and Irina Popescu provide a reasonably of the history of religion in the European and American politics including the 2008 presidential elections. Twenty one essays follow the legal commentaries and political controversies of the modern and contemporary period. Addressing a fairly salient topic, this book examines a broader context of scientific analysis avoiding the political, historical, legal, cultural, social and not least, religious determinism focused on the 1989 and 2001 years: the fall of the

Berlin Wall and the terrorist attacks of September 2001 in New York..

The key questions on which the book focuses are: Who, how, and where do political actors seek to influence religious principles and practices in EU and USA? In this situation, the early essays converge toward the acceptance of the following components: religious liberty and national identity, political conditions of church in early modern Europe, the papal government and the catholic modern teaching, Europe and inter-religious dialogue, reform of Islam, freedom of conscience and religion in Eastern Europe.

The basic theme of the majority of the book is that the religious and political transformations in Europe and United States designed a new conceptual schema of understanding accompanying the image deficit of the central institutions which therefore become the central element of the analysis of governmental stability.

The middle essays tend to summarize the academic interest for the contemporary political and legal controversies in European Union. The contributors explore numerous modes through which the promotion of democracy pictures a multifunctional approach: the multilevel governance, the establishment of the supremacy of European law, the dynamics of the European legal system, the legislative and mutual recognition of qualifications, political cleavages in Eastern Europe, the theoretical overview of post-communist party system, the indicators of government stability.

On the one hand, the authors follow the detailed exposition of the theoretical and practical elements of the major events or more specifically how it is conceptualized the relationship between citizen involvement and the political behavior.

The vast majority of the book focuses on the transformations of the East-European institutional system before and after 1990.

This work includes the political activities of the central institutions of the former communist countries. In addition, the book explores the analysis of the indicators of governmental instability. Several essays also examine the meanings of the crisis of political legitimacy and the context of transition created by the collapse of the communist regime.

The last chapter *US Democracy Promotion: Leadership and Institutions* is the most interesting element of the book. No other recent book on religion and politics includes anything like the particular complexity of the last ten years in which the internal and external factors and arguments are combined in order to offer the East-West reconciliation.

At a time when world politics is focused on the religious factor, the book represents a must-read for students, academics, and politicians. Providing a survey of what is happening in relation between religion and politics, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of politics, international relations, religion, European and American studies. The book is also an excellent opportunity for the undergraduate graduate: *State, society and religion* introducing students to the complexities of the religious and political phenomenon in two free democracies.

Overall, *Politics and religion in EU and USA: legal commentaries and social controversies* represents the hopeful beginning of insightful scholarship on the relationship between religion and politics.

Aurel Pițurcă



Patricia González Aldea, *Helsinki 1975. Începutul sfârșitului*, Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishing, 358 pages

Helsinki 1975. *Începutul sfârșitului* is one of the first comprehensive researches of the Romanian history in the 20th century. Situating the rise and the fall of Romanian communism within the international changing environment of the last century, the book is one of the few volumes in Romanian recent history and politics written by a Spanish researcher.

Using key concepts, such as liberty, cults, human rights, elections, information, the author focuses her attention on the analysis of decisions and policies adopted by the Romanian communist regime perceived to be a part of the “the independents” in the years 1970. Patricia González Aldea, a leading researcher in Romanian recent politics and history, delivers an insightful book that argues that the proper understanding of the current political evolution – from exclusion to integration – requires a regional analysis. In her own words “giving the peculiar present context, I realized that only the past can explain the present” (p. 10).

This original work is read with a passionate exploration making it more than a simple study about the communist period. It traces the origins and the evolution of the main events in Romanian communist history and the role of the communist leader in the context of the “Soviet ideology”. Based extensively on the consequences of the Helsinki Conference (1975), the book focuses on documents inaccessible for Romanians under the communist regime and consulted since the fall of the Berlin Wall by only a handful of scholars and researchers.

The book is divided into two parts. The first discusses the major significant moments in the final six decades of the Romanian dramatic history including: the Helsinki Conference, the Romanian participation, the evolution of the communist block in the years 1970, the international relations and the peculiar contribution of Pope John Paul II, the role of the civil society, the religious liberty and the regime of cults before 1989. The author also examines the two main processes in world politics during the Ceausescu’s rule: the European community integration and the European security.

The book provides a case-study in Ceausescu’s totalitarian methods and tactics. The book of the Spanish researcher, Patricia González Aldea, does more than analytically present the Romanian communist regime. It detects, evaluates and promotes the peculiar Romanian ethos: the bases of the religious “communist deconstruction”, the legal situation of the main cults, the social and constitutional evolution since 1965, the media dimensions and political expressions.

The second section of the book analyzes the Romanian post-communist history through the new challenging political and economical context. The author’s review of the communist regime raises several significant issues. The most important, perhaps, is whether an analysis of the Romanian tragic

history will inspire an improvement of the national dialogue since 1989 leading to a better understanding of the past and future politics.

The orientation of this second part towards a broader context of scientific analysis allows the possibility of the avoidance of historical, political, cultural and legal determinism on the years 1975 and 1989. As to the structural and functional dimension of the Romanian politics since 1989, most of the second part of the book converges towards the acceptance of the following practical and theoretical elements: the Romanian Revolution, the religious conscience, the religious institutions, the legislative variables.

The present volume recognizes the importance of legislative apparatus which becomes an indispensable instrument of the dynamics of the new political involvement.

A notable point of this book is the structural analysis of the press and the liberty of information. In this perspective, a special place is devoted to the analysis of the “new era of disinformation”. The author notices, when referring to similarity, the continuity of many practices and methods in the internal political arena. Although there is a great deal of diversity in the new constitutional system, the author found a number of similarities – for example, radio and television faced with two basically options: frontal confrontation or political compromise.

Emphasizing the concepts of compatibility and incompatibility, Patricia González Aldea’s study, intends to be a pertinent analysis of the Romanian political behavior before and after 1989.

Anca Parmena Olimid



Dr. Michael Radu

We are saddened to announce that Dr. MICHAEL RADU, frequent contributor and member of the *International Advisory Board* of our Review, has passed away on March 25, 2009. It is a great loss for the entire Western academic community.

Dr. Radu was born in Romania on April 29, 1947. He studied at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (1965-1975) and he emigrated to the USA in 1976. In 1981, he received his Ph.d. in international relations from Columbia University. He worked at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia) since 1981 and in 2002 he became co-chairman of the FPRI's Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Homeland Security.

He was author, co-author or editor of 15 books and he frequently contributed to several American and Romanian periodicals (*Review of International Law and Politics, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Newsweek, Romania Libera, Cotidianul, Revista de Stiinte Politice/Revue des Sciences Politiques*).

May God rest him in peace!

Books by Michael Radu

- *Europe's Ghost. Tolerance, Jihadism, and the Crisis of the West* Encounter Books, New York, 2009.
- *Islam in Europe*, Mason Crest Books, Philadelphia, 2009.
- *The War on Terrorism. A collection of FPRI essays, 2001–2007*, editor (with Stephen Gale and Harvey Sicherman), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2008.
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- *Collapse or decay? Cuba and the East European transitions from communism*, Endowment for Cuban American Studies, Miami, 1997
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- *Africa in the Post-decolonization Era*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1984, co-editor (with Richard Bissell).
- *Eastern Europe and the Third World*, Praeger, New York, 1981. Editor and principal contributor.

(From <http://www.fpri.org/about/people/radu.html>)

